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A B S T R A C T 
Over the past twenty years a growth in sub-standard shipping has been observed. The thesis 
identifies the causes of this growth. It then identifies Port State Control (PSC) as a measure 
evolved by some states, with the purpose of removing sub-standard shipping from their 
waters, and thereby improving maritime safely and the protection of the environment. The 
purpose of this programme of research is to assess the effectiveness of PSC in achieving its 
purpose. 
An eclectic research methodology has been adopted which first considers, in depth, the 
global and regional context in which PSC functions. Taking the Port of Hong Kong as an 
example, the study then reviews how PSC operates in practice. Shipping casualty data is 
examined to test the merits of targeting ships for PSC inspection. Finally the expert opinion 
of both official and wider marine communities in Hong Kong is sampled in order to form an 
overall view on the effectiveness of PSC. 
The research reveals considerable agrcemenl between all parlies that PSC, in general is 
achieving its purpose. It also recognizes that PSC should only be a "second line of defence" 
in combating sub-slandard shipping. The first line remains Flag State enforcement of 
standards, accompanied by wider development of a safety culture in the shipping industry. 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1 Development of Shipping 
The shipping industry has always been international in its nature. The world merchant 
fleet transports more than 90 per cent of global trade and modem society has an increasing 
reliance upon the commodities - particularly hazardous and dangerous cargoes that are 
carried by ships. The demand for ships is derived from the need to move large quantities 
of goods (and people) from one part of the world to another, in the cheapest and most 
reliable way possible. The demand for sea transport would be affected by the level of 
world economic activity and this in turn, would be expected to have a significant impact 
on the supply of ships and hence, the size of the world merchant fleet [ I -1 ] . It is essential 
that safety in this industry is given the priority it deserves and that international shipping is 
governed by effective regulatory mechanisms, mechanisms that are, in turn, properly 
monitored and enforced to ensure full compliance with agreed standards. 
The reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan after World War I I gained momentum by 
the mid 1960s. Whatever domestic sources of raw materials existed were simply 
inadequate to ftiel desired levels of economic activity, and large quantities of steel-making 
ores, coking coal and crude oil had to be imported from foreign sources [1-2]. 
The effects of these developments on the world merchant fleet were two-fold. The first 
was a rapid increase in the supply of ships to meet the additional demand for sea transport. 
The second was a marked change in the size distribution of ships within the fleet, as 
economies of scale were being explored to the fullest, especially by Japanese, Greek and 
Norwegian shipowners who sought a competitive edge in the market. 
1.2 Commercial Pressures - The World Economic Situation And The Ageing Fleet 
World economic conditions in combination with an excess of tonnage (contributed to at 
least in part by the operation of sub-standard vessels), have reduced freight rates to levels 
where, in some trades, returns barely meet a vessel's expenses. This is particularly the 
case when items of depreciation and maintenance of the capital asset are included in the 
equation. The position was summarized thus in the report of the Australian Inquiry into 
Ship Safety: 
In response to commercial pressures sub-standard ship owners / managers are 
accepting lower freight rates, leaving responsible ship owner / managers who are 
unable to operate at the lower freight rates with a declining market share. This is 
particularly evident in the bulk trades. The acceptance by charterers of low freight 
rates available through the operation of sub-standard shipping exacerbates this 
situation [I-3J. 
In its turn some of the World's trade has come to rely on cheap sea transport. The 
following example illustrates the World's dependence on cheap shipping: 
Wastepaper is collected in Germany: because of various environment laws, it is 
not profitable to recycle it here in Germany, so it is shipped in containers to 
Canada where it is pulped. It is then shipped to Indonesia to make new paper 
which is then shipped to Taiwan for printing. The finished product is then 
returned to Germany for final consumption. This is an extreme example; but 
without a cheap and effective transport system many industries would not have 
survived. [1-4]. 
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Low financial returns mean that new buildings are in many cases difficult to justify. This 
has led in recent years to an increasing number of vessels remaining in operation in 
circumstances where they might otherwise have been scrapped and replaced with newer 
tonnage. 
The average age of the world fleet was 17 years in 1998 and was increasing at the rate of 
nine months per year. 
Three quarters of the world's tankers are over 15 years old, the age that IMO 
estimates to be about the safe working life of a ship, depending upon her initial 
scantlings and the quality of her maintenance and management [1-5], 
This is not to say that old ships are necessarily unsafe. An old but well maintained and 
crewed vessel will be safer than one which is newer but has not had the advantage of 
maintenance and a well trained crew. The fact is that older vessels tend not to be properly 
crewed or maintained. That older ships are lost more often than newer vessels is clearly 
reflected, in the casualty statistics [1-6]. 
Low financial returns also mean that owners look to cut costs. Safety is not without 
financial cost and is thus too often one of the first casualties. 
1.3 Insurance 
The marine insurance industry is fiercely competitive. Towards the end of the 1980s, and 
in the early years of the 1990s, significant losses were incurred. Premiums did not reflect 
the risks involved as fierce premium cost cutting battles raged amongst the marine 
insurance industry for the purpose of maintaining customers in business. Whilst the case 
with which insurance could be obtained was perhaps not in itself a primary cause of 
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sub-standard vessels, it can certainly be argued that it is a contributory factor and a factor 
due in part to competitive commercial pressures. There have undoubtedly been some 
improvements in more recent years. More detailed attention is being paid to risk analysis 
and the Joint Hull Committee, representing Lloyds underwriters and the non-Lloyds 
commercial underwriters has introduced the classification clause and structural condition 
warranty. Under these conditions, vessels can be subjected to survey by the salvage 
association, on behalf of the underwriter, as a condition of insurance being granted or 
maintained. The danger remains however, that as the market improves standards wil l 
again begin to fall and underwriters will become less concerned with the standard of 
vessels taken on their books. 
Whilst not in itself a cause of sub-standard ships the lack of a compulsory requirement for 
all vessels to hold adequate insurance in respect of at least third party liabilities is a 
symptom of sub-standard operations. Vessels carrying in excess of 2,000 tonnes of 
persistent oil in bulk, must carry appropriate cover under the 1976 Civil Liability 
Convention. Similar requirements are imposed by the laws of various individual countries. 
Unfortunately not all countries in the maritime world make mandatory the requirement for 
the ship owner to hold adequate insurance in respect of third party liabilities. These 
situations amplify the scale of damages to the victims in the case of marine accident, in 
particular with the sub-standard ship operators whose capital investment in these vessels 
is already at minimal. In case of a major disaster let alone the damages that had created 
due to the accidental nature, there would be a heavy loss in a sense of financial 
consequences when no adequate insurance was covered in respect of third party liabilities. 
However, i f sub-standard operators were insured then at least the victims o f damage from 
such vessels would stand a better chance of receiving compensation. In this regard it may 
be right to say that failure to hold evidence of valid insurance could be made a ground for 
detention by Port State inspectors, yet none of the Memorandum of Understandings 
(MOUs) has reached the stage of taking marine insurance into their consideration. 
1.4 Problems with Classification Society 
In the past classification societies were largely associated with the vessels registered in the 
Flag State in which each society was situated. The rise of the open register has changed 
this and societies must now compete for business. In addition to classing ships, the 
classification societies are also, in certain cases, appointed by Flag States to carry out 
regulatory surveys and inspections. There is thus significant scope for commercial 
pressures and conflicts o f interest to impinge on the operation of the societies. The 
Australian Inquiry into Ship Safety considered that: 
There seems little doubt that the quality of classification society inspections 
declined as societies sought to maintain their client base. It is abundantly clear 
to the Committee that while classification societies remain subject to 
unregidated commercial competition there is the possibility of inspections not 
being carried out properly. Put bluntly, ample evidence was put to the 
Committee that the quality of inspections had gone down as the intensity of 
competition for clients has gone up [1-7]. 
Whilst steps have been taken within International Association of Classification Societies 
(lACS) to improve co-operation between the societies (including liaison in respect of 
owners seeking to transfer between societies or class hopping) and the quality of their 
organizations, it appears that there is still some way to go before classification societies 
could pose heavier weight on maintenance of standard rather than competition of 
commercial interest [1-8]. 
1.5 The Evolution of Open Registry 
One of the principal means by which owners may seek to cut costs is to register their 
vessels under the flag of an open register or flag of convenience country. 
Much is made of the fact that in excess of 50% of the world's tonnage is registered under 
flags of convenience. It is also a fact that vessels registered under certain of such flags 
appear in the casualties statistics and in the defect reports of Port States on a much more 
regular basis than those registered under the flags of the traditional maritime States [1-9]. 
That is not to say however, either that all ships registered under flags of convenience are 
sub-standard or that all vessels registered under traditional maritime flags are beyond 
reproach. Some flags of convenience operate with accident rates that are less than those 
achieved by certain of the established national flags. 
There are some professional, competent and efficient operators who choose to operate 
under flags of convenience for legitimate reasons, or at least for reasons which do not 
involve a desire to cut down on the safety and efficiency of their ships and crews. There 
are a number of reasons, not related to cost savings or reduced adherence to safety 
regulations, why operators may choose to register under a flag of convenience. In the case 
of certain eastern European States for example, registration under a flag o f convenience 
brings with it the opportunity to grant a mortgage over the vessel in a form acceptable to 
western banks, thereby giving access to sources of finance which might otherwise be 
unavailable. Vessel under South African control during the period of that country's 
isolation ft-om worid affairs were registers restricted under flags of convenience with a 
view to hiding their ultimate beneficial ownership. 
What then is a flag of convenience and why do such flags tend to attract sub-standard 
ships and crews? Generally speaking there are two types of ship register: open registers 
and closed registers. Registration under the flag of an open register is available to any 
shipowner, regardless of nationality, who applies for registration and satisfies the 
necessary conditions. In contrast, closed registers restricted registration to the nationals of 
a country [I-10]. 
At one end of the spectrum are the national registers that treat the shipping company in the 
same way as any other business in that country. Countries such as France, Japan and the 
United States operate national registers and use their vessels principally for their own 
domestic needs. These vessels are closely controlled as to safety and environmental 
standards, and are generally owned and crewed by citizens of the same country. 
In the centre of the spectrum are the cross-trading nations such as the United Kingdom, 
Norway, and Greece that use their ships primarily to carry cargoes among countries other 
than their own. Vessels registered under these flags are also usually regulated and often 
owned, managed and crewed by citizens of the Flag State. 
The international open registries are located at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
national registries and are operated primarily by developing countries such as, 
traditionally, Honduras, Panama and Liberia, and more recently, for example, Vanuatu 
and Mauritius. Insofar as their import and export requirements are concerned, these 
countries have virtually no need for most of the shipping registered under their flags. 
They have been set up with the specific aim of offering foreign shipowners internationally 
competitive terms, as a means of earning revenue for the Flag States. 
One might also make reference to a fourth category, namely international or second 
registers. These are secondary registers operated by some of the traditional maritime 
States, the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) being a prime example. Under 
these arrangements, traditional countries have attempted to make available to their own 
nationals certain of the financial benefits of the open registry whilst at the same time to 
maintain existing safety and pollution prevention standards. 
In 1974 the ITF defined flag of convenience in the fallowing terms: Where beneficial 
ownership and control of a vessel is found to lie else where than in the country of the 
flag the vessel is flying, the vessel is sailing under a flag of convenience 
Whilst not everyone necessarily agrees with the International Transport Federation (ITF) 
definition of flags of convenience, the following features are now generally accepted as 
indicative of as flag of convenience or open register: 
. I Non citizens may own and /or control vessels. 
.2 Access to registry is easy. A vessel may be registered at a consulate office. (In 
certain cases, Liberia being the prime example, the operation of the registry is 
not even located in the Flag State but in another commercial center). 
.3 Taxes on income fi-om the ships are low or non-existent. Revenue is obtained 
by the levy of a registry fee and annual tonnage charge. Relatively speaking 
these costs are nominal. 
.4 The state registry is a small, often third world, power with no requirement for all 
of the tonnage registered under its flag in terms of transporting its own exports 
and imports. However receipts from the relatively small annual charges levied 
against ships registered under that flag produce a substantial effect on the Flag 
State's national income. 
.5 There is no restriction on the crew of vessels. Crewing by non-nationals is 
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freely permitted. 
.6 The Flag State has neither the administrative machinery, competence, nor the 
power to effectively impose any government or international regulations. 
.7 The Flag State does not have the will or ability to control the corporate bodies 
which are invariably the owners of vessels registered under the flag. 
1.6 The Reward of Sub-standard Operation 
The competitive advantages to be obtained by using some registers, through 
non-observance of the applicable intemational rules and standards, are considered in the 
following occasions. 
One of the examples used in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) report to illustrate the savings which may be achieved by operating 
a vessel at a sub-standard level relates to the costs of operating a late 1970s built 30,000 
deadweight (dwt) bulk carrier operating within the handy-size time charter market in late 
1994. 
Assume that the ceiling, (which may be defined as the level of maximum 
expenditure, influenced by the financial revenue earning potential of the vessel in 
the freight market and financial costs of the owner) at which a vessel might be 
operated, is set at US$7,500 per day. Operation of the vessel at a level of good 
practice, (defined as being a high level of expenditure adopted by a minority of 
shipowners), would then give a cost in the region of US$4,500per day [!-l2]. 
Dropping to the level of "common practice", defined as the average level o f expenditure 
adopted by a majority of shipowners, the costs fall to US$3,750 per day. Falling further to 
"standard practice", defined as a minimum level of expenditure to ensure owners' 
compliance with basic safety standards, the cost falls to US$3,250 per day. At the "base 
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floor", being defined as the minimum level necessary to keep the vessel operation, it will 
be US$2,750 per day. 
It will be seen that the difference between the "floor" and the "ceiling" amount to some 
US$4,750 per day. The difference between the industry average "common practice", and 
the "floor" stands at US$1,000 per day whilst the margin between the level of "standard 
practice" required to comply with minimum safety standards and the lowest level of 
sub-standard operation can be seen to equate to some US$500 per day or nearly 
US$ 182,500 per year. A reduction of 13% in the annual running costs for this vessel type 
is apparent when the common "practice" and "floor" levels are compared. 
A similar exercise carried out in relation to the operation of a 1990* s 40,000 dwt products 
tanker revealed saving of 15% per annum or US$237,250 per year as between operation at 
the "common practice" level and the "floor". It will thus be seen that the rewards for the 
operation of sub-standard vessels are not inconsiderable. The scope for obtaining such 
rewards is significantly wider under flags of convenience which in many cases permit 
operation at the lowest levels [1-13]. 
1.7 The Growing Importance of Port State Control 
In accordance with international law each state has the sovereign right and responsibility 
to exercise control over foreign flag ships within its territorial jurisdiction. In addition to 
territorial jurisdiction, a number of international maritime conventions adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) provide for countries to conduct inspections of foreign ships visiting their ports. 
The object of these conventions is to improve maritime safety, protect property, life and 
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the marine environment and to promote and ensure compliance with acceptable on board 
living and working conditions. The responsibility for ship safety and pollution prevention 
lies primarily with the Flag States, the ship's owner and operator and its crew [1-14]. 
However, many Flag States are either unable or unwilling to maintain full and continuous 
control of their ships and increasing responsibility is placed on the Port State. 
Long term viable solutions to problems associated with sub-standard and un-seaworthy 
vessels can only be achieved through international action by individuals, organizations 
and governments, taking responsibility for ship safety. The answer lies in all owners or 
operators and Flag States implementing convention requirements to acceptable levels 
[1-15]. I f such effective action is implemented there should be no place on the 
international shipping scene for the ship owner who seeks to operate ships that do not 
comply with the relevant international conventions. 
Port State Control is a method of checking the successful enforcement of the provisions of 
various international conventions covering safety, working conditions and pollution 
prevention on merchant ships. It is the process by which a nation exercises authority over 
foreign ships when those ships are in waters subject to its jurisdiction. The right to do this 
is derived from both domestic and international law. 
A nation may enact its own laws, imposing requirements on foreign ships trading in its 
waters, and nations which are party to certain international conventions are empowered to 
verify that ships of other nations operating in their waters comply with the obligations set 
out in those conventions. Under international law the ship owner has prime responsibility 
for ensuring compliance with international conventions. The Flag State involved should 
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carry out safety inspections to their ships on a continuous basis when they are away from 
their registered ports, either by the Flag State surveyors or delegated classification society. 
However in the case that the Flag State fails to regulate such measures, Port State Control 
provides a back up for monitoring the implementation of international shipping 
regulations. Under the Port State Control system ships failing to comply with the 
international conventions could be detained by the Port State authority. 
The stated purpose of Port State Control in its various forms is to identify and eliminate 
ships which do not comply with internationally accepted standards as well as the domestic 
regulations of the state concerned. When ships are not in substantial compliance, the 
relevant agency of the inspection of the Port State may impose controls to ensure that they 
are brought into compliance. It is the ship owner who is ultimately responsible for all 
compliance with international and national obligations but it is incumbent upon any state 
which allows the registration of ships under its flag effectively to exercise jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters. A Flag State is required to take 
such measures as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard to construction, 
maintenance and seaworthiness, manning, labour conditions, crew, training and 
prevention of collisions of ships flying its flag. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port State Control is a regional 
administrative agreement signed by the regional maritime authorities. In the 
memorandum of understanding the participating maritime authorities agree to establish in 
their ports a harmonized system of Port State Control with the aim of eliminating the 
operation of sub-standard ships. 
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The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control entered into effect on 1 
July 1982. Its present membership consisted of 19 members. The co-operating countries 
were Japan and United States. 
In November 1992, an agreement for co-operation on Port State Control was signed by 10 
maritime authorities in Latin American region, subject to their acceptance of the 
agreement. Under the agreement each country will inspect 15% of foreign merchant ships 
visiting their ports to ensure that they comply with major IMO/ILO instruments. 
On 29 November - 2 December 1993, the Tokyo MOU in Asia Pacific Region was 
concluded and signed at the Tokyo meeting on 2 December 1993. The Tokyo MOU was 
signed by 18 maritime authorities in the Asia-Pacific region. 
On 23"* November 1995, Intemational Maritime Organization (IMO) of the United Nation 
adopted a resolution providing procedures for the uniform exercise of Port State Control 
and regional agreements have been adopted by individual countries within Europe (Paris 
Memorandum), various Asian states (Tokyo Memorandum) and other states in Caribbean, 
South America and countries in the Mediterranean regions. In addition, some countries 
such as United States of America have adopted a unilateral approach to the subject, which 
nevertheless has the same aims [1-16]. 
Shipowners and operators should take measures to reduce the likelihood that their ships 
will be subjected to intervention or detention, bearing in mind that increasingly efficient 
databases will enable the maritime authorities who participate in the growing range of 
intemational agreements, memoranda and conventions to exchange information. Being 
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inspected by one state and given a clean bill of health will not necessarily prevent ftirther 
inspections being made by another maritime authority, and, as information is exchanged 
between various organizations, non-compliant ships will find it increasingly difficult to 
continue operations. 
1.8 Problems Associated With European Port State Control Experience 
The introduction of Port State Control, in North West Europe, was met with some 
prejudice on the part of the maritime industry in general and ship owners in particular. An 
unbalanced "witch hunt" in European ports was feared, causing apprehension on the part 
of many Flag States, especially developing countries, who considered Port State Control 
to be a European protectionism measure [1-17]. This general hesitance in wide maritime 
circles portrays the overall conception climate in which Port State Control under the Paris 
Memorandum had to make a start. 
In October 1999, Cyprus, burdened by a 20% detention rate compared with 7% for 
European Union member states, conveyed its disillusionment with the system to the 
European Commission and was in the process of substantiating what it claims are the 
frequent excesses of inspectors. Cypriot officials were enraged by the detention of the 
general cargo ship * Anais' at Antwerp in eariy October 1999 while the ship was in the act 
of changing flag to Cyprus and under Flag State inspection [1-18]. Nine of the 
deficiencies reported by the Belgian inspectorate confirmed the absence of safety 
certificates on board, but these were being examined at the time by the Cypriots for 
registration purposes, thus they could not be found on board. According to the director of 
Cyprus' shipping department. Serghios Serghiou, Port State Control had lapsed from its 
serious purpose. He raised the concem that ships had been detained by the Port State for 
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very minor deficiencies, in many cases for insignificant deficiencies and in many other 
cases for no reason at all. 
This fact, however, generated a renewed concern on the part of some sectors of the 
shipping industry, particulariy ship owners and some Flag States that this form of Port 
State Control would lead to unacceptable interference with normal shipboard 
operations[l-19]. However many Flag States continue to ignore the maintenance of a 
proper control of ships on their respective registers. This applies in particular to the 
shipping in developing world countries, where low profit margins and heavy competition 
are likely to be expected, often resulting in sub-standard ships and poor crew standard. 
This situation amplifies the role of the Port State Control in ensuring that ships continue to 
comply with acceptable standards of maritime safety, pollution prevention and on board 
living and working conditions [ I -20]. 
However the long term goal of the Port State Control is to minimise the operation of the 
sub-standard vessel by re-allocating the role in maintaining a good standard ship to the 
Flag State and the ship owner manager on an self initiative base rather than as a preventive 
measure [1-21]. Recognising that a Port State could not eliminate the operation of 
sub-standard ships singled handed, the lesson of past Port State Control experience in 
Europe demonstrates also that no one region can effectively eliminate the operation of 
sub-standard ships. The best possible result one region can achieve is to keep sub-standard 
ships at an arm-length, just outside the region, ready to re-enter the region only when the 
commercial benefits for the ship owner exceed the costs of compliance with the 
international convention in the case his ships being detained by the Port State authorities. 
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1.9 Port State Control - the Practice 
Post 1960 developments in shipping have been characterized by a rapid increase in the 
number and size of ships, as shipowners sought to match a seemingly insatiable demand 
for seaborne transport with tonnage supply. A significant highlight of this era, has been 
the phenomenal growth in the tanker and dry bulk fleets, as attempts were made to secure 
operational advantages from greater economies of scale. This has held a number of 
far-reaching implications for the maintenance of standards of safety in shipping. The 
probability of collisions, a major cause of marine casualties, occurring became higher, due 
to the increased traffic intensity, resulting from a more than tripled bulk fleet, by the early 
1970s. 
The demand for trained officers and crew sky-rocketed, thus causing a sudden graduation 
of seafarers from small ships to much larger ones, thereby creating a greater focus on the 
human error element which it is estimated to be responsible for over 75% of all marine 
accidents. Tankers which, prior to 1960, averaged under 30,000 deadweight were 
approaching the 500,000 deadweight mark by the mid 1980s and there was now a 
likelihood of wider scale pollution damage to the marine environment, as a result of tanker 
accidents. 
Of ftirther significance was the vulnerability of the bulk fleets, in particular, to changing 
freight market conditions, which manifested itself, during the prolonged periods of 
recession that characterized the post 1970 - 1985 era. Huge tonnage surpluses and the 
resultant depressed freight market resulted in shipowners flagging out their ships to open 
registers in order to survive periods where revenues were inadequate to cover the cost of 
operating. 
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The powers of ship registration granted to states under Article 5 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention [1-22] were conditional upon there being a "genuine link" between the ship 
and the flag of registry. However, the conventions avoidance of a definition of what 
constituted this "genuine link", encouraged a proliferation of open ship registers as 
shipowners sought to gain further competitive advantages over their competitors who had 
also switched to open registers. These registers were set up by most developing countries 
with their aim primarily to generate much needed foreign currency. Thus tonnage moved 
to these registers and there was no corresponding effort directed towards the development 
of the administrative machinery necessary to ensure the maintenance standards on board 
the ships belonging to these registers. 
Despite the ratification of the relevant IMO and ILO conventions by most of these 
registers, many of them lacked the wil l and resources control, particularly with respect to 
their easy ship registration requirement, that are so essential to enforcing the rules 
embodied in these conventions. The quality of Flag State control therefore became 
doubtfijl as much of the power, necessary to ensure that standards of safety are maintained 
on board all ships, was suddenly out of the reach of traditional maritime states. A 
proliferation of classification societies which also resulted in falling standards, coupled by 
depressed freight rates which saw shipowners making ftirther cutbacks in repairs and 
maintenance expenditure, both added to the already deep concern about the adequacy of 
Flag State control. 
The inadequacy of Flag State control manifested itself in a few major marine accidents 
involving ships that were later found to be sub-standard. Particularly, the much publicized, 
and occasionally exaggerated, pollution damage caused to coastal areas of traditional and 
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socially developed maritime states. This resulted in the general public and other 
concerned organizations exerting pressure on their governments to take preventive action. 
Port State Control was therefore a most urgent necessity. 
Given the wide powers of ship Administration and control bestowed on Flag States, under 
the international law, it is evident that the practice of well co-ordinated Port State Control 
can prove to be an effective means available to Port States desirous of exercising some 
degree of control over safety standards on foreign ships calling at their ports. Despite the 
continued operation of sub-standard ships, after almost ten years o f Port State Control 
activities in various part of the worid, there have been a number of important 
developments in shipping that owe their origins to the recognized decline in safety 
standards in shipping, uncovered by Port State Control activities. Examples such as 
serious attempts to improve the standard of class surveys, the pursuit o f uniform ship 
management standards, the International Safety Management Codes which will be put in 
force to all ships and their management companies by 1.7.2002, greater effort at better 
enforcement by the major open registers and the formation of a new sub-committee on 
Flag State implementation. Al l these changes are capable of contributing positively to the 
maintenance of international standards of safety on board ships, thereby reducing 
accidents and hence, the threat of loss of life and pollution damage to the marine 
environment. 
There is no doubt that initiatives such as the contemplation by the Maritime Safety 
Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee within the IMO on the 
establishment of an international ship information database, in order to facilitate the 
interchange of knowledge about vessel quality amongst regulatory authorities. 
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classification societies, insurers, shipowners, operators, charterers and others can enhance 
the effectiveness of Port State Control. However, in the meantime, the spread of Port 
State Control accompanied by extra regional co-operation amongst Port States can in 
itself, improve its own effectiveness, since it would afreet a significant portion of the 
world merchant fleet on most trade routes, in the course of its daily operation. At the same 
time, it reduces Port State reliance on some of the other players such as insurers. 
Classification societies, in the industry who, while keen on putting their own houses in 
order, appear to be less enthusiastic about the idea of sharing information with outsiders. 
Since the standards of safety embodied in the relevant IMO/ILO conventions are 
internationally agreed, they should continue to form the basis for Port State Control in 
order to preserve uniformity which ensures strictness, while removing suspicions of 
protectionism which unilateral legislation often attracts. However, there is still work to be 
done in the area of uniform interpretation and application of convention rules. 
Variations in the practice of Port Slate Control from state to state and region to region, 
which undermine its effectiveness, require a great deal more of thought and attention. The 
short-listing and selecting ships for Port State Control inspections is one such area. 
However, it has been shown that this can be effectively improved without states having to 
resort to "flag targeting" and preferential treatment to ships having on board masters and 
crews of a particular nationality. These can all harm, rather than enhance Port State 
Control, since the manner in which they are proposed is bound to harbour inconsistencies 
that can have far-reaching political implications. 
In both class surveys and Flag State control, the quality of surveyor / inspectors used is 
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probably the most important factor upon which effectiveness hinges. Even though training 
seminars for inspectors are important, harmonisation of surveys, especially on a regional 
basis will be difficult to achieve, as long as activities such as the categorisation of 
deficiencies and detention of ships are left solely to the "professional" judgement of 
surveyors. The latter must be kept to a minimum in order to ensure uniformity, while 
allowing for some flexibility. Memory aids for inspectors, in the form of simple 
check-lists and guide-lines, coupled with region-wide categorisation and identification of 
ship deficiencies that wil l result in automatic detention, are necessary to promote 
consistency amongst inspectors and hence, strictness. 
1.10 Port State Control - The Cost Elements 
The cost element involved in the execution of Port State Control must be addressed. 
Though Port State Control became necessary as a result o f the inadequacy of Flag State 
control, it amounts to "self defence" by practising states and hence they should be 
shouldered whatever costs are incurred. However, i f the opportunity cost of Port State 
Control in some states increases and becomes too great a cost to sustain indefinitely, then 
the practise of such control could be weakened. Such a situation could be further 
exacerbated by any increases in the cost of Port State Control due to situations where such 
control is done, at the expense of Flag State control, in most of the developing countries 
with limited resources but under an obligation to inspect a certain number of ships 
annually due to regional agreements such as Tokyo MOU. 
Therefore, Port States need to devise some transparent and legally enforceable means that 
could bring about a reduction in the cost of Port State Control over time, whilst ensuring 
the continued maintenance of internationally agreed standards of safety on board ships. 
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Taking Hong Kong and the positive effects on sub-standard shipping in Hong Kong 
waters as an example, apart from the heavy financial consequence due to ship's detention, 
the Marine Department levied heavy charges for further follow up inspections imposed on 
safety-deficient ships and sub-standard operators in addition to detention of vessel. This 
is well known by the sub-standard operators. Therefore, by ensuring that transgressors 
pay heavily for their transgressions, the spread and effective practice of Port State Control, 
by itself, is capable of significantly reducing the level of sub-standard shipping, and can 
partly sustain its continued practice and effectiveness, by generating some revenue which, 
though still beyond the target of self budget balancing, could still offset some of its cost in 
the Port State Control-section. 
1.11 Summary 
In the past, the shipping industry has been one of high risk and high profit. In recent years 
a transformation of the world economy and an excess of tonnage, has been accompanied 
by a dramatic increase in competition in every trade. Freight rates have fallen to a very 
low level. To survive, shipping companies and operators have few options but to reduce 
their costs, especially those spent in manning and vessel maintenance, which usually form 
a large portion of the overall operational cost. But adequate expenditure in these areas is 
central to vessel safety and environmental protection. Unqualified seafarers and poor 
maintenance are widely considered to be the most common causes of substandard 
shipping. 
The tough situation in the shipping industry has also spread to other shipping related fields. 
Shipping companies and operators are switching to underwriters who can offer low 
premiums. They are also seeking class societies whose inspections are not so strict, and 
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flying a Flag of Convenience to enjoy the advantage of a register with few minimum 
requirements. That all these parties may have lowered their standards in face of 
competition for clients give rise to cause for concern, not only in relation to lowering 
safety standards, but also to weakening enforcement of international regulations. 
Increasing responsibility for ship safety is being transferred from Flag States to the Port 
States. Port State Control may offer a very effective way to ensure that international 
regulations are frilly complied with. The practice of Port State Control in many regions 
has in fact faced a number of difficulties since its implementation. Some of these issues 
might cause complication when it was escalated to a sense of cost in the operation of Port 
State Control. It is known that the transgressors pay principle has been implemented by 
few participating Port States. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
2.1 Introduction 
Identified, in general terms, has been the growing concern with issues relating to safer 
ships and cleaner seas. Also identified is the initiation of action by European Port States 
against sub-standard shipping. Following the lead of the Paris MOU, maritime nations in 
the SE Asia Pacific area met to develop the Tokyo MOU and introduce PSC to the region. 
The purpose of the study is to see whether PSC is having an effect on ship safety and 
where other measures have failed. 
The fact that the author is serving as a PSC inspector puts him in a strong position to 
attempt to answer the question. In that attempt the first step is to select a simple aim for 
the investigation, and objectives through which that aim may be achieved. 
A preliminary literature review found that although there were a few official reports and 
some individual comments on the PSC subject, no evidence of any formal research into 
the subject could be identified within the region. The author further searched available 
marine sources for similar academic research originating in the Asia Pacific region. None 
was found. That being so it is thought this is an original study into the operation of PSC 
within the Tokyo MOU region, relating specifically to the role of Hong Kong. As the 
study is original it needs to set out the background to PSC, including the forces that 
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brought its introduction. 
To set a contextual background the thesis will examine the operation of Port State Control 
activities in different regions, review current developments, and then attempt to determine 
the effectiveness of Port State Control as a means of improving ship safety with reference 
to world shipping casualty statistics. 
A scenario analysis exploring the background environment of the world shipping industry 
and the commercial pressures that have caused some ship owners to limit spending to the 
well being of their vessels will be made. The problem of sub-standard shipping, and 
human factors such as crew standards and the lack of transparency of the ship owner wil l 
also be reviewed as part of the background to the study. 
The study wil l explore the practice o f Port State Control inspections taking the work of a 
Hong Kong Port State Control officer as an example. Detention, follow up action, 
reporting procedure, and the actual conduct of inspections wil l be studied. 
In an attempt to identify any relationship between PSC and ship safety, statistical analysis 
of world shipping casualty figures and PSC annual records from the Paris and Tokyo 
MOU regions will be made. This analysis will be directed into the causes of shipping 
casualties, a comparison of the various divisions of data such as differences of standard of 
seamen, loss ratio of FOC vessels, ship age and preventative measures against shipping 
casualties and the significance of Port State Control inspections. 
Appraisal wil l be made of the unique environment of the Asia Pacific States, and 
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evaluation of the Port State Control co-operation with respect to that enviromnent and the 
strategic alternatives. 
The expert opinion of both official and wider marine communities in Hong Kong is 
sampled in order to form an overall view on the effectiveness of PSC. The differences of 
opinion between the two sectors on the views of Port State Control would be elaborated 
with a view to find the causes of difference. 
2.2 The Research Process 
Productive research needs to be structured. A simple sequential structure is shown below: 
Research Idea 
Research Statement 
Research Outline 
Decisions about information-gathering techniques 
Participant Observation - Interviews - Questionnaires - Documentary analysis 
Decisions about source of information 
Research Design 
Getting the information 
Recording the data 
Analyzing the data 
Writing the paper 
2.3 Selection of Aim and Objectives 
The study needs also to make an assessment of how effective PSC has been in achieving 
its own aims and objectives. Based on the foregoing factors the chosen aim for this 
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programme of research is: 
To assess the effectiveness of PSC as a means of improving ship safety. 
The objectives through which the aim will be achieved have been outlined in paragraph 
2.1, to which is added sampling opinion amongst the maritime community. 
2.4 Limitations of the Study 
Recognizing the increaingly widespread introduction of PSC the review wil l be general in 
approach. Similarly casualty trends are considered in the international rather than 
regional or local dimension. The study in its consideration of the practical application of 
PSC and determination of its impact will be based on the Hong Kong experience, 
knowledge of which is held by the author. It will thus be aimed mainly at the regional 
rather than intemational nature of PSC. 
2.5 Choices of Approach 
Before commencing the formal research programme a number of approaches to the work 
were considered. These included: 
Research families 
Quantitative or qualitative 
Deskwork or fieldwork 
Research approaches 
Action research 
Ethnographic research 
Experiments 
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Surveys 
Research techniques 
Documents 
Interviews 
Observation 
Questionnaires 
Quantitative research is, as the term suggests, is concerned with the collection and 
analysis of data in numeric form. It tends to emphasize relatively large scale and 
representative sets of data, and is often, falsely in some views, presented or perceived as 
being about the gathering o f facts'. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is concerned 
with collecting and analyzing information in as many forms, chiefly non-numeric, as 
possible. It tends to focus on exploring, in as much detail as possible, smaller numbers of 
instances or examples which are seen as being interesting or illuminating, and aims to 
achieve ' depth* rather than ' breadth'. As the nature of this research involves practical 
experience, interpretation and opinion, rather than the gathering of ' fac ts ' , a qualitative 
research approach will be adopted. 
The distinction between deskwork and field work offers alternative ways of thinking 
about basic research strategies. Fieldwork refers to the process of going out to collect 
research data. Such data may be described as original or empirical, and cannot be 
accessed without the research engaging in some kind of expedition. It might, for example, 
involve visiting field sites and to interview other members of the industry, or by 
administering questionnaires to the industry. 
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Deskwork, on the other hand, comprises those research processes which do not necessitate 
going into the field. It consists, literally, of those things which can be done while sitting at 
a desk. These may include, for example, the Administration, collection and analysis of 
postal surveys, the analysis of data collected by others, certain kinds of experimental work, 
literature searches in the library, and, of course, writing. 
The distinction between fieldwork and deskwork is obviously also not clear-cut. It is 
debatable, for example, into which category one would place telephone interviews, such 
as the author subsequently had during initial interviews before construction of a 
questionnaire. This was work conducted at the desk that effectively took the author into 
the field. A similar case would be the use of postal questionnaires. The development of 
information and communication technologies has undoubtedly allowed a great deal more 
* fieldwork' research to be carried out from the comfort of the office. This might seem to 
be a mixed blessing. 
Action research is an increasingly popular approach in small-scale social science research, 
particular for those working in professional areas. It is well suited to the needs of people 
conducting research in their workplace, and who have a focus on improving aspects of 
their own and their colleagues' practices. It is also an on the spot procedure designed to 
deal with a concrete problem located in an immediate situation. This means that ideally, 
the step by step process is constantly monitored over varying periods of time and by a 
variety of mechanisms so that the ensuing feedback may be translated into modifications, 
adjustments, directional changes, re-definitions, as necessary, so as to bring about lasting 
benefit to the ongoing process itself [2-1]. 
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Brown and Mclntyre, who describe an action research model for curriculum innovation in 
Scottish schools, also draw attention to the principle of deriving hypotheses from practice. 
The research questions arise from an analysis of the problems of the practitioners in the 
situation and the immediate aim then becomes that of understanding those problems. The 
essentially practical, problem-solving nature of action research makes this approach 
attractive to practitioner-researchers who have identified a problem during the course of 
their work and see the merit of investigating it and, i f possible, of improving practice. 
There is nothing new about practitioners operating as researchers, and the ' teacher as 
researcher' model has been extensively discussed [2-2]. 
The ethnographic style of fieldwork research was developed originally by anthropolpgists 
wishing to study in depth some aspect of a society, culture. They developed an approach 
which depended heavily on observation and, in some cases, complete or partial integration 
into the society being studied. This form of participant observation enabled the 
researchers, as far as possible, to share the same experiences as the subjects, to understand 
better why they acted in the way they did and "to see things as those involved see things" 
[2-3]. This approach is no longer limited to anthropological studies and has been used 
effectively in a good many studies of small groups. In ethnographic research, the 
researcher has to be accepted by the individuals or groups being studied, and this can 
mean doing the same job, or living in the same environment and circumstances as the 
subjects for lengthy periods. Time is not the only problem with this approach. 
Clearly the techniques, documentary, interview, observation, questionnaire, can be 
applied to any one of the approaches. The adopted methodology is given in para. 2.7, 
which briefly notes the research techniques the thesis will use. Research interviews can be 
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structured, where the researcher is seeking answers to pre-conceived questions, or 
unstructured, were the topic is defined but the interviewee is not lead. There may be 
problems of time or cost involved with generating a large enough sample o f respondents 
when using interviews; questionnaires properly devised and trialed can widen the 
population. Results from interviews can be validated by questionnaire. 
Documents will form part of any literature search and observation needs a rigorous and 
consistent form of information recording [2-4]. 
2.6 Cost Benefit Analysis 
Cost benefit analysis is a technique used to evaluate i f the benefits of implementing a 
programme justify its costs. The outcome of analysis may determine other options, 
perhaps less costly methods that will achieve the same results. This is purely an economic 
procedure in which dollar values are assigned to various costs and benefits. Then total 
costs are divided into total benefits. I f the resultant is greater than one benefit outweigh 
costs. 
Shipping economists have used cost benefit analysis to evaluate the effect of universal 
commercial shipping efficiency. The costs are primarily the dollar value of ship hiring 
and other maintenance costs to be paid by ship owners. The benefits include the dollar 
value of freight earnings and so on. 
Cost benefit analysis is not as scientific as it appears at first. There is a great deal of 
subjectivity in deciding what will be included as costs and benefits, in particular with the 
PSC activities which involve a great deal of government obligation to maintain a safe port. 
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Nevertheless, it is a useflil tool for evaluating the economic efficiency of a programme and 
determining whether a programme should be started or continued. 
Because there is almost always more than one way, or one programme, to achieve a single 
goal, the second efficiency question is also important: Are there other, less costly methods 
that will achieve the same results? 
Process evaluation is the types of evaluation to see i f the programme was implemented as 
planned and i f it was effective, adequate, and efficient. These criteria determine the 
success of the programme. In addition to knowing whether the programme was successful, 
it is often useful to know why it was or was not successful. That is the purpose of process 
evaluation. 
A process evaluation assesses the components of a programme to identify which ones 
contributed to its success and which did not. It traces the history of the programme and the 
implementation of its various features to give us an understanding of what happened. 
2.7 Adopted Methodology 
Having reviewed a range of research methodologies it is apparent the nature of this study 
tends towards the adoption of an integrated methodology, in which various families, 
approaches and techniques are used. The study would be essentially qualitative and 
would involve both desk and fieldwork, while the techniques involved would include 
document search, interviews, questionnaires and observations. This inevitably leads to an 
eclectic approach in which no method is either exclusive or excluded. 
33 
Reference 
[2-1] Questionnaires, diaries, interviews and case studies 
[2-2] Baume. David "Training materials for research students" 1996 
[2-3] Bartholomew 1971, Research Methodology 
[2-4] Denscombe, Martyn "The good research guide for small scale social research 
projects" 1998 
34 
C H A P T E R T H R E E 
T H E C O N T E X T U A L BACKGROUND - INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
3.1 The Problem with Sub-Standard Shipping 
3.1.1 The Ageing Fleet 
The ageing fleet is reflected in the increasing number of very large crude oil carriers 
(VLCCs) and large bulk carriers sold for scrap. Meanwhile, according to Metaxas (1985) 
the demand for quality shipping is undercut by low freight rates and fierce competition 
exacerbated by: 
. 1 Badly maintained ships as owners cut maintenance, 
.2 Reduced crews who are poorly paid, under-trained, 
.3 Lack of technical competence in management as maintenance/ technical 
management are cut, 
.4 Reduced quality standards, 
.5 The descent through flags/registries, classification societies, insurers, ship 
management companies, charterers; cheap construction, 
3.1.2 Crew Standards 
The cost of crewing a vessel is a significant proportion of the owner's operational 
expenditure. It is also an area to which some owners look in cutting costs, often with a 
consequent reduction in safety. Having few restrictions as to crew and, in some cases, no 
35 
programme of enforcement of required standards of competence, flags o f convenience, 
which the flag requirement does not normally require own nationals to be engaged 
onboard its vessel, provide opportunities for sub-standard operations. 
Safe and efficient crews are a pre-requisite for safe and efficient ships. It is generally 
recognized that a good crew may save a bad ship in times of stress and alternatively that a 
bad crew can destroy a good ship. Clearly the combination of a sub-standard ship and a 
sub-standard crew is a recipe for disaster. There are a number of aspects arising in relation 
to the debate over crew standards. 
3.L3 Human Error 
One point which surfaces in every study of shipping casualties, and which is relevant to 
any discussion on sub-standard ships and crews, is that human error plays a part in a large 
majority of casualties. 
There is wide agreement that about 80% of maritime casualties are caused, or aggravated 
by human error [3-1]. 
A study undertaken by the Institute of Shipping Economics in Bremen, Germany 
examined 330 merchant shipping accidents occurring between 1987 and 1991 and 
concluded that two factors were principally responsible for 75% of the incidents[3-2]: 
. 1 Too heavy a crew workload, particularly when in port, 
.2 Inadequate training 
An analysis undertaken by the UK P&I Club during the same period concluded that 
overall 60% of the 1.444 claims reviewed were the result of human error, including 50% 
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of pollution claims and 90% of collisions[3-3]. 
The British Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution considered that of 182 oil spills in 
United Kingdom waters in 1990, human error was responsible for 66%[3-4]. 
In Australia a Department of Transportation and Communications report produced in 
1992 concluded that 75% of accidents arose as the result of human error[3-5]. 
"There is no more recent evidence to suggest any change in the role of human 
error as a major cause of accidents. " [3-6] 
While it is not possible to eliminate human error, there is clearly room for significant 
reduction. 
3.1.4 Crew Size 
A future aspect of the "human factors" reason behind sub-standard ships and crews relates 
to the issue of crew size. Lack of hands on board ship can mean reduced ability to perform 
essential tasks in an efficient manner and reduced ability to deal with disaster situations. It 
can also result in those holding positions of responsibility suffering serious fatigue, a 
factor mentioned in the Bremen study and one which inevitably leads to accidents. The 
capacity of such persons is further weakened, when, in addition to coping with their own 
increased work load, they are required to carry out the tasks of other personnel whose 
competency and ability to carry out their own duties are questionable or non-existent. 
The trend is towards fewer and fewer crew members on board. This is true not only of flag 
of convenience vessels but generally across the board. During the PSC inspection the 
author observed that vessels previously operating with crews of 42 or more now operate 
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with as few as 17 onboard. The advent of new developments in technology has increased 
the commercial pressure within the shipping industry for the introduction of one man 
bridge operation, where vessels may operate with crews of 6 or 7. 
A number of carefully supervised trials utilizing high technology ships and competent 
crews, have been taken to establish that the concept is safe. However it has also been said 
that with regard to high technology ships: 
"The real life situation will be the fatigue of the watch-keeper, after a briefstay in 
port, or a series of brief stays, alone on the bridge in the middle of the middle 
watch, at times only kept awake by dead man alarms or other ingenious devices 
designed to snap him out of his reverie " [3-7]. 
Whilst such vessels may be safe when they are new and operated in a controlled manner 
by competent crew, one wonders what will be the position in 12 to 15 years when they 
have changed ownership for the third or fourth time and come into the hands of operators 
who are neither prepared nor forced to maintain those initial high standards. 
Apart from issues of fatigue there are other factors to be considered in relation to smaller 
crew. The lonely watch keeper has no one to relate to. His social isolation on watch, and 
in many modem ships, even when he is of f watch, is such that loneliness can lead to severe 
de-motivation. Alertness is likely to suffer. In addition to safety concerns, the social 
desirability of one man bridge operations should be carefully thought o f Are highly alert 
well-trained individuals going to be prepared to work in such an environment, particular i f 
there is little to do other than monitor the technology and keep a look out for external 
dangers [3-8]. 
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3.1.5 Maintenance 
Whilst modem technology may be touted as a basis for reducing crew sizes, it would 
appear that it might have the opposite effect in certain cases. For example, it seems that 
excessive use of high tensile steels in the construction of tankers [3-9] and bulk carriers 
has been a factor in some of the recent losses. The extra strength of high tensile steel when 
compared with the more traditional mild steels has meant that less material is required for 
a given task. The use of less steel has, however, decreased the resistance to corrosion and 
may thus have led to premature ageing of some vessels where proper maintenance has not 
been carried out [3-10]. Smaller crews mean less opportunity for the conduct of routine 
maintenance. Whilst sometimes additional riding crews are placed on board to deal with 
such matters, often they are not. 
3.1.6 Recruitment and Qualifications 
A further factor arising in relation to vessels registered under flags of convenience is the 
fact that owners acquire a greater freedom to recruit masters, officers and crew from any 
country able to supply them, often without regard to compatibility, competence or to the 
training undergone. One a world-wide basis over 60% of ships* officers and 75% of 
ratings now come from developing nations [3-11], 
Many of these countries simply do not have maritime education of a high standard, nor do 
they have effective examination and certification programmes, even though they may be 
signatories to the STCW Convention. One is forced to agree with the following 
comments: 
'We do not wish to suggest that manners of one nationality are necessarily better or 
worse than those of another: that would be as untrue as it would be offensive. But it 
is certainly true that standards of training vary between countries and that there are 
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fundamental problems of communications within mixed crews, not just because of 
language differences but also because of cultural differences " [3-12] 
In a similar vein the Australian Inquiry into Ship Safety concluded that: 
The poor quality of crew training and lack of experience dominated the evidence received 
by the Committee. It became apparent that the crews of many bulk carriers are 
inexperienced and lack any formal training. The increasing use of crew members from 
non-traditional maritime nations on very low wages was put forward as a major reason for 
the decline in crewing standards. This is not to suggest that nationality has anything to do 
with proficiency as a seaman, but rather the level of training available in these countries 
[3-13]. 
It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that vessels will be operated at sea without human 
input. Urgent attention is required to ensure that all engaged in the operation of vessels 
have the level of skill and training sufficient to ensure safe and pollution free operations. 
The burgeoning shortage of qualified and competent seafarers, more particularly officers, 
is the subject of increasing comment within the industry. It has been foreseen for some 
time and arises from the fact that in the 1980*$ many owners, principally for economic 
reasons, halted or cut back their training for seafarers. The industry is now feeling the 
effect of that shortsighted policy. The ITF estimated that the shortage was in the vicinity 
of 18,000 officers world-wide and that the difficulties were compounded by the fact that 
10% of officers trainees dropped out before they qualified [3-14]. Other studies suggested 
that the situation was even worse. A report prepared by the University of Warwick 
Institute for Employment Research in 1990 suggested that 35,000 officers per year were 
required simply to maintain the status quo at the turn of the century [3-15]. 
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Lack of qualified seagoing personnel also has a flow on effect, given that it is traditionally 
from their ranks that staffs are recruited for areas such as port Administration, Port State 
Control inspection and surveying of ships. 
Engaging and retaining within the industry individuals possessing the appropriate calibre 
and motivation requires that a career at sea provides the satisfaction and rewards 
commensurate with the expectations of those whom it is sought to attract. 
Fraudulent certificates of competency are common. Even genuine certificates may be 
suspect where they have been issued by states which do not exhibit the proper control in 
respect of the conduct of examinations and the subsequent issue of certificates [3-16]. 
In some cases training given to both rating and officers, although purporting to comply 
with the requirements of STCW, is insufficient to ensure the safe operation of large 
vessels. Anecdotal evidence of certificates bought and paid for, or examination papers 
purchased prior to sitting abound. It is clearly important that the standard of seagoing 
qualifications should meet an acceptable minimum that is applied on a world-wide basis 
and that the actual documents should issued in a manner which reduces the opportunity for 
fraud. 
3.1.7 Communication 
The English language is nominally (although not officially) the language of the sea. It is 
clear however, that not everyone engaged in shipboard operations has sufficient 
understanding of that language. 
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Mixed nationality crews can result in communication difficulties causing operational 
problems for the vessel. It is obviously imperative that orders relating to the safe 
navigation and operation of a ship are understood and obeyed. It is equally clear that 
manuals which are not written in the crew* s language will not be understood and are 
unlikely to be complied with. There are a number of incidents which have illustrated the 
problem. In the incident involving a fire on the "Scandinavian Star" in 1990[3-17], one of 
the difTiculties experienced appears to have been an inability for crew members to 
understand each other and to instruct passengers in appropriate disembarkation 
procedures. Communication problems increase with stress, people tend to panic in the 
case of emergency when heavy stresses are expected. 
In the case of some polyglot crews the practice has arisen whereby orders are directed 
through a bosun or senior petty officer. Relying on a single person for communication in 
cases of urgency is clearly an unacceptable risk. Good communication is an essential part 
of safe operation, lack of communication can lead to disaster. 
3.1.8 Operational Responsibility 
Notwithstanding the importance of a well trained, properly motivated crew which can 
adequately communicate with itself and the outside world, the human input extends 
fijrther. Properly functioning competent crews require a properly managed organization: 
Bad management, however, is a problem everywhere. The inquiry into an incident 
involving a European ferry, the "Herald of Free Enterprise" which capsized with heavy 
loss of life. The inquiry said that from top to bottom the body corporate was infected with 
the disease of sloppiness while the inquiry into a major spill by a Liberian tanker "Exxon 
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Valdez" in North America referred to the failure of the ship owner to provide a fit master 
and a rested and sufficient crew[3-l8]. 
Responsibility for the safe operation of a ship does not, as some owners or managers 
might believe, rest solely in the master. The importance of the shore-based organization 
in respect of the safe operation of vessels has now been recognized in an IMO Code. The 
recently adopted International Safety Management (ISM) Code takes a broad based 
approach applying to all those involved in the industry, and in particular imposes an 
obligation on ship owning companies to set, implement and maintain effective safety 
management systems. As with all IMO sponsored initiatives, the issue will be whether the 
regulations are adequately implemented and enforced. 
3.1.9 Crew Conditions 
Consideration must also be given to the issue of the treatment of crews and their living 
conditions. Report from seamen's union to the Marine Department has been received that 
mistreated crews are reluctant to complain as they will be blacklisted by crewing agencies 
and refused work as seamen. The extent of this maltreatment extends to: 
. I provision of inadequate food, 
,2 inadequate and non hygienic accommodation and washing facilities, 
.3 no proper working equipment provided for job, 
.4 unsafe working environment. 
As a general comment, it could also be fairly added that an unhappy ship is more likely to 
be an unsafe ship. 
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3.1.10 Anonymity - Lack of Transparency 
Another of the principal areas of concern is the lack of n^nsparency in the shipping 
industry as a whole. The attitude taken by some flag of convenience states to disclosing 
information in relation to the corporate background or individuals involved with the 
ownership of any given vessel has been noted in the discussion relating to ownership. 
The lack of transparency in the industry is further reflected in the apparent unwillingness 
of other participants to engage in mutual disclosure of relevant information. An inability 
to ascertain the identity of the parties responsible for tlie operation of sub-standard vessels 
results in major problems in determining accountability. The introduction of International 
Safety Management System by IMO aims to rectify this situation, clause 3.1 of the ISM 
code stipulates: 
"If the entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is other than the 
owner, the owner must report the full name and details of such entity to the 
Administration. " 
Classification societies have in the past been reluctant to disclose records relating to vessel 
deficiencies without the written consent of the owner. That consent was not often 
forthcoming. 
Similarly, underwriters, for reasons of commercial secrecy, have in the past maintained 
the confidentiality of their databases. 
The salvage association, tasked by the insurance industry to conduct condition surveys, 
pursuant to the classification condition and structural condition warranty, in relation to 
vessels seeking cover, no longer publishes the result of such surveys. 
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In 1992 the United States and United Kingdom government made submissions to the IMO 
on the issue to the effect that: 
"There can be no doubt that a central information system which recorded serious 
deficiencies and defects would help to identify sub-standard operators, owners. 
Flag States and classification societies " [3-19] 
There are signs, particularly with the advent of increased use of the Port State Control 
mechanism, that the position insofar as the exchange of information is concerned, is 
changing. The Paris MOU states have made use of computer technology to permit the 
sharing of information relating to inspection results through the SIRENAC system 
operated by the French Government under the Paris MOU. 
Canada, with its central location between Europe and the Asia Pacific region has linked its 
own coastguard Port State Control inspection database to the European system. Similarly, 
the data exchange system established in Russia for the Asia Pacific region pursuant to the 
Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding was linked to the Paris MOU database as Russia 
now takes over on database management. This will provide for a significant degree of 
international co-ordination in relation to Port State Control data. 
3.1.11 Regulations and Standards 
The principal regulatory body in respect of matters related to safety at sea and the 
prevention of marine pollution is the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
Criticism has been leveled at that organization to the extent that it is reactive as opposed to 
pro-active, and that when it does react to significant issues it does so too slowly. Major 
decisions require consensus among member states and consensus is difficult to achieve 
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when certain states are engaged in protecting their own vested interests. Difficulties are 
increased by the fact that the organization as a whole faces funding problems due to the 
failure of some member states to pay their dues. 
3.1.12 Enforcement - International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
Under current conventions there is little in the way of direct enforcement action that may 
be taken by the IMO. To the extent that countries which although signatories to its 
conventions do not adhere to their obligations, it may be possible to procure their 
suspension from the organization or to remove the right to vote at an Assembly. At the 
very least IMO should be put in a position to publicly sanction those members whose 
fleets are deficient. The possibility of such action providing a significant incentive for 
compliance by Flag States which had already exhibited contempt for their obligations 
would depend on charterers, underwriters and Port States declining to do business with 
that flag. The IMO could readily publish details of those flags, ships and owners which 
failed to comply with IMO standards and should consider changes to conventions to 
provide for more robust disciplinary action. 
3.1.13 Enforcement - Flag States 
The IMO is principally a body for the formulation of policy and international ship safety 
regulations. The primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing those policies 
and regulations rests on the member states in which vessels are registered, the Flag States. 
Unfortunately it has become clear that some of those states either by intent, ignorance or 
incompetence are failing to detect and eradicate sub-standard shipping. 
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3.1.14 Enforcement - Port States 
While it remains the primary obligation of Flag States to ensure that vessels registered in 
their jurisdictions meet appropriate standards, it is clear that this source of control cannot 
be completely relied upon. The focus has therefore of late turned to enforcement by those 
with the most to lose, namely Port States. It is these states which are, by default, being 
forced to assume the role of the policeman and to become the first line of defence against 
sub-standard vessels. 
There are a number of problems with sub-standard shipping and their remaining in 
operation today. The underlying causes of those problems may be summarized as follows: 
3.1.15 Sub-Standard Shipping Today (Summary) 
In recent years, significant actions have been taken by various authorities and 
organizations to improve the shipping standard. Among them are the Port State Control 
activities, which have been extensively implemented under different regional MOUs. A l l 
around the world, ship owners and operators have realized that the safety of ships and 
protection of the environment will never be overemphasized. In fact, improvement 
measures have been carried out by ship owners to comply with new regulations and 
requirements, either voluntarily or passively. Modem technologies and advanced 
designing methods also help to make ships safer and more environmental friendly. 
On the other hand, introduction of modem technology equipment onboard ships requires 
large numbers of well-trained professional seafarers, which are in great shortage at present. 
Fewer crew members, faster ship speed, shorter port stay period, and more dependent on 
electronic systems - the pattem of navigation has been changed rapidly. Today, not 
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adequately trained seafarers and poor management also makes a ship to be sub-standard. 
Driven by cost saving and other financial restraints, flying convenient flag is becoming 
the first choice for most of ship operators. The fleet size of convenience flag has increased 
tremendously with a high speed over last two decades. In this connection, there is no real 
meaningful connection between those convenience Flag States and ships, near to an out of 
control status. Unfortunately, existing code and regulations system could do nothing to 
stop this trend. It may conclude that the convenience flag system could contribute as the 
main factor for sub-standard shipping. Under the circumstances, there should be an 
efficient system to cope with the various problems arisen from the global sub-standard 
shipping situation. 
3.2 International Shipping Conventions & Regulations 
3.2.1 Background 
Although under Article 5 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, whilst every state is given the 
right to set its own standards for the ships flying its flag, it would be difficult for different 
states to impose their own requirement on international shipping. There would be no 
uniformity and consistency of standard in regulating safety of ships, thus causing lots of 
arbitration for international trade ships i f every state were to set their own requirements. 
To prevent such a situation the IMO and ILO have developed a number of conventions 
and regulations setting out minimum operation standards of safety for ships abided by the 
signatory states. 
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3.2.2 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
The IMO, formerly known as Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMCO) prior to 1982, the principal regulatory body insofar as international shipping is 
concerned, is a specialist agency of the United Nations (UN). Conceived at a UN 
conference in 1948, the IMO was the first international governmental body devoted 
exclusively to maritime matters. The convention establishing the new organization 
entered into force in 1958 and the first meeting of the 31 founding members was held in 
1959. 
The IMO, with its headquarters in London, is governed by an assembly consisting of 
representatives fi-om each of the 149 member states that now make up the Organization. 
The Assembly meets once every 2 years. Between assembly meetings the governance of 
the organization falls to a council consisting of 32 elected members. The Council is 
divided into the following committees: 
.1 Maritime Safety 
.2 Marine Environment Protection 
.3 Legal 
.4 Technical 
.5 Facilitation 
The committees, and in particular the important Maritime Safety Committee, are ftirther 
divided into sub-committees dealing with areas such as safety of navigation, radio 
communication, life saving, search and rescue, ship design and equipment and training 
and watch keeping. 
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In addition to the various committees and sub-committees there is a permanent secretariat 
headed by a Secretary General who is appointed by the Council and approved by the 
Assembly. 
Representation in the form of consultative status has also been granted to a number of 
non-governmental organizations such as Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), 
the Intemational Association of Classification societies (lACS), International Transport 
Workers Federation (ITF), the Oil Companies Intemational Marine Forum (CIMF) and 
the Intemational Chamber of Shipping (ICS). Representation of these organizations give 
IMO access to highly qualified technical experts who not only provide advice on 
particular problems or take over a whole complex of preparatory work, but also promote 
the implementation of convention provisions following their adoption. 
Since its establishment, IMO has promoted the adoption of over 30 conventions and 
associated protocols and has adopted a large number of codes and recommendations on 
various matters relating to maritime safety and the prevention of pollution. Conventions 
are legal regulatory instruments and are subject to ratification, while recommendations 
provided more specific guidelines and are not subject to ratification [3-20]. The 
obligations to which a state ratifying an IMO Convention commits itself include: 
.1 to give effect to the treaty, in particular by promulgating the necessary laws, 
decrees, orders and regulations. 
.2 to communicate to the Organization national texts and also, where appropriate, 
a list of non-government bodies authorized to act on behalf of the govemment 
50 
and models of certificates issued [3-21 ] . 
Insofar as can be said in relation to an international body which is a part of the UN, the 
IMO is largely a non-political organization. It has. since its inception, been principally 
concerned with technical matters related to maritime safety and marine pollution. The 
IMO has never been particular involved in matters bearing directly on the economic 
aspects of the seaborne trade. 
Boasting a wealth of experts in maritime affairs on its various committees and 
sub-committees, the IMO has been recognized by the US Department of State as one of 
the most cost effective, well run and efficient of the UN specialized agencies [3-22]. 
However, the Organization has been criticized for its inability to react speedily to well 
publicized marine disasters and its not so infrequent compromises to the lowest common 
denominator in order to obtain consensus on common international standards [3-23]. 
3.2.3 International Labour Organization (ILO) 
The ILO was established under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to promote joint action 
between governments, employers and trade unions in the cause of social justice and the 
establishment of decent living standards, satisfactory conditions of work and pay, and 
adequate employment opportunities [3-24]. It is a tripartite organization (government / 
employers / trade unions) comprising over 144 member states, with the representatives of 
workers and employers participating in its work on an equal footing with those of 
governments. 
The organs of the ILO are the International Labour Conference which is the governing 
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body, and the Intemational Labour Office which is the Organization's permanent 
secretariat. It also works through subsidiary bodies such as regional conferences, 
industrial committees and panels of experts serving on technical co-operation 
programmes around the world. Questions of policy and the organization's programme of 
work are decided by the goveming body. 
The Intemational Labour Conference has adopted a total of 173 conventions and 180 
recommendations over the last 74 years [3-25]. The ILO's maritime standards cover 
training and certification of seafarers engagement, conditions of employment, labour 
problems arising from technological changes, wages, safety, health, welfare, repatriation, 
social security and labour inspection. On the question of the training and certification of 
merchant seafarers, the ILO co-operates with the IMO through the Joint IMO / ILO 
Committee on Training. Through its technical co-operation programme the organization 
provides assistance to countries that are in the process of establishing, developing or 
improving their maritime industries to facilitate the application of ILO maritime labour 
standards. 
Evidence of the ILO's success is reflected in the nearly two thousand cases of progress 
made since 1964 towards the implementation of the Organization's standards by states, 
following assistance given to individual govemments (via comments and reports which 
set out guidelines for a systematic and consistent approach to ILO's standards 
implementation) by its supervisory bodies [3-26]. 
3.2.4 Relevant IMO / I L O Conventions And Regulations 
The relevant IMO and ILO Conventions with regards to Port State Control have been 
52 
identified as follows: 
.1 International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 and its Protocol of 1988, 
.2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 or SOLAS 1974 
with 1978, 1988 protocol and amendments, 
.3 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as 
modified by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). 
.4 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarer, 1978 and 1995 (STCW, 1978) & (Revised STCW 
95), 
.5 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at sea (COLREG), 1972 as 
amended, 
.6 Merchant Ship (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention No. 
147), 
.7 International Safety Management Code (ISM). 
3.2.5 International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 and its Protocol of 1988 
This Convention applies to all ships of 24 metres in length or more built after May 1970 
and ships of 150 gross tonnage or more build before that date. Such ships are required to 
be in possession of an International Load Line Certificate which has a maximum duration 
period of 5 years. 
The need for a ship* s side to be marked with lines to indicate its safe carrying capacity was 
recognized as early as 1834 when a committee of Lloyd's Underwriters proposed that a 
ft-eeboard should be set down each side of a ship equal to a quarter of the depth of the hold 
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of the ship. In the years to follow, efforts were made to determine the best method of 
computing an assigning freeboard in an attempting to overcome the problem of 
dangerously overloading ships. They included calculations proposed by Liverpool 
Underwriters (1834-1854), the Institution of Naval Architects report to the British 
Parliament (1870), and the work of Samuel Plimsoll, MP for Derby (1870-1875). 
However, the most significant of these was the 1930 International Convention on Load 
Lines. 
The knowledge and experience gained from the operation of the 1930 Convention, 
combined with considerable developments in areas of ship design and construction, 
shipbuilding techniques, methods of closing openings, weather forecasting, aids to 
navigation and radio-communications, led to the 1966 Load Line Convention which 
updated the 1930 Convention and incorporated new and improved measures. The new 
Convention was the end product of an international conference held by the IMCO in 
London in 1966 and came into force on 21 July, 1968. The preamble to the Convention 
States its objective as follows: 
To establish uniform principles and rules with respect to the limits to which ships 
on international voyages may be loaded having regard to the need for 
safeguarding life and property at sea [3-27]. 
Article 13 places an obligation on Flag States that are signatories to the Convention to 
ensure that the ships flying their flags are surveyed, inspected, marked and, i f necessary, 
granted with appropriate exemptions in line with Articles 4-6. While Flag States may 
entrust these duties to nominated surveyors or recognized organization, the responsibility 
is still theirs to fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the survey, inspection 
and marking. 
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Initial and periodical surveys are to ensure that the structure, equipment, arrangements, 
material and scantlings fully comply with the requirements o f the present convention. 
Annual inspections are necessary to ensure that alterations have not been made to the hull 
or superstructures which would affect the calculations determining the position of the load 
line and so as to ensure the maintenance in an effective condition of fittings and 
appliances for protection of openings; guard rails; freeing ports; and access to crew 
quarters. 
An International Load line Certificate (1966) must be issued after ships have been 
surveyed and marked. The certificate is required to be endorsed for annual surveys within 
3 months before or after each anniversary date of the certificate's issue. Renewal of a 
certificate may be extended for a period of up to 5 months after a renewal survey has been 
carried out and there is good reason for delay in issuing a new certificate. The certificate 
may also be extended for a period of up to 3 months to permit it to proceed to another port 
to be surveyed for renewal of the certificate. It is understood that classification societies 
prefer to issue short dated or interim certificates rather than endorse the existing 
certificate. 
An International Load Line Exemption Certificate may be issued to a ship, which exempts 
the ship ft-om any of the provisions of the 1966 Convention where, either: 
.1 the ship embodies features of a novel kind (under Article 6(2) of the 
Convention); or 
.2 the ship is not normally engaged on international voyages and under exceptional 
circumstances is making a single voyage (under Article 6(4) of the Convention). 
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This certificate when issued under 3.2.4,1 has the same period of vahdity and requirement 
for annual surveys as an International Load Line Certificate. The Port State Control 
officer should ensure any certificate issued under 3.2,4.2 is for the voyage currently being 
undertaken. 
Port State Control of load lines is authorized by Article 21 of the Convention which 
empowers contracting Port States to carry out inspections to ensure that a valid Load line 
Certificate (1966) is on board the ship and that the ship is not loaded beyond the limits 
allowed by the Certificate; the position of the load line of the ship corresponds with the 
certificate and the ship has not been so materially altered that the ship is manifestly unfit to 
proceed to sea without danger to human life. 
As a general guide, ships from non-convention states are expected to have been surveyed 
and marked in a similar manner to those from convention states and should meet all the 
requirements of the Convention. Therefore, the Port State would usually require a f i i l l 
survey to be carried out to ensure that the ship meets the requirements of the convention, 
unless it has some reciprocal (bilateral) agreement with the particular Flag State, which 
provides for some alternative course of action [3-28], 
An International Load line Certificate which is current when the present Protocol enters 
into force in the ship's Flag State shall remain valid until it expires. Contracting states 
must however issue all new Load Line Certificates in accordance with the provisions of 
the present Protocol only. Moreover, the new provisions shal! be applied to all foreign 
ships on which Port State inspections are carried out by a state which has ratified the 1988 
Load Line Protocol. The 1988 Load Line Protocol is yet to receive the threshold number 
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of ratifications, necessary for it to enter into force [3-29]. 
3.2.6 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974) 
and the 1978, 1988 Protocols 
The sinking of the Titanic on her maiden voyage in April 1912, which resulted in the death 
of more than 1500 passengers and crew, led to the convening of the first International 
Convention for SOLAS which was adopted in 1914. It was however put on hold due to 
the outbreak of World War I [3-30]. SOLAS conferences were again held in 1929 and 
1948 with the aim of improving many aspects of vessel safety design and construction 
which in the past, were left to the shipyards under the close supervision o f classification 
societies [3-31]. 
These SOLAS Conventions were designed with the aim of improving safety in shipping 
by establishing commonly agreed standards that would ensure that a ship is fit for its 
intended service without posing any danger to safety of life [3-32]. Even though SOLAS 
1960 was amended several times in response to new developments, the rather difficult 
requirements for bringing amendments into force prevented any of these amendments 
from becoming binding internationally. 
SOLAS 1974 along with its amendments in 1981, 1983,1988 and 1989 have been adopted 
by more than 100 states, controlling 95% of the world's merchant tonnage. Article I I of 
the 1978 SOLAS protocol which was incorporated in the 1974 Convention, requires 
contracting governments to apply the requirements of both the Convention and Protocol to 
ships belong to non-party states to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to 
such ships. 
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Only ships engaged on international voyages are affected by the regulations. Port State 
Control is enshrined in Chapter 1, Part B, Regulation 19 of SOLAS 1974, as amended by 
the 1978 SOLAS protocol. Paragraphs (a) and (b) state that every ship is subject to Port 
State Control when in a port of another party to the Convention, provided that such control 
is directed towards verifying the validity of the ship's certificates which i f valid shall be 
accepted. 
A number of important amendments were made to the SOLAS 74 by IMO in May 1994. 
Among those amendments, it is of particular importance that Regulation 4 in new Chapter 
X I provided legal basis for Port State Control on operational requirements. This 
amendment came into effect on I January 1996. 
Chapter X I , Regulation 4 of SOLAS 74 stipulates the Port State Control on operational 
Requirements. A ship when in a port of another contracting government is subject to 
control by officers duly authorized by such government concerning operational 
requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing 
that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the 
safety of ships [3-33]. 
3.2.7 2000 Amendments to 1974 SOLAS 
At the 73"* session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO in December 2000. 
substantial amendments to Chapters 11-2 and V of 74 SOLAS, as amended were adopted 
together with amendments to Chapters 11-1, IX and X (IMO Resolution MSC.93(73)) and 
related IMO guidelines. The amendments are entering into force on 1^ July 2002. 
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Among these amended chapters, Chapter II-2 "Fire Protection, Fire Detection and Fire 
Extinction" and Chapter V "Safety Navigation" have been comprehensively reviewed and 
re-written. Basically new amendments are applied to ships the keels of which are laid or 
which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1^* July 2002 (new ships). However, 
some of the new requirements are also applied to ships constructed before 1^* July 2002 
(existing ships). 
3.2.7.1 New Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 
The regulations of new Chapter II-2 are grouped by function required for fire safety, that is 
fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, escape and operational requirements. In 
addition to these common requirements in Parts B & E, special requirements for helicopter 
facilities, ships carrying dangerous goods and ro-ro spaces are provided separately in Part G 
as special requirements. A new regulation for approval of altemative designs and 
arrangements is provided in Part F. Under the regulation, a design of new concept deviating 
from the prescriptive requirements may be accepted as altemative design and arrangement 
i f considered equivalent. 
Other amended areas include the incorporation of IMO interpretations into the regulations, 
amplification of operational requirements in Part E of the Chapter, incorporation of IMO 
guidelines on helicopter facilities. There are also some new requirements for enhancement 
of fire safety additional fire safety measures related to oil fuel piping. Regulation 4.5.10 
describes the protection of cargo pump rooms of tanker and a fixed local application fire 
fighting systems, in addition to the current requirement of a fixed fire extinguishing system 
is required to be equipped with. Deep fat cooking equipment should also fit with the fire 
extinguishing systems. Emergency escape breathing devices are to be provided to 
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machinery spaces and accommodation. 
3.2.7.2 New Chapter V of SOLAS 
The revised chapter V applies to all ships on all voyages irrespective of type, size and date 
of construction of ships with some exceptions and is entering into force on 1st July 2002. 
New ships shall be fitted with navigational systems and equipment in the chapter including 
newly specified equipment such as automatic identification system (AIS) and voyage data 
recorder (VDR) depending on ship* s size and type. Regulation 15 stipulates the principles 
relating to Bridge Design and electromagnetic compatibility on or in the vicinity of bridge 
shall be required to new ship only. Regulation 14.4 describes the use of English language as 
bridge-to-bridge and bridge to shore safety communications as well as for communications 
on board between the pilot and the bridge watch keeping personnel, unless those directly 
involved in the communication speak a common language other than English. There are 
also new requirements for records of navigational activities and voyage planning for the 
safe navigation and avoidance of dangerous situations that may expect during the voyage. 
The new SOLAS regulations shall have effect to Port Slate inspection after July 2002 and 
the PSCO should familiar themselves with the new regulation before the implementation 
date. Appropriate MOU guidelines for the inspection have been issued under the respective 
MOU as to the consistency of measures to be taken in case the ships do not meet the new 
requirement. 
3.2.8 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for 
Pollution Prevention (The International Safety Management (ISM) Code) 
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The ISM Code was adopted by the IMO by resolution A.741 (18) and has been made 
mandatory by virtue of the entry into force on 1 July 1998 of SOLAS Chapter IX on 
Management for the Safe Operation of Ships. The ISM Code provides an international 
standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. 
The task facing all shipping companies is to minimize the scope for poor human decisions 
which contribute, directly or indirectly, to a casualty or a pollution incident. One aim 
should be to ensure that staff are properiy informed and equipped to ful f i l their operational 
responsibilities safely. Decisions taken ashore can be as important as those taken at sea, and 
there is a need to ensure that every action affecting safety or the prevention of pollution 
taken at any level within the company, is based on a sound understanding of its 
consequences. 
The adoption by IMO of the ISM code is the reflection of this objective on the part of the 
Flag States. The ISM Code establishes an international standard for the safe management 
and operation of ships by setting rules for the organization of company management in 
relation to safety and pollution prevention and for the implementation of a safety 
management system (SMS) [3-34]. 
The rules and regulations governing safety and environmental protection have progressed 
over time through interrelated stages, all of which have relevance to today's shipping 
industry. The eariiest and most basic stage concentrates on the consequences of safety 
failures where, in the aftermath of personal injury cases, damage to ship or cargo or 
environmental pollution, where the essential theme is to identify and then to apportion 
blame, frequently to the last person in the chain of events. The underiying principle is that 
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the threat of punishment influences company and individual behavior to the extent that 
safety gains a higher priority. 
The ISM code concentrates on internal management and organization for safety and 
encourages individual industries and companies to establish targets for safety perfonmance. 
Self-regulation also emphases the need for every company and individual to be responsible 
for the actions taken to improve safety, rather than seeing them imposed form outside. This 
requires the development of company specific, and in the case of shipping, vessel specific, 
safety management systems (SMS). In this third stage, importantly, safety is organized by 
those who are directly affected by the implications of failure. 
Historically, the regulation of safety and pollution prevention in a worid wide shipping 
industry has been characterized by a culture of punishment and a culture of external 
compliance. IMO* s adoption of the ISM Code and its mandatory application by all member 
states is an important step towards the creation of a culture of self-regulation in shipping. 
Self-regulation is not, however, wholly effective on its own. In order to achieve safer seas 
and environment protective it is necessary for all three stages to coexist. Each stage plays a 
significant part in influencing company and individual behaviour. 
The application of the requirement of the ISM code may be applied to all ships regardless of 
the date of construction, as follows: 
. 1 passenger ships including passenger high speed craft, not later than 1 July 1998; 
.2 oil tanker, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high speed 
craft of 500 grt and upwards, not later than I July 1998; and other cargo ships 
and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 grt and upwards, not later than 1 July 
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2002 [3-35]. 
3,2.9 International Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution 73/38 -
Marpol 73/78 
The publication of a comprehensive report on the causes and effects of oil pollution and the 
short and long term solutions, by the Faulker Committee in 1953, led to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL 54) [3-36]. 
The Convention focused on pollution from routine tanker operations and from discharge of 
oily wastes from machinery spaces. Particular anention was paid to the unloading of ballast 
water carried in cargo tanks prior to reloading cargo, which inevitably contained a certain 
amount of oil and hence polluted the sea. 
The pollution damage caused by the "Torrey Canon" in 1967 signalled the need for a more 
broadly based convention on marine pollution. MARPOL 73 was adopted by the 
International Conference on Marine Pollution convened by IMO in 1973. It was modified 
by the protocol of 1978 relating thereto which was adopted by the International Conference 
on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention (TSPP Conference) convened by the IMO. The 
Convention, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 is known as MARPOL 73/78 [3-37]. 
The objectives, as stated in the preamble to the Convention, are to achieve the complete 
elimination of international pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmfiil 
substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances. 
Flag States must establish sanctions which should be applied to any of their ships i f found to 
be in violation of the requirements of MARPOL 73/78 (Article 4). Any party is allowed to 
flimish evidence of detected violations to the Flag State Administration which must take 
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any necessary action against the ship, provided that it is satisfied that enough evidence is 
available (Article 6). Flag States are also responsible for the issuing of any certificates as 
required by the Convention to the ships flying their flags and these shall be accepted as valid 
by all other parties. 
The authorization for Port State Control is found in Art. 5, which makes any ship that is 
required to hold a certificate under MARPOL 73/78, subject to inspection by Port State 
inspectors whenever it is in the ports of another party. Such an inspection shall be limited to 
"verifying" that there are valid certificates on board, unless there are clear grounds for 
believing that the condition of the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially 
with the particulars of that certificate. If there are indeed "clear grounds" or the ship is not 
carrying a valid certificate, the Port State is authorized to take whatever steps are necessary 
to ensure that the ship does not sail until it can proceed to sea without presenting an 
unreasonable threat or harm to the marine environment. In doing so. the ship must not be 
unduly delayed since such unnecessary delay will entitle the ship to compensation for any 
loss or damage suffered (Article 7). Ships belonging to Flag States that are non-parties to 
MARPOL 73/78 are subjected to similar treatment, based on the principle of "no more 
favourable treatment" (Article 5). Any action taken by a Port State must be communicated 
to the relevant Flag State Administration. 
It is important to note that a Port State which is not a party to MARPOL 73/78 can still 
impose Port State Control in relation to pollution, under Article 220(1) of UNCLOS III 
which provides that a State may arrest and prosecute a vessel in one of its ports which is 
alleged to have violated that State's pollution laws. Even though Article 219 further 
empowers a Port State to take administrative measures to prevent a vessel in one of its ports 
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from sailing, where it has ascertained that the vessel is in violation of applicable 
international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens 
damage to the marine environment, it is less likely to be acted upon by a non-party to 
MARPOL 73/78, since it is this Convention which embodies all pollution related 
internationally agreed rules and standards. 
3.2.10 Standard Of Training, Certiflcation And Watchkceping For Seafarers 
Convention ( STCW 1978 as amended 1995 ) 
A report on the findings of a study carried out by the Netheriands Maritime Institute, 
published in 1978, revealed that 75% of all shipping incidents were due to human operating 
errors in some form or another [3-38]. This realization that human error played a prime role 
in marine casualty led to the adoption of STCW 1978 Convention at an International 
Conference on Training and Certification of Seafarers convened by the IMO, in association 
with the ILO in London. The Convention came into force on 29 April 1984 and applies to 
all merchant ships when visiting ports of states that are parties to the Convention. 
3.2.10.1 Authorization 
The authorization for Port State Control is found in Article 10, as amplified by Regulation 
4 of Chapter 1. It renders ships affected by the Convention, subject to control of Port State 
officers (PSCO) while in the ports of a party to the Convention. Such control is limited to: 
. 1 Verification that all seafarers serving on board hold a valid certificate or a 
valid dispensation. 
.2 Assessment of the ability of the seafarers of the ship to maintain 
watchkeeping standards as required, i f there are "clear grounds" for 
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believing that such standards are not being maintained. 
3.2.10.2 Restrictions 
Unlike the other conventions already covered, "clear grounds" in this Convention is 
restricted only to situations where: 
. 1 The ship has been involved in a collision, grounding or stranding; 
.2. There has been a discharge of substances from the ship where underway, at 
anchor or at berth which is illegal under International Conventions; or 
.3 The ship has been manoeuvered in an erratic or unsafe manner or 
navigational course markers or traffic separation schemes have not been 
followed. 
Where a ship is found to be deficient in any of the above respects, the master and the Flag 
State Administration must be notified in writing. However, i f after taking into 
consideration the size and type of the ship and the length and nature o f the voyage, these 
deficiencies pose a danger to persons, property or the environment, the Port State is 
authorized to detain the ship until they are corrected and the danger has been removed. 
3.2.10.3 S T C W 9 5 
The STCW 78 was extensively revised at the STCW Conference in June/July 1995. The 
revised STCW Convention was aiming at providing more strict competence criteria to 
ensure that seafarers were properly trained and certified and operated the ship in a safe 
manner. The revised STCW convention gave IMO the power, for the first time, to 
supervise over Flag States on the establishment of appropriate seafarers' training and 
certification system. 
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The STCW 78 Convention (previous Conventions) was the principal international treaty 
regulating seafarers* training, certification and watchkeeping arrangements, and forms the 
basis of national standards world-wide. However, even when adopted in 1978 it was 
regarded as a compromise between those nations wanting very high standards and those 
countries concerned about their ability to implement such measures. 
In more recent years, three particular concerns about the previous Convention have been 
identified, which the 1995 amendments are to address: 
.1 The previous Convention did not in fact contain precise standards of 
competence relating to the abilities needed to perform shipboard functions 
safely and effectively - it only stipulated minimum knowledge requirements for 
the issue of certificates. Moreover, evidence that required knowledge has been 
absorbed by candidates for certification is currently left to be determined "to the 
satisfaction of the Administration". Because the provisions of the existing 
Convention have been open to different interpretation, they have failed to 
establish a uniform minimum level of competence internationally. 
.2 Neither the process by which countries have ratified the Convention, nor the 
provisions of the Convention itself, have been sufficient guarantees to ensure 
that STCW requirements have been implemented world-wide or sufficiently 
enforced. Consequently, there has been a loss of confidence in the reliability of 
STCW certificates issued by certain governments as an indicator of seafarers* 
competence. 
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.3 The previous Convention was written in terms of conventional shipboard work 
organization based on traditional divisions between the deck and engine 
departments. It has therefore failed to accommodate modem developments in 
training and shipboard organization. This has already proved too restrictive, 
limiting the potential career development of seafarers and preventing any 
safety-enhancing redistribution of workload on board during intensive working 
periods. In short, the previous Convention lacked the flexibility to meet the 
industry* s anticipated needs in the 21st Century. 
In response to various piecemeal amendments that were then being considered. 
International Shipping Federation (ISF) proposed, in 1992, that IMO should undertake a 
complete review of the STCW Convention. And with the strong support of the 
government representatives to IMO, a comprehensive review was subsequently 
commenced [3-39]. 
Following a series of high profile maritime casualties, which drew additional attention to 
concerns about general levels of crew competence, the IMO Secretary General initiated a 
fast track revision of the Convention in co-operation with the ILO which is responsible for 
global labour standards relating to seafarers* employment. In July 1995, this accelerated 
revision process was finalized with the adoption of a package of radical amendments to 
the STCW Convention. 
The 1995 amendments to the STCW Convention represent a comprehensive package of 
interrelated measures. Collectively they are designed to address the inadequacies of the 
current Convention and improve overall standards of seafarers* competence world-wide. 
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3.2.10.4 Main Features of STCW 95 
The main features are covered in three essential areas: 
. 1 New responsibilities for shipping companies 
These stipulate the explicit responsibilities of shipping companies for ensuring 
that the seafarers they employ meet minimum international standards of 
competence, that ships are manned in accordance with Flag State requirements 
and that detailed records are maintained of all seafarers. 
Companies wil l also have to ensure that all seafarers, on being assigned to their ships 
undergo familiarization on board and that measures are adopted to ensure effective 
co-ordination between seafarers. 
These provisions will be enforced by requiring governments to apply penalties to 
companies found to be in breach of the Convention and by expanding the 
circumstances in which Port State Control Officers (PSCO) can question the 
operational competence of seafarers. 
.2 New uniform standards of competence. 
These establish, for the first time, uniform standards for the attainment of 
competence in particular maritime skills. The revised Convention contains 
specific detailing the standards of knowledge, understanding and proficiency to 
be achieved in each element of competence by candidates for certification, and 
the criteria for evaluating them. 
The revise Convention also extends elementary standards of competence to 
69 
categories of shipboard personnel not addressed by the present Convention. 
.3 New measures to ensure implementation by governments: 
The revised Convention incorporates measures designed to help ensure that 
governments that are Parties to the Convention actually implement STCW 
requirements and that certificates are only issued to seafarers that meet the 
minimum competency standards. 
3.2.10.5 Outcome of IMO Sub-committee - Standard of Training and 
Watchkeeping 33 (STW 33) on matters affecting PSC relating to the 
implementation of S T C W 95 
The sub-committee of STW 33 held from 21-25 January 2002 approved two circulars in 
providing advice to PSCO and recognized organizations issuing the ISM certificates. 
Under the circulars, until 31 July 2002, i f seafarers do not carry STCW 95 certificates or 
Flag State endorsement, PSCOs are recommended to issue only a warning to companies 
and to notify the seafarers and Administrations concerned accordingly. 
The reason for these circular to be issued was because the non-availability of many 
nations to issue the Flag State endorsement to their seafarers working on board their ships. 
Many nations are still not ready to sign the undertaking with other states for reciprocal 
recognition of certification under Regulation 1/10 of the STCW 95 Convention. 
There are two reasons for these circulars to be issued. The first reason was the belated 
announcement of the White List. The White List would state the acceptance of standard 
of the listed maritime states as to its compliance to the STCW 95 requirement. The 
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announcement of the first batch of the approved 70 States to be included in the White List 
was made in November 2000, less than 15 months to the implementation date of the 
STCW 95 Convention. Some delegates to IMO considered such belated announcement 
was due to the reluctance in submission of documentation by some states under 
assessment to the IMO assessors, which had delayed the assessment schedule. 
The second reason was the mis-interpretation of Regulation I/IO by some member states 
before signing the undertaking with the other states. The purpose of Regulation I/IO is to 
provide change of information regarding certification arrangement between both 
signatory states. This was the main purpose of Regulation I/IO. Unfortunately many 
states considered this signing of undertaking a diplomatic agreement, once getting into 
such idea it would take ages for the officials to clear their national procedures before the 
agreement could be signed between the two states. 
3.2.10.6 Other Provisions 
The revised Convention contains a wide range of other provisions the most significant of 
which include the use of simulators in training, the qualifications of training instructors 
and assessors, measures to prevent fatigue, and principles governing alternative 
arrangements for issuing certificates which depart from conventional departmental 
divisions. Together with the three major components outlined above, these provisions 
form part of the total STCW package intended to ensure that the principal factors 
determining standards of training and crew competence would be sufficiently regulated 
internationally [3-40]. 
Although the speed at which governments are able to implement the new requirements 
71 
may vary, it should be assumed that all new provisions placing additional obligations on 
shipping companies have been in force already by 1 February 1997. 
The acceptability of certificates already issued to seafarers will not be affected unless they 
have lapsed or individual certificate holders are subsequently found to be incompetent or 
iraudulent. However, governments will be obliged to compare the standards of 
competence that will be required under the revised Convention with those required 
nationally under the existing Convention and to determine whether existing STCW 
certificate holders need to undergo appropriate refresher and updating training or 
assessment. 
To take account of the International Tonnage Convention, the tonnage thresholds 
applying to standards in the deck department required for various sizes of ship will be: 
. I 500 gross tonnage instead of the current 200 gross registered tons; and 
.2 3,000 gross tonnage instead of the current 1,600 gross registered tons. 
3.2.11 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976 
I L O Convention No. 147 
The non-observance of accepted international standards governing ship safety and crew 
conditions has been a subject of discussion within the ILO for some time. As early as the 
1930s and 1940s, the Organization drew the attention of governments, shipowners and 
seafarers to this problem with a view to correcting deficient practices. The Seafarers' 
Engagement (Foreign Vessels) Recommendation (No. 107) and the Social Conditions and 
Safety (Seafarers) Recommendation (No. 108), adopted in 1958, requested ILO member 
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states to discourage their seafarers from serving on foreign flag ships under sub-standard 
conditions, in particular as regards repatriation, medical care and maintenance in foreign 
ports, supervision of signing on and of f ships, freedom of association, certificates of 
competency and the provision of a ship inspection service [3-41]. 
As part of its long-standing efforts and in response to greater international concern for 
safety at sea and the prevention of marine pollution, the ILO adopted the Merchant 
Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 147). This Convention was 
recognized as having strengthened substantially the international will to eliminate the 
operation of sub-standard ships. It aimed to improve the efficiency and safety of 
navigation, enhanced measures to protect the marine environment and advance seafarers' 
interests in the fields of health and safety, working conditions and trade union rights. The 
Convention, which essentially applied to every seagoing ship employed for any 
commercial purpose, entered into force in November 1981. 
Convention No. 147 prescribed a set of minimum standards relating to safety, social 
security, shipboard conditions of employment and living arrangements to be observed in 
merchant shipping registered under any flag, by reference to a number of other ILO 
conventions listed in an Appendix to Convention No. 147. These conventions covered 
minimum age, medical examination, articles of agreement, officer's competency 
certificates, food and catering on board ship, crew accommodation, prevention of 
occupational accidents, sickness or injury benefits and repatriation. The Appendix also 
referred to two other Conventions, on ft-eedom of association and the protection of the 
right to organize, and on collective bargaining. In addition, one provision of Convention 
No. 147 refers to standards of hours of work and manning to ensure the safety of human 
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life aboard ships. Another required that due attention be given to an ILO recommendation 
concerning the vocational training of seafarers, so as to ensure that seafarers are properly 
qualified and trained for the duties for which they were engaged. 
The substantive obligations on states party to Convention No. 147 were set out in Article 2, 
which required that ratifying states undertake to have laws or regulations laying down, for 
ships registered in their territory, provisions which were substantially equivalent to those 
of the conventions or articles of conventions referred to in the Appendix to Convention No. 
147, in so far as such states were not otherwise bound to give effect to any of the 
conventions in question by virtue of having ratified them [3-42]. In other words, i f a state 
was already to become a party to any of the conventions listed in the appendix, it must 
apply precisely the terms of those conventions. 
Convention No. 147 also required ratifying states to exercise effective jurisdiction or 
control over ships which were registered in their territory as regard to: 
.1 Safely standards, including standards of competency, hours of work and 
manning, prescribed by national laws or regulations; 
.2 Social security measures prescribed by national laws or regulations; and 
.3 Shipboard conditions of employment and shipboard living arrangements 
prescribed by national laws or regulations, or laid down by competent courts in 
a manner equally binding on the shipowners and seafarers concerned. 
In addition, a ratifying Flag State must satisfy itself that measures for the effective control 
of other shipboard conditions of employment and living arrangements, where it has no 
effective jurisdiction, were agreed between the organizations of shipowners and of 
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seafarers concerned. 
Under Convention No. 147, a ratifying Flag State also undertook to ensure that adequate 
procedures existed for: 
.4 The engagement of seafarers on ships registered in its territory and for the 
investigation of complaints arising in that connection, and 
.5 For the investigation of any complaint made in connection with the engagement 
in its territory of seafarers of its own nationality on ships registered in a foreign 
country. It also undertook to ensure that any complaint made in connection with 
the engagement in its territory of foreign seafarers on ships registered in foreign 
country was reported to the competent authority of the country in which the ship 
was registered. 
A further point under Convention No. 147 was that ratifying Flag States must verify by 
inspection or other means that their ships complied with national laws and regulations 
which applied the standards prescribed by the Convention and with applicable collective 
agreements. 
The authority for Port State Control was found in Article 4 which empowered Port States 
that had ratified the Convention to take any measures necessary to rectify any condition on 
board a foreign ship in its ports, which were clearly hazardous to safety and health. Action 
by a Port State was limited to situations where it received a complaint or obtained 
evidence that the ship did not confirm to the standards of this Convention". "Complaint" 
as defined in paragraph 3 of this Article, included information submitted by any person 
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with an interest in the safety of the ship, including an interest in safety or health hazards to 
its crew" which should cover any reports by authorized Port State Control officers. Port 
States were once more reminded not to detain or delay the ship unreasonably. 
3.3 International Shipping Conventions & Regulations Today - Summary 
As the principal regulatory body of international shipping, IMO has been playing an 
important role in setting up and promoting the adoption of conventions and regulations 
relating to maritime safety and prevention of pollution. To cope with the change and 
development of the shipping industry, and to fu l f i l l the world's requirement on 
environmental protection, these conventions and regulations are revised from time to 
time. 
Beyond IMO Conventions, ILO Convention No. 147 is another important shipping 
convention. Although its objectives are similar, namely safety and environment protection, 
ILO 147 differs from all IMO conventions in that its emphasis is much more on crew's 
welfare and living conditions onboard. 
In the past, these conventions and regulations were implemented mainly through 
classification societies and Flag State authorities. Classification societies, on one hand, 
participate in setting up these provisions in the form o f sending consultative 
representatives in IMO, and on the other hand, implement them through classification for 
new building and existing vessels. Flag States that are parties of these conventions and 
regulations will reflect them in the national laws and regulations. Port State Control has 
ftirther enforced these conventions and regulations through its regional networks. Most 
conventions have given explicit authorization to Port State Control, and have been 
adopted by various MOUs as basic guide lines when undertaking PSC inspections. 
The PSC system is directly aimed at sub-standard shipping. IMO has developed a number 
of conventions and regulations concerning minimum operation standards of safety of 
ships. These conventions and regulations provide PSC strong support on legal basis. 
Under these conventions and regulations, all vessels compliance with the standards would 
be an obligation. 
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C H A P T E R FOUR 
T H E C O N T E X T U A L BACKGROUND - R E G I O N A L 
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING 
4.1 Paris Memorandum Of Understanding 
The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control is a regional 
administrative agreement, concluded in Paris on 26 January 1982 by the maritime 
authorities of 14 European countries. In this memorandum of understanding the 
participating maritime authorities agree to establish in their ports a harmonized system of 
Port State Control with the aim of eliminating the operation of sub-standard ships [4-1]. 
The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control entered into effect on I 
July 1982. Its present membership consists of 19 Members: Belgium, Canada, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Further 
adherence is anticipated. The co-operating countries were Japan and United States. 
4.1.1 The Objectives of the Paris MOV 
The objectives of the Paris MOU as stated in the preamble to the Memorandum are: 
. I To co-ordinate and harmonize the efforts of the maritime authorities in relation 
to Port State Control activities; 
.2 To assist in securing the compliance of ships with international standards 
regarding: 
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a. Safety of life at sea; 
b. Prevention of pollution of the marine envirorunent; and 
c. Working and living conditions on board. 
Each authority will maintain an effective system of Port State Control to ensure that 
foreign merchant ships visiting its ports comply with the standards laid down in relevant 
International Conventions and will achieve an annual total of inspection corresponding to 
25% of the estimated number of individual ships which entered the ports of its state during 
a 12 month period. In practice this will result in an inspection rate of around 90% of all 
ships using ports in the region. 
The Paris MOU does not contain any new regulations, but aims to ensure the enforcement 
of the relevant International Conventions currently in force, which themselves provide the 
basis for Port State Control of foreign ships. Inspections under the provisions of the Paris 
MOU are governed by principles and guide-lines developed by the Port State Control 
Committee, the executive body of the Paris MOU. 
The Paris MOU Port State Control Committee (PSCC) is the executive body instituted by 
the Paris Memorandum and it is composed of the representatives ft-om each of the 
participating maritime authorities and of the European Communities. IMO and the ILO 
participate as observers in the work of the Port State Control Committee. 
The Committee has the task of carrying out the specific duties assigned to it under the 
Paris Memorandum and to promote by all necessary means the harmonization of 
procedures and practices relating to inspection, rectification, detention and the application 
81 
of the no more favourable treatment clause. 
The Committee (PSCC) held its 33"* meeting in Southampton, United Kingdom, from 9 to 
12 May 2000. The Committee discussed a range of issues and made a number of 
decisions in order to improve the targeting of sub-standard ships and work on the sharing 
of information on ship safety with industry. In the wake of the Erika disaster which 
occurred on 13 December 1999, a 37,283 deadweight Maltese-flag tanker has broken in 
two in heavy seas around 70 miles south of Brest, while en route from Dunkirk to Italy. 
The PSCC announced a concentrated inspection campaign on oil tankers from September 
to November 2000, which will target oil tankers over 15 years of age and over 3000 GT 
and focus on both structure and operational aspects. The PSCC unanimously accepted 
Iceland as the latest ftjU member of the Paris MOU (effective from I July 2000), thereby 
bringing the membership to 19 maritime Administrations. Slovenia was accepted as a 
co-operating member. The Committee also ratified an agreement to supply information to 
EQUASIS from the SIRENAC database. EQUASIS is an information system collating 
existing safety related information on ships from both public and private sources and 
making it available on the internet. It is an international database covering the whole 
world fleet. 
4.1.2 The EQUASIS 
The role of the industry in promoting quality and safety in marine transport is at the heart ol 
the Quality Shipping Campaign, launched by the European Commission and the UK 
Government in November 1997. The campaign's aim is to bring together all players 
involved in the various different fields of marine business in an effort to improve marine 
safety. It is based upon dialogue between all the marine industry and public authorities and 
its tools are primarily voluntary measures. 
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As this campaign has demonstrated, one of the greatest impediments to a genuine quality 
culture in shipping, is the lack of sufficient transparency in the information relating to the 
quality of ships and their operators. 
While much relevant information is collected and available, it is scattered and often difticull 
to access. One of the main conclusions of the Quality Shipping Conference in Lisbon in 
June 1998, was a unanimous call from the participants, representing the whole range of 
industry professionals (including shipowners, cargo owners, insurers, brokers, 
classification societies, agents, ports and terminals), for making such information more 
accessible. 
In response to this call, the European Commission and the French Maritime Administration 
decided to co-operate in developing a data system collating existing safety-related 
information on ships from both public and private sources and making it available on the 
Internet. 
The main principles, in setting up, the Equasis information system are as follows : 
.1 Equasis should be a tool aiming at reducing substandard shipping, and it should 
be limited to safety-related information on ships. 
.2 Equasis has no commercial purpose; it addresses a public concern and should act 
accordingly. 
.3 Equasis should be an international database covering the whole world fleet. 
.4 Active co-operation with all players involved in the maritime industry is needed.. 
.5 Equasis will be a tool used for a better selection of ships, but it wi l l be used on a 
voluntary basis; there wil l be no legal pressure for industry to use Equasis. 
.6 The setting-up and effective operation of Equasis wil l promote the exchange of 
unbiased information and transparency in maritime transport and thus allow 
persons involved in maritime transport to be better informed about the 
performance of ships and maritime organisations with which they are dealing. 
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4,1.3 Paris MOU Secretariat 
The Secretariat, functioning within the Netherlands* Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management, is situated in Rijswijk, near Hague. The Secretariat acts under 
the guidance of the Port State Control Committee. 
In November 1994 the European Union (EU) Transport Council reached a common 
position on the Port State Control Directive, which implies that the EU member states 
agree with its contents and further adoption in the following meeting in June 1995. The 
Directive 95/21/EC on Port State Control was fully implemented by the EU member states 
on 1 July 1996 [4-2]. 
The substance of the Port State Control Directive is more or less based on the technical 
contents of the Paris Memorandum and on common policies agreed within the Port State 
Control Committee, However, the consequences of the introduction of the Port State 
Control Directive in Europe will have a significant effect on the involvement and 
commitment of the EU member states in their capacity as a Port State. Since the Directive 
is a "legislative umbrella" over the Paris Memorandum, the Port State Control effort of the 
EU member states, which are currently based on voluntary commitment, wi l l come under 
strict mandatory prescription of the Directive. 
The relevant instruments for the purposes of the Paris MOU on PSC are: 
.1 The Intemational Convention on Load Line, 1966; 
.2 The Protocol of 1988 relating to the Intemational Convention on Load Line, 
1966; 
.3 The Intemational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74); 
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.4 The Protocol of 1978 relating the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974; 
.5 The Protocol of 1988 relating the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974; 
.6 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78); 
.7 The International convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78); 
.8 The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 (COLREG 72); 
.9 The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969; 
.10 The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards ) Convention, 1976 ( ILO 
Convention No. 147 ) 
During 2000, 18,559 inspections were carried out in the Paris MOU region on 11.358 
foreign ships registered in 101 different Flag States. The number of inspections is slightly 
higher than the inspection figure for 1999 (18,399), and overall, the figures show a steady 
increase in 2000 [4-3]. 
The overall inspection rate in the region was 28.6% in 2000, compared with 27.6% in 
1999, 26.5% in 1997. 
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4.1.4 Targeting System 
Targeting system means a ship targeting scheme by which ships were marked in 
accordance to their performance record. A serious of targeting factors such age and type 
of vessel, its duration between PSC inspection and previous PSC inspection results are 
taken into account to determine the markings of the vessel. It aims to provide a list of 
priority of ship selection for the PSC officer to conduction the inspection in their ports. 
The "Black, Grey and White List" is based on performance over a 3-year rolling period 
but now indicate the fl i l l spectrum between quality flags and flags with a poor 
performance which are considered high or very high risk. The White List represents 
quality flags with a consistently low detention record. Next to the white list is the grey list 
where flag of ships are at a relatively low performance. Down at the bottom is the black 
list where rust bucket or poorly performed flag states would be listed. Ships in this 
category are targeted and boarded more frequent than the ships that are categorized on the 
other lists. This new normative listing of Flag States provides an independent 
categorization that has been prepared on the basis of the Paris MOU Port State inspection 
results. Compared to the calculation method of previous year, this system has the 
advantage of providing an excess percentage that is significant and also reviewing the 
number of inspections and detentions over a 3-year period. 
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4.1.5 Banning of Ships 
At the end of 2000 a total of 16 ships were banned from the Paris MOU region, because 
they failed to call at an agreed repair yard, jumped detentions or were not certified in 
accordance with the ISM Code. During the year 8 ships were placed under the banning 
measures, the remaining ships were banned in previous. By the end o f 2000 the ban had 
been lifted on 2 ships after verification that all deficiencies had been rectified. 
The Paris MOU Port State Control Committee met in St. Petersburg for its 13th meeting. 
During the meeting the Rules of Procedures for that Committee was adopted. Unlike the 
approach taken by Tokyo MOU the Paris MOU introduced directly provisions of the 
resolution into their Memorandum. Thus, the Paris MOU guideline includes annexes, 
self-contained and comprehensive procedures and guideline for Port State inspections. In 
addition, Paris MOU also adopted the provisional guidelines for the control on the ISM 
code and decided to conduct a concentrated inspection campaign on ISM Code during the 
period of July to September in 1998. 
4.1.6 Inspection in the Paris MOU Region 
An outline of inspections throughout the region follows:Table 4,1: Inspections 
Throughout the Region from 1997 to 2000 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
No. of Ships Inspected 10,256 10,719 11,168 11,248 
No. of Inspections 16,070 16,813 17,643 18,399 
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Fable 4.2 Approximate Inspection Efforts By Individual Paris MOU Members (2000) 
MOU states % of Ships Calling Inspected 
Belgium 25.6% 
Canada 35.6% 
Croatia 45.5% 
Denmark 23.8% 
Finland 35.3% 
France 12.2% 
Germany 25.9% 
Greece 23.1% 
Iceland 26.3% 
Ireland 14.65% 
Italy 36.0% 
Netherlands 28.9% 
Norway 22.4% 
Poland 35.5% 
ss 
Portugal 33.0% 
Russian Federation 54.3% 
Spain 32.4% 
Sweden 26.7% 
United Kingdom 27.7% 
A p p r o x i m a t e I n s p e c t i o n E f f o r t s o f 
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Source: Annual Report and Accounts, the Paris MOU 2000 
Under the Paris MOU member states have agreed to inspect 25% of the estimated number 
of individual foreign merchant ships which enter their ports. Each authority wil l achieve, 
within a period of three years from the coming into effect of the Memorandum, an annual 
total of inspections corresponding to 25% of the estimated number of individual foreign 
merchant ships, which entered the its ports during a representative period of 12 months. 
Table 4.3 Overall Number of Ships Detained in Paris MOU 1997 - 2000 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
No. of Ships Inspected 10,256 10,719 11,168 18.559 
Detention as a % of Ships 
Inspected 
10.7% 9.66% 9.06% 9.5% 
Source: Annual Report and accounts, the Paris MOU 2000 
A hard core of Flag States appeared on the Black List. Most flags which were considered 
"high risk" in 1999 remain so in 2000. Newcomers in the category of very high risk and at 
the top of the list are Bolivia and Sao Tome and Principe. 
Table 4.4 Paris MOU Black List 1998 - 2000 
Flag States No. Inspections 
98-00 
No. of 
detentions 98-00 
Excess factor 
Bolivia 50 28 13.16 
Albania 129 79 12.23 
Sao Tome & Principe 33 16 9.82 
Honduras 344 128 9.63 
Lebanon 225 72 7.64 
..21 more states are within the Black List 
The White List represents quality flags with a consistently low detention record. The 
Paris MOU flags of Finland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany and Ireland are placed 
highest in terms of performance. Flag States with an average performance are shown on 
the Grey List. Their appearance on this list may act as an incentive to improve and move 
to the White List. At the same time flags as the lower end of the Grey List should be 
careful not to neglect control over their ships and risk ending up on the Black List next 
year. 
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Table 4.5 Paris MOU Grey List 1998 - 2000 
Portugal 606 53 0.99 
Bulgaria 312 29 0.95 
Azerbaidzhan no 12 0.94 
Cayman Islands 213 19 0.81 
Hong Kong 305 14 0.03 
25 more states are within the Grey List 
Table 4.6 White List 1998 - 2000 
USA 172 6 -0.01 
Korea, Republic of 118 3 -0.08 
Barbados 279 I I -0.15 
China, People's Rep. 412 18 -0.18 
United Kingdom 562 8 -1.48 
.. J 7 more states are within the White List 
Source: Annual Report and Accounts, the Paris MOU 2000 
Table 4.7 Detention per Ship Type - Paris MOU 1999-2000 
1999 2000 
General cargo 13.34% 12.85% 
Bulk Carriers 8.78% 9.26% 
Tankers 5.93% 8.09% 
Gas Carriers 1.64% 2.66% 
Chemical tankers 6.17% 7.28% 
Passenger ships 5.09% 4.83% 
Refrigerated ships 8.31% 7.17% 
Ro-ro / containers 4.43% 4.40% 
Other types 7.71% 4.32% 
All types 9.15% 9.50% 
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Source: Annual Report and Accounts, the Paris MOU 2000 
Table 4.8 Major Categories of Deficiencies in relation to Inspection / Ships 
1998 1999 2000 
Life Saving Appliances 10,445 10,882 10,942 
Fire Safety Measure 7,749 8,052 8,789 
Safety in General 7,603 7,965 9,243 
Safety of Navigation 6,426 6,643 8,055 
Marine Pollution (Oil) 4,112 4,276 4,875 
Ships Certificates 3.204 3,596 3,465 
Load lines 3,161 3,308 3,816 
Prop/Aux Machinery 3,128 2,966 3,671 
Accommodation 1,931 1,889 1,963 
Source: Annual Report and accounts, the Paris MOU 2000 
4.2 Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding 
Recalling the recommendation from the IMO's Resolution (A.682(17)) on regional 
co-operation in Port State Control, the maritime authorities in the Asia Pacific region had 
increased the awareness of the importance and necessity for co-operation on Port State 
Control. Learning the successftil experience from the Paris MOU, a number of countries 
in the Asia Pacific regions started to work together in 1992 to explore ways to establish the 
regional co-operative system on Port State Control [4-4]. 
At the initiative of the Government of Japan, the first preparatory meeting was convened 
on 13 February 1992, in Tokyo. At the meeting, the maritime authorities agreed to 
co-operate with each other to promote Port State Control activities in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, but no decision was taken at that time whether a MOU should be drawn up in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
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At the second meeting in Sydney, Australia on 4-6 November 1992, the authorities agreed 
to develop an MOU and also to set up an Interim Secretariat in Australia. As a result of 
deliberations at two further preparatory meetings, a third meeting in Vancouver, Canada 
in 1-3 June 1993 and a fourth meeting in Tokyo, Japan in 29 November - 2 December 
1993, the Tokyo MOU in Asia Pacific Region was concluded and signed at the Tokyo 
meeting on 2 December 1993 [4-5]. 
The Tokyo MOU was signed by 18 maritime authorities in the Asia-Pacific region: 
Australia, Canada, China, Fiji , Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea. Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vanuatu and Vietnam. 
According to the provisions of the Memorandum, those authorities that have signed and 
formally accepted the Memorandum would become members of the Tokyo MOU. By the 
end of 1995. 12 authorities were full members of the Tokyo MOU: Australia, Canada. 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Russian Federation, Singapore and Vanuatu. 
The Tokyo MOU came into effect from 1 April 1994. A permanent secretariat (the Tokyo 
MOU Secretariat), as an independent body to serve the Port State Control Committee, was 
established in Tokyo, Japan, and became operational in April 1994, The secretariat 
ftjnctions were transferred fi-om the Interim to the Permanent Secretariat at the end of the 
first meeting of the Port State Control Committee. 
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4.2.1 Provision in Tokyo Memorandum 
The Memorandum provides that each authority wil l establish and maintain an effective 
system of Port State Control. 
The following instruments are relevant to the Port State Control inspections: 
.1 The Intemational Convention on Load Line, 1966; 
,2 The Intemational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) 
as amended; 
.3 The Protocol of 1978 relating the Intemational Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974; 
.4 The Intemational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution ft-om Ships, 1973 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78); 
.5 The Intemational convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. 1978 (STCW 78); 
,6 The Convention on the Intemational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 (COLREG 72); 
.7 The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards ) Convention, 1976 ( ILO 
Convention No. 147) 
.8 STCW 95 
.9 ISM 
4.2.2 Operation of Tokyo MOU 
In selecting ships for inspection the authorities pay special attention to: 
. 1 passenger ships, roll-on/roll-off ships and bulk carriers; 
.2 ships which may present a special hazard, including oil tankers, gas carriers, 
chemical tankers and ships carrying harmful substances in packaged form; 
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.3 groups of ships appearing in the three-year rolling average table of above 
average delays and detentions in the annual report of the Memorandum; 
.4 ships that have had several recent deficiencies; and 
,5 ships that have not been inspected by any Authorities within a previous period 
of six months [4-6]. 
The authorities report on their inspections and results and exchange inspection 
information in accordance with the procedures set out in the Memorandum, (To serve this 
purpose, the Asia-Pacific Computerized Information System (APCIS) was established 
under the auspices of Russia Federation.) 
The authorities will endeavor to establish training programmes and seminars for Port State 
Control officers. A Port State Control Committee is to be established, composed of a 
representative of each of the member authorities. A permanent secretariat is established 
in Tokyo, Japan responsible for the procedures and provisions for amendments and 
Administration. 
As an executive body of the MOU, the Port State Control Committee was established, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum, to monitor and control the operation 
and effectiveness of the MOU and to take decisions on matters related to the operation of 
the Tokyo MOU. In addition to the member authorities, observers from non-member 
authorities such as the IMO, ILO, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) and the Paris MOU also participate in the work of the Committee. 
4.2.3 Tokyo MOU Secretariat 
The Tokyo MOU Secretariat (TMS) was established in Tokyo, Japan, as an independent 
public foundation in conformity with the provisions of the Tokyo MOU. The TMS is 
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govemed by and accountable to the Port State Control Committee. It serves the 
committee meetings and also organizes or assists to organize seminars and other training 
activities in the Asia Pacific Region. 
4.2.4 Asia Pacific Computerized Information System (APCIS) 
For storing Port State Inspection data and facilitating of exchange of information among 
authorities in the region, a computerised database system was established in Russia. On 
18-19 Febmary 2000, the 8th meeting of Regional Database Managers (DBM08) was held 
in Nadi, Fij i . The meeting discussed the status of establishment of the regional data 
exchange system and measures to be taken for enhancement of exchange o f information. 
At present, only a limited number of Authorities transmit data to APCIS, but other 
authorities gradually establish their computerised database. 
4.2.5 Inspections Throughout the Tokyo MOU Region 
In 2000, 16,034 inspections were carried out on ships registered in 94 countries. During 
inspections, 10,628 ships were found with deficiencies. Since the total number of 
individual ships operating in the region was estimated at 24,537, the inspection rate in the 
region was approximately 65% in 2000. In 2000, 1,101 detentions were warranted to ship 
registered in 53 countries because of serious deficiencies found on board. The rate for 
detention compared to the inspections carried out was about 6.87%. 
Table 4.9 Inspection rate of member states 
Authorities Total Inspection Inspection Rate 
Australia 2,926 18.25% 
Canada 424 2.64% 
China 1,576 9.83% 
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Fiji 56 0.35% 
Hong Kong 885 5.52% 
Japan 4,248 26.49% 
Indonesia 685 . 4.27% 
Republic of Korea 2,191 13.66% 
Malaysia 235 1.47% 
New Zealand 658 4.10% 
Indonesia 685 4.27% 
Russia Federation 495 3.09% 
Singapore 1,023 6.38% 
Thailand 227 1.42% 
Vanuatu 5 0.03% 
Vietnam 225 1.40% 
Source: Annual Report. Tokyo MOU2000, published June 2001 
Table 4.10 Types of Ships Inspected -Tokyo MOU 
Ship type No. of Ships 
Inspected 
Percentage Detention 
Percentage 
Bulk Carrier 4,541 28.32 % 4.54% 
General Dry Cargo 5261 32.81 % 11.88% 
Ro-Ro Container 2,947 18.38% 3.66% 
Oil Tanker 1,092 6.81% 5.4% 
Reefer Cargo 572 3.57% 7.34% 
Chemical Tanker 574 3.58 % 4.53% 
Gas Carrier 315 1.96% 3.81% 
Passenger ferry 199 1.24% 5.53% 
Others 533 3.32 % 2.25% 
Average detention percentage 1998- 2000 = 7.11% 
Source : Annual Report of Tokyo MOU2000, published June 2001 
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Table 4. I I Detention Per Flag exceeding 3 year rolling average detention 
percentage - Tokyo MOU (Average detention percentage 1998 - 2000 = 
7.11%) 
Flag No. of Detentions Detention 
percentage(%) 
Korea, Dem. Peoples's Republic 43 39.45 
Indonesia 47 38.21 
Vietnam 22 27.85 
Cambodia 112 21.25 
Belize 85 18.81 
Honduras 42 16.41 
Malaysia 46 15.23 
Russia 49 12.25 
Taiwan, China 20 10.99 
Thailand 21 10.99 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 28 9.66 
India 7 8.97 
Flags listed above are the top twelve flags which ships were involved in at least 20 Port 
State Inspections and detention percentage of which are the regional average detention 
percentage. 
Source : Annual Report of Tokyo MOU2000, published June 2001 
Table 4.12 Detention per ship type - Tokyo MOU 
Ship type Detention Percentage 
Bulk Carrier 7.39 % 
General Dry Cargo 7.55 % 
Ro-ro Container 2.89 % 
Oil Tanker 2.60 % 
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Reefer Cargo 3.08 % 
Chemical Tanker 3.38 % 
Gas Carrier 1.01 % 
Passenger ferry 5.06 % 
Others 3.90 % 
Source : Annual Report of Tokyo MOU2000, published June 2001 
Table 4.13 Comparison of number of Deficiencies by main categories 
1998 1999 2000 
Life saving appliances 11025 10266 11774 
Fire safety measures 8050 6407 8758 
Stability, structure and related equipment 5816 5550 7331 
Safety of navigation 5542 5813 7066 
Load lines 4209 3844 4381 
Radiocommunication 1275 2504 2573 
Source : Annual Report of Tokyo MOU2000, published June 2001 
4.3 Acuerdo de Vina del Mar (Latin American Agreement) 
In November 1992, an agreement for co-operation on Port State Control was signed by 10 
maritime authorities in Latin American region, subject to their acceptance of the 
agreement. A secretariat and an information centre network known as ROCRAM 
(Operative Network of Co-operation between maritime authorities of South America, 
Mexico and Panama) were established in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
In November 1994, the first committee meeting of the Latin American Port State Control 
Committee was held in Uruguay. The second meeting took place in Buenos Aires of 
Argentina in September 1995, following countries had registered their acceptance of the 
Acuerdo de Vina del Mar: Argentina, Brazil. Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, 
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Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Under the agreement each country will inspect 
15% of foreign merchant ships visiting their ports to ensure that they comply with major 
IMO/ILO instruments. During the first Committee meeting, it was decided to monitor 
carefully the results of discussions within the Paris MOU framework and to consider their 
possible relevance for the Latin America region at a later stage [4-7]. 
The executive body of the Latin American Agreement on Port State Control is the Port 
State Control Committee. This is composed of representatives of the member states 
which meets once a year, or at shorter intervals i f necessary. Administrative procedures, 
co-ordination and publication of statistics as well as the development of a regional 
database have been arranged under the auspices of the Argentinean Coast Guard based in 
Buenos Aires. 
The Latin American Agreement emphasizes that the main responsibility for effective 
enforcement of International Conventions lies with the owners and the Flag States, but as 
with the other regional agreements it recognizes the "need for effective action for Port 
State in order to prevent the operation of deficient ships". 
The recitals also acknowledge the objectives of ROCRAM and other South American 
regional resolutions and herald a harmonization role for the Agreement when it stated " i t 
is necessary to avoid differences in the treatment given to ships by the different courts and 
that said practices may distort competition between ports". As with the other regional 
agreements it regards its primary role as one of "back up" to the roles of the Flag States 
and coordination, as it states in the recitals: "to implement an efficient harmonic control 
system by Port States and to strengthen cooperation and interchange of information." 
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The Secretariat of the Vina del Mar Agreement held its 7th committee meeting in Panama 
City, Panama, from 16 to 18 August 2000. Important issues were discussed in connection 
with new procedures for vessel inspections in order to eradicate substandard vessel from 
the region. A representative of the International Labour Organization also attended the 
meeting and advised on the possibility of incorporating ILO Convention 147 as a relevant 
instrument. The agenda included new guidelines for Port State Control Officer (PSCO), 
fishing vessel control, procedures to detect fraudulent certificates on board, bulk carrier 
safety and verification of cargo stowage and securing procedures. Training of PSCO'S 
training was also a major item on the agenda. 
4.3.1 Pertinent Instruments 
For the purposes of the Agreement, the internationally accepted Conventions monitored 
by the Agreement are called "Pertinent Instruments" and are: 
.1 The International Convention on Load Line, 1966 (LOADLINES 1996); 
.2 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74); 
.3 The Protocol of 1978 relating the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Protocol); 
.4 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78); 
.5 The International convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. 1978 (STCW 78); 
.6 The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 (COLREG 72); 
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.7 The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement o f Ships, 1969 
(TONNAGE 1969); 
4.3.2 Target Rate For Inspection 
Each participating maritime authority is asked to make efforts to reach, within a maximum 
three year term as from the date of enforcement of this agreement, and survey minimum of 
15% of foreign ships that may have entered the ports of its state during a recent 
representative period of 12 months. As with the other regional agreements, some 
individual countries are exceeding this target, others are falling below it. 
Table 4.14 Inspections where deficiencies were found 
Country Inspections No. of Inspections where 
deficiencies were found 
1998 1999 
(I^^ quarter) 
1998 1999 (l^'quarter) 
Argentina 237 93 142 48 
Brazil 733 564 315 205 
Chile 79 53 55 27 
Columbia 0 39 0 14 
Cuba 117 58 106 56 
Ecuador 1 24 I 1 
Panama 35 14 12 8 
Peru 0 34 0 2 
Uruguay 37 14 19 8 
Total 1,239 893 893 369 
Source: Acuerdo Latin American Sobrc Control de Burque pour el Estano Rector del Pcrto, Estadisticas 
1998 and 1999 
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Table 4.15 Detentions - South America MOU 
Country No. of Detentions 
1998 1999 (1^^ quarter) 
Argentina I 0 
Brazil 18 6 
Chile 8 3 
Colombia Data not available 28 
Cuba 54 Data not available 
Ecuador Data not available 4 
Panama 3 Data not available 
Peru Data not available Data not available 
Uruguay 1 1 
Venezuela Data not available Data not available 
Total 85 42 
Source: Acucrdo Latin American Sobrc Control de Burque pour el Estano Rector del Perto, Estadisticas 
1998 and 1999 
Table 4.16 Comparison of Inspections, Deficiencies and Detentions 1997 - 1999 (First 
Quarter) 
1997 1998 1999(1*' quarter) 
inspection 504 1,239 893 
Deficiencies 297 647 Data not available 
Detentions 893 85 42 
Source: Acuerdo Latin American Sobre Control de Burque pour el Estano Rector del Pcrto, Estadisticas 
1998 and 1999 
In assessing the inspection result in 2001, LATIN America 11-country Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control had not attained its inspection target of 15 per cent of 
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all ships coming to the region. Under the 1992 Vina del Mar agreement, the target 
inspection rate was set at 15 per cent within three years. It wil l take some years to attain 
this percentage, said the agreement secretary and head of the Argentine coast guard Juan 
Jose Beltritti. However, member countries have increased their inspection targets, with a 
resulting decrease in sub-standard ships visiting the region. He declined to provide the 
current, overall inspection target rate. Beltritti said vessels arriving for the first time or 
calling six months after their last inspection are targeted. Countries infrastructure levels, 
resources, information systems and ships calling patterns all impacted on inspection target 
levels. The MOU noted the situation in Europe where they have been working on Port 
State control for more than 20 years and should take into account that some of the Latin 
American members only joined two years ago [4-8]. 
4.4 Port State Control in the USA 
The USA is not a participating member of any of the regional agreements currently in 
force, but it does take a proactive unilateral stance on the subject of the monitoring and 
enforcement of International Conventions and regards it as an increasingly important 
component in the policing and enforcement of maritime regulations. 
Until 1994, boarding to ensure compliance with US regulations for tank ships, passenger 
ships, navigational safety and pollution prevention constituted the US Coast Guard's main 
involvement with non-US ships and only in the most extreme or obvious cases did the 
Coast Guard intervene under the international Conventions (e.g. SOLAS, MARPOL, 
Leadline) to detain non-US ships. 
However, in 1994, the US Congress recognized that there existed a number of 
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sub-standard ships amongst the 8,000 non-US ships arriving in the USA every year and 
directed the Coast Guard to develop a programme to eliminate them from the national 
waters, and to submit annual reports on the status of this mandated programme that has 
come to be called the Port State Control Programme. 
The USA Government maintains that the prime responsibility for compliance with the 
requirements laid down in the intemational maritime conventions lies with the ship owner 
/ operator. It also continues to maintain that the responsibility for ensuring such 
compliance lies with the Flag States, but the language contained in the various statement, 
papers etc. issued by the USCG indicates that while Port State Control is seen as a safety 
net, it is to be regarded as a proactive one and the USCG has recently begun to 
demonstrate, both by statements and by action, that it intends to enforce intemational 
standards stringently. 
4.4.1 Jurisdiction of the Port State Control Programme 
Foreign ships operating in US waters are subject to inspection under Title 46 United State 
Code (USC) Chapter 33. Reciprocity is accorded to ships of countries that are parties to 
the Intemational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (46USC 3303(a)). In 
additional, certain provisions of the pollution prevention and navigation safety regulations 
(33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)154-I56 and 164 respectively) apply to foreign 
ships operating in US waters. 
As there is no agreement or memorandum specifically dedicated to Port State Control, 
there is no conclusive list of the conventions enforced by the USCG under their Port State 
Control regime. However it can be said that detentions and interventions may be 
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undertaken by the USCG under the authority of: 
.1 46 United States Code (USC) 5101 - 5116, Load line requirement for foreign 
ships. 
.2 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (12) 3306(a)(5) and 49 USC 1801 -1812, 
Safety requirements for carriage of dangerous articles and substances abroad 
foreign ships. 
.3 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (21) and (35), 3504 and 3505, Safety 
requirements for foreign ships carrying passengers from any US port to any 
other place and country. 
.4 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (12), (21), (22) and (35) and Chapter 35, 
Inspection and certification requirements for all foreign passenger ships which 
embark passengers at and carry them from a US port. 
.5 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (12) and (39), 3301 (10) and Chapter 37, 
Safety requirements that apply, with certain stipulations, to all foreign ships 
regardless of tonnage, size, or manner of propulsion, whether or not carrying 
freight or passengers for hire, that enter US navigable waters while carrying 
liquid bulk cargoes that are flammable or combustible; oil of any type or in any 
form, including petroleum, fiiel oil, sludge, oil refuse and oil mixed with wastes, 
except dredge spoil; designated as a hazardous substance under Section 311(b) 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)(33USC 1321); or 
designated as hazardous materials under Section 104 of the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) (49 USC 1803); 
.6 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (21) and 3304, Permission for US ships 
transporting cargo to carry a limited number of individuals without being 
considered as a "passenger ship" for most inspection purposes, and extension of 
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this privilege to cargo ships of those nations that accord reciprocal treatment; 
.7 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (33) and 3301 (7), Directs that safety 
requirements of 46 USC Chapter 33 are applicable to seagoing motor ships of 
300 or more gross tons; 
.8 46 United States Code (USC) 2101 (35) and 3301(8), Safety requirements for 
foreign small passenger ships carrying more than six passengers form a US port; 
.9 50 USC 191, Requirements for security of ships, harbours and waterfront 
facilities and provision for control of the movement of foreign ships in US 
waters by the local OCMI / COTP. 
.10 33 USC 1221 -1232, Statutes for advance notice of arrival and navigation safety 
regulations. 
4.4.2 Applicable International Conventions 
.1 The International Convention on Load Line, 1966 (LOADLINES 1996); 
.2 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74); 
.3 The Protocol of 1978 and 1988 relating the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Protocol); 
.4 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78); 
.5 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. 1978 (STCW 78); 
.6 The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 (COLREG 72); 
.7 The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO 
Convention No. 147); 
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.8 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1975 and the Protocol relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil , 1983. 
4.4.3 Selecting a ship for inspection - The Boarding Priority Matrix 
Until 1994, the USCG's ship boarding programme was largely ad hoc, but they now have 
developed a Boarding Priority Matrix as part of their effort to systematically determine the 
probable risk posed by non-US ships calling at US ports. This matrix is used to decide 
which ships Port State Control inspectors should board on any given day, in any given port. 
Ships are assessed in each category and then summed for a total point score. This 
numerical score, along with other performance based factors, determines a ship's 
boarding priority from Priority I through IV. 
In developing this point system, the US Coast Guard has identified five features which 
directly influence a ship's operational condition and compliance with international safety 
and environmental protection standards. These are, 
1. Flag States 
2. Classification societies 
3. Owner and Operators List 
4. Ship Type, and 
5. History 
The first three are particulariy significant and are dealt with as explained below: 
Flag States 
The flag list is composed of those Flag States whose detention ratios exceed the average 
detention ratios for all Flag States whose ships call at US ports. 
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A Flag State's detention ratio is ascertained by dividing the number of its ships which 
have been detained in the last three years by the total number of its ships which have 
called at US ports within the same period. For example, i f a flag has had three of its ships 
detained during the last three years, and a total of 60 of its ships have had US port calls in 
the same period, the detention ratio would be: 3/60 X 100%=5%. The average detention 
ratio is ascertained by dividing the total number of detentions by the total number of 
arrivals for all Flag States. 
The flag list is updated annually on 1 April and remains in effect for twelve months and is 
sent to all Coast Guard Marine Safety Offices. A Flag State may be removed from the list 
when its detention average drops below the overall average Flag State detention average 
or when it is associated with less than two detentions within a twelve months period. 
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Classification societies 
Beginning in 1998 this consists of a two-tier process whereby any classification societies 
with less than ten arrivals in the previous year are eliminated from the process. Then, 
classification societies with more than ten distinct arrivals in the previous year are 
evaluated on their performance over the previous two years. Their performance is based 
on their detention ratio (number of detentions divided by number of distinct arrivals). 
This ratio is then compared to the average detention ratio (total number of detentions 
divided by the total number of distinct arrivals). Classification societies are then assigned 
points according to where their detention ratios fall in relation to the average detention 
ratio. 
Below the Average Detention Ratio = 0 points 
Between the average and 2 times the average = 1 point 
Between 2 times and 3 times the average = 3 points 
Between 3 times and 4 times the average = 5 points 
More than 4 times the average = Priority 1 
Owner/Operator List 
The US Coast Guard Headquarters Ship Compliance Division (G-M0C-2I) compiles a 
list of owners and operators associated with ships that have had more than one ship 
detained by the Coast Guard under the authority of an intemational Convention within the 
last twelve month period. Any ship making a US port call that is owned or operated by a 
person or entity that has had that ship, or a different ship, subject to more than one 
intervention action within the last twelve months is accorded high priority status. 
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Point Score Summary 
Owner Listed owner (5 pts) 
Flag Listed Flag State (7 pts) 
Class Priority I (10 arrivals with detention ratio more than 4 times the average or 
<I0 arrivals, but involved in a detention in the previous 2 years) 
5 Points (10 Arrivals with ratio between 3 & 4 times the average) 
3 Points (10 Arrivals with ratio between 2& 3 times the average) 
1 Points (10 Arrivals with ratio between average and twice the average) 
0 point (10 Arrivals with ratio below average or <10 arrivals, 
(0 detention in the previous 2 years). 
History 
Intervention within 12 months 8 Pts 
Other Operation Control within 12 months 1 Pt 
Casualty within 12 months 1 Pt 
Not boarded within 6 months 1 Pt 
Ship Type 
Oil or Chemical Tanker I Pt 
Gas Carrier 1 Pt 
Bulk carrier > 10 years 2 Pts 
Passenger ship IPt 
Carrying low value commodities in Bulk 2 Pts 
Boarding Priority Matrix - Priorities I-IV and Effects Thereof 
111 
The points are added up for a total point score and the ship's Boarding priority determined 
as follows: 
Priority I Ships 
17 or more points on the matrix, or ships involved in a marine casualty, or USCG Captain 
o f the Port determines a ship to be a potential hazard or to the port or the environment, or 
ships whose classification society has ten or more arrivals the previous year and a 
detention ratio more than four times the average, or ships whose classification society has 
less than ten arrivals the previous year and have been associated with at least one 
detention. 
Port entry may be restricted until ship is examined by the Coast Guard. Priority I ships are 
targeted for examination prior to entry to US ports. Where feasible, these ships are 
boarded prior to port entry to ensure deficiencies are corrected. Otherwise, they are 
boarded upon entry and prior to commencement of cargo transfer operations or passenger 
embarkation. 
Priority I I Ships 
7 to 16 points on the Matrix, or outstanding requirements from a previous boarding in this 
or another US port, or the ship is overdue for an annual tank or passenger ship 
examination. 
Cargo operations may be restricted until ship is examined by the Coast Guard. Priority II 
ships are targeted for boarding prior commencement of cargo transfer operations or 
passenger embarkation. An exemption to the requirement for boarding prior to 
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commencement of cargo transfer operations or passenger embarkation may be granted i f 
there are clear indications that the ship is in substantial compliance with applicable 
standards. 
Priority I I I Ships 
4 to 6 points on the matrix, or alleged deficiencies reported, or the ship is overdue for an 
annual freight examination. Priority I I I ships may be targeted for boarding after entry into 
port, but no operational restrictions are imposed. 
Priority IV Ships 
3 or fewer points on the matrix 
Priority IV ships are not targeted for boarding, but may be boarded and examined by the 
US Coast Guard at the discretion of the local Captain of the Port or the Officer in Charge, 
Marine Inspection. 
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4.4.4 2001 Classification Society Performance Statistics 
Table 4.17 Class related detentions 
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Source: USCG Web Site (July 2000) 
Table 4.18 Target Flag States 2000 
Flag States Detention % 
Antigua & Barbuda 5.56 % 
Belize 38.2 % 
Bolivia 100.00% 
Cambodia 42.86 % 
Cyprus 5.42 % 
Honduras 25.51 % 
India 7.09 % 
Malta 4.75 % 
Panama 5.17% 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 8.43 % 
Philippines 3.59 % 
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Russia 5.17% 
Turkey 7.25 % 
Average Detention percentage 2000 = 2.52 % 
Source: USCG Web Site (July 2000) 
4.4.5 Qualship 21 
On January 1, 2001, Qualship 21 (Quality Shipping for 2P' Century) was implemented. 
Qualship 21 is an initiative to identify high quality non-U.S. flagged vessels, and then 
reward them with incentives. These vessels are managed by well-run companies, classed 
by organizations with a quality track record, have an outstanding PSC record in U.S. 
waters, and are registered with Flag States that have a superior PSC record. Nearly 800 
ships were found eligible for the programme. And 379 vessels were awarded Qualship 
status in March 2001, the first month that incentives began. Incentives for Qualship 21 
vessels include Qualship 21 Certificates, vessel names posted on the Coast Guard PSC 
web site, Qualship designation on EQUASIS files and less frequent PSC exams. 
4.5 Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding (CMOU) 
A memorandum of understanding on PSC in the Caribbean region has been signed by 22 
maritime Administrations in the area in Barbados in February 1996 and adopted the final 
text of a Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (CMOU). 
Fourteen of these Administrations signed the CMOU prior to the closure of the period of 
signature on 9 August 1996 and up to December 1998 ten Caribbean states had accepted 
the CMOU. They are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. A small secretariat was established in 
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Barbados while an information centre was established in Curacao. 
Signatories to the MOU have given themselves three years to reach an annual target of 
inspecting at least 15% of all ships entering Caribbean ports. As a result of a survey in 
1994, over 66% of the MOU signatories did not have properly developed maritime 
Administrations, nor are they in possession of any appropriate shipping legislation. An 
immediate programme for the creation of maritime Administrations were therefore to be 
set up together with the existence of modem shipping legislation. In addition it was found 
that only 41% of the countries involved had accepted the basic I MO safety conventions 
and 54% the main pollution conventions. Action to ratify relevant IMO conventions is 
therefore important to the signatory countries. 
4.5.1 Upgrade of Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) 
Since the adoption of the CMOU in 1996, there has been a flurry of activity in the 
Caribbean region with regards to the up grade of MSAs. The Regional Maritime Safety 
Adviser has undertaken initial mission visits to Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 
Barbados and other Caribbean states and made specific suggestions in relation to the up 
grade of these Administrations. In a number of cases, it was observed that the appropriate 
legislation was already in place for the operation of a MSA, but no action had been taken. 
Following the visits, Guyana, Jamaica and St. Lucia have taken action, including the 
enactment of new shipping legislation and the establishment of MSAs which is of 
sufficient capacity, logistically and substantially to comply in fijil with all provisions and 
activities specified in the CMOU in order to enhance its commitments, which include the 
employment of properly qualified Port State Control officers acting under the 
responsibility of its Administration. 
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4.5.2 Setting of Quality Standards 
The present text of the CMOU does not contain specific provisions regarding quality 
standards. The third meeting of the Caribbean Port State Control Committee reviewed the 
CMOU and in particular the inspection and reporting requirements. The member 
Administrations reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the CMOU in the 
ratification of all relevant instruments of the CMOU. 
The Caribbean Region is fijlly aware of the fact that ratification o f the relevant 
instruments of the CMOU is a pre-requiste for implementation of Port State Control. This 
is one of areas on which the Regional Maritime Safety Adviser has focused on. There has 
been some success, particularly with respect to Guyana and Grenada. A number of states 
which have not yet accepted the CMOU have indicated that their intention is to first ratify 
these instruments before depositing the relevant Letter of Acceptance. 
The 4th PSC Committee meeting of the CMOU took place in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & 
Tobago, on 28 and 29 July 1999 with the participation of 21 countries of the region. 
During the meeting Cuba deposited a letter of acceptance with the Secretariat and thus 
became a full member of the Caribbean MOU. The Committee discussed a Caribbean 
Small Ship Database (CaribShip), developed by Lloyd's Register in co-operation with the 
Regional Maritime Safety Adviser and introduced during the meeting. Furthermore, a 
Caribbean Maritime Inspection Database (CMID), developed by the USCG for the 
Information Centre in Curacao and for use by member countries of the MOU, was 
introduced and discussed. The meeting also considered the creation of a Directory of 
Authorized ship surveyors and agreed that such directory should be established and 
maintained by the Secretariat (Report of the 4**' PSC Committee meeting of the Caribbean 
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MOU). 
4.6 Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding 
Eight Mediterranean countries signed a memorandum of understanding on PSC in July 
1997 in Valetta. The maritime authorities of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Malta, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey have undertaken to meet certain criteria in harmonizing 
inspections, exchanging information and strengthening co-operation between. With a 
secretariat has been set up in Alexandria and its information centre in Casablanca, the 
signatory countries pledged to inspect 15% of the foreign merchant ships entering their 
ports. Technical assistance from both IMO and the European Commission are to be 
rendered in order to achieve a vested interest in harmony of high standards of merchant 
shipping going to North Europe and be connected with the Paris MOU. 
4.6.1 Qualification and training requirements of PSCOs 
The PSCO should be an experienced officer qualified as Flag State surveyor and should be 
able to communicate in English with the key crew. The Administration should provide 
training for PSCOs for the necessary knowledge of the provisions of the applicable 
conventions which are relevant to the conduct of Port State Control, taking into account 
the latest IMO Model Courses for Port State Control. Periodical seminars for PSCOs 
should be held in order to update their knowledge with respect to instruments related to 
Port State Control [4-9]. 
In specifying the qualifications and training requirements for PSCOs, the Administration 
should take into account, as appropriate, which of the internationally agreed instruments 
are relevant for the control by the Port State and the variety of types of ships which may 
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enter its ports. 
PSCOs carrying out inspections of operational requirements should be qualified as: a 
master or chief engineer and have appropriate seagoing experience, or have qualifications 
from an institution recognized by the Administration in a maritime related field and have 
specialised training to ensure adequate competence and skill, or be a qualified officer of 
the Administration with an equivalent level of experience and training, for perfonning 
inspections of the relevant operational requirements. 
The 3rd PSC Committee meeting of the Mediterranean MOU took place in Limassol, 
Cyprus, from 6 to 8 October 1999. As of July 1999. Jordan signed and accepted the MOU 
and thus became a full member. The Committee discussed general matters relating to the 
Secretariat and Information Centre and training programmes. Furthermore, the meeting 
dealt with the problem of transitional certificates of competence and decided not to accept 
them. Procedures and a framework for detentions were also discussed, in particular the 
question of charging for verification inspections. They will be communicating with IMO 
and other MOUs regarding appropriate action. The meeting also considered a proposal 
for the Secretariat to establish a website (Report of the 3rd PSC Committee meeting of the 
Mediterranean MOU). 
4.6.2 Summary on Regional Memoranda of Understanding 
As more and more countries have taken part in the Port State Control activities, it has 
become very important that different authorities - especially those that are within the 
same geographical region - should co-operate and co-ordinate with each other to achieve 
the best effect through these activities. These included sharing of information, 
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consolidating common standards, and monitoring rectification actions taken by owners. 
Today, numbers of regional MOUs have been set up. They have covered the range of 
nearly all over the world, (except for some regions in Africa.) and have the following 
aspects in common: 
Adoption of the main IMO and ILO conventions and regulations and standards; 
Establishment of a central data base accessible to all member authorities; 
agreement on inspection rates that all member authorities should achieve in order to 
ensure that an adequate number of ships have been inspected; 
Development of priority lists for use in selection of ships for inspection. 
Recent reports from different MOUs revealed that the inspection rates for vessel have 
been increasing in all regions, and also the developed countries have a higher inspection 
rates than others. Various MOUs including USA's separate system are all playing an 
important role on PSC. 
4.7 Contextual Conclusions 
Sub-standard ships have existed for a long time, and will continue to exist in the future. As 
technologies develop and the shipping industry advances, standards become higher. This 
will give rise to new kinds of sub-standard ships. To ensure maritime safety and 
protection of the environment, intemational organizations such as IMO and ILO have 
developed a number of conventions and regulations setting out standards of safety and 
120 
environment protection. These have been updated by working out revisions whenever 
needed. Such conventions and regulations are implemented by member states and class 
societies through registration and classification activities. However, some Flag States fail 
to detect and eradicate sub-standard ships. These ships usually endanger countries or 
regions they sail to, and compete unfairly with other standard ships. 
Economies in crew numbers, rates of pay, low registry charges and taxes, reduced 
standards of maintenance, cheaper ship construction, lack of training expense and so on, 
in one word is cost saving always conflict with safety of life and environment protection. 
A functional system to fight against and control this trend within a relative balance level 
and flirther to gradually improve the operating standard of shipping is needed. PSC is an 
effective weapon in implementing all relevant conventions that international societies 
develop. 
To protect themselves from these losses. Port States have to carry out ship inspections to 
eliminate sub-standard ships from their regions. Port State Control is a very effective 
method of enforcing International Conventions and regulations. It acts as an essential back 
up for the Flag States. As Port State Control is adopted by more and more authorities, 
regional co-operation and co-ordination must be considered. This has led to establishing 
of various regional MOUs around the world. The establishment of regional MOUs sets a 
new era for Port State Control. It enables Port State Control to be more standardized and 
organized, thus maximizes the final effects. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
CONDUCT OF PSC INSPECTIONS IN HONG KONG 
5.1 Conduct of PSC Inspections 
Hong Kong has a large number of sub-standard ships using its port facilities. Over the 
past few years major deficiencies, revealed through PSC inspection and resulting in 
detention, were found in a significant number of such vessels. The direct sources of 
authority for exercising Port State Control in Hong Kong waters are the laws of Hong 
Kong, and are based on relevant intemational IMO conventions. Hong Kong as an 
associate member of IMO has adopted these conventions, and incorporated them in its 
legislation. While Hong Kong Regulations apply specifically to Hong Kong registered 
ships, they apply also to foreign flag ships when they are in Hong Kong waters. In 
practice however, those provisions of the regulations which are in excess of the 
requirement of the intemational conventions are seldom used against foreign registered 
ships. 
When detention is required, it would be normally for the PSCO to withhold port clearance 
of a vessel until the ship has rectified the immediate deficiencies and is considered safe to 
proceed to sea. This is done under Section 11 of the Shipping and Port Ordinance Chapter 
313 - "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Ordinance, the Director (of Marine), i f 
he is satisfied that there is reason for doing so, may refuse permission for a vessel, or class, 
type or description of vessel, to enter or leave the waters of Hong Kong". A l l the existing 
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laws related to the marine operation of the ports of Hong Kong still remain valid after the 
sovereignty change on 1 July 1997. 
5.1.1 Application of the Clause of *no more favourable treatment' 
Ships of a non-party or below convention size to a relevant instrument wi l l be given no 
more favourable treatment, for example ships below 500 gross tonnage for application of 
SOLAS convention. As ships of non-Parties and ships below convention size are not 
provided with SOLAS, Load Line or MAHPOL certificates, as applicable, or the crew 
members may not hold valid STCW certificates, the Port State Control Officer (PSCO) 
should be satisfied that the ship and crew do not present a danger to those on board or an 
unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. 
I f the ship or crew has some form of certification other than that required by a convention, 
the PSCO may take the form and content of this documentation into account in the 
evaluation of that ship. The conditions of and on such a ship and its equipment and the 
certification of the crew and the Flag State's minimum manning standard shall be 
compatible with the aims of the provisions of the conventions; the PSCO might use his 
professional judgment in accordance with the minimum safety standard as required by the 
Intemational Convention to see i f the ship is safe. In any event when a ship is found to be 
unsafe, it is not be permitted to depart from Hong Kong until the major deficiencies have 
been rectified. Such detention could last as little as a few hours, but on occasion have 
lasted as long as three to four days. 
Hong Kong has been conducting PSC for many years. The earliest recorded inspection 
was in April 1986. At this time there were very few inspections conducted within the 
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Asia-Pacific region in accordance with PSC policy on board foreign flagged vessels. The 
growing concern of sub-standard shipping movements fi-om one region to another to 
escape the * safety net* lead to more concentrated and enhanced inspections being 
conducted, especially in Hong Kong where large volumes of shipping are trading daily. 
5.1.2 Targets 
The targeting of ships within the region varies from state to state; Hong Kong currently 
pursues a target of 15% of all ships entering Hong Kong. The target is based upon the 
number of ships entering the port, which have not been inspected within the last 6 months. 
Where * clear grounds' exist the officer will conduct an extended inspection after the initial 
documentation checks. 
The targeting system is still under development in the Tokyo MOU region. A working 
group has been set up and led by Australia during the lO"^  Port State Control Committee in 
October 2001 to study a targeting system for the region. In selecting ships for inspection, 
the PSC team will refer to the statistics published in the Tokyo MOU report. Ships that are 
above the rolling average detention rate will be given a high boarding priority. 
5.1.3 Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) 
Hong Kong maintains a section of dedicated and experienced PSC officers, all who are 
qualified ship surveyors fi-om the main disciplines of Master Mariners, Engineers and 
Naval Architects. 
Hong Kong PSCOs follow the principles and guidelines for conducting PSC inspections 
on foreign flagged vessels in accordance with the contents of IMO resolution A.787(19) 
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and the guidelines prepared by the TMOU PSC manual[5-l]. A l l PSCOs are qualified to 
carry out PSC inspections independently. Moreover, training courses are attended by 
PSCOs to gain further experience and to up date their knowledge and skill via various 
technical co-operation programmes. 
5.1.4 Prior to boarding 
The Port State Control Section of the Marine Department receives a copy of the daily 
movement of the ships in the port from the Vessel Traffic Control Centre. An initial 
selection of the vessels to be visited will be based on elements of priority as laid down in 
the Tokyo MOU, such selection may be undertaken on the basis o f 
1. the types of ship selection; 
2. the request of, or on the basis of, information regarding a ship provided by 
another state, or 
3. information regarding a ship provided by a member of the crew, a professional 
body, an association, a trade union or any other individual with an interest in the 
safety of the ship, its crew and passengers, or the protection o f the marine 
environment. In the case that an inspection is initiated based on a report or 
complaint, especially i f it is fi-om a crew member, the source of the information 
is not to be disclosed. 
The PSCO is then issued with Port State Control Forms A & B and heads directly to the 
selected vessel for an unscheduled inspection. 
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Table 5.1 Report of Inspection on Port State Control Form A 
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Table 5.2 Report of Inspection on Port State Control Form B 
F O R M B 
REPORT OF (NSPCCTION IN ACCOROANCe WITH THE MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDIMO ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACrFIC REGION 
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5.1.5 The Inspection 
On arriving at the vessel the PSCO may gain much from its appearance in the water. An 
impression of its standard of maintenance can be gained, before boarding, from the 
condition of its paintwork, and the existence of corrosion or pitting or unrepaired damage. 
The year of build and size of the ship for the purpose of determining which provisions of 
the conventions are applicable should be ascertained at the earliest possible opportunity. 
When boarding a ship, the PSCO should present to the master or to the representative of 
the owner, i f requested to do so, the PSCO warrant card. This card should be accepted as 
documented evidence that the PSCO in question is duly authorized by the Marine 
Department to carry out Port State Control inspections. The PSCO then asks whether the 
vessel has been PSC inspected within the previous six months in other states. The 
signatory states of the Tokyo MOU have agreed not to spend further effort on any vessel 
which has been undergone a PSC inspection within the previous six month period. 
Inspection commences with an examination of the vessel's relevant certificates and 
documents as follows: 
For passenger ships, general cargo and bulk carriers: 
. 1 Intemational Tonnage Certificate (1969); 
.2 Passenger Ship Safety Certificate; Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate; 
Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate; Cargo Ship Safety Radiotelegraphy 
Certificate; Cargo Ship Safety Radiotelephony Certificate; Cargo Ship Safety 
Radio Certificate; Exemption Certificate; Cargo Ship Safety Certificate; 
.3 Intemational Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate; 
.4 Intemational Load Line Certificate (1966); Intemational Load Line Exemption 
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Certificate; 
.5 Oil Record Book parts I and I I ; 
.6 Cargo Record Book; 
.7 Minimum Safe Manning document; Certificates of Competency; 
.8 Stability information; 
.9 Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan; 
.10 Certificates as to the ship's hull strength and machinery installations issued by 
the classification society i f the ship is classed (Class certificate); 
. 11 Reports of previous Port State Control inspections; 
. 12 Document of Compliance; 
.13 Safety Management Certificate. 
For other specialised vessels ( chemical carrier, oil tanken vessels carrying dangerous 
goods): 
.14 International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in 
Bulk; Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk, i f 
applicable; 
.15 International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk; 
Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk, i f applicable. 
.16 International Pollution Prevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious 
Liquid Substances in Bulk, i f applicable; 
I f the certificates are valid and the PSCO's general impression and visual observations on 
board confirm a good standard of maintenance, the PSCO wil l generally confine the 
inspection to reported or observed deficiencies, i f any. Form A wil l then be issued by the 
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PSCO to indicate that nil or minor observed deficiencies have been found during the 
inspection [5-2]. 
It should be noted that any PSC inspection in Hong Kong are normally limited to verifying 
that there are, on board, valid certificates and other relevant documentation, and the PSCO 
forming an impression of the overall condition of the ship, its equipment and its crew, 
unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its equipment 
does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificates. 
I f the PSCO, ft'om general impressions or observations on board, has clear grounds for 
believing that the ship, its equipment or its crew does not substantially meet the 
requirements, the PSCO then proceeds to a more detailed inspection. The following 
would constitute clear grounds for PSCO to conduct a more detailed inspection: 
.17 the absence of principal equipment or arrangements required by the 
conventions; 
. 18 evidence from a review of the ship's certificates that a certificate or certificates 
are clearly invalid; 
.19 evidence that the ship's logs, manuals or other required documentation are not 
on board, are not maintained, or are falsely maintained; 
.20 evidence from the PSCO's general impressions and observations that serious 
hull or structural deterioration or deficiencies exist that may place at risk the 
structural, watertight or weather tight integrity of the ship; 
.21 evidence from the PSCO's general impressions or observations that serious 
deficiencies exist in the safety, pollution prevention, or navigational equipment; 
.22 information or evidence that the master or crew is not familiar with essential 
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shipboard operations relating to the safety of ships or the prevention of pollution, 
or that such operations have not been carried out; 
.23 indications that key crew members may not be able to communicate with each 
other or with other persons on board; 
.24 absence of an up-to-date muster list, fire control plan, and for passenger ships, a 
damage control plan; 
.25 the emission of false distress alerts not followed by proper cancellation 
procedures; 
.26 receipt of a report or complaint containing information that a ship appears to be 
sub-standard. 
5.1.6 More Detailed Inspection 
I f the ship does not carry valid certificates, or i f the PSCO, from general impressions or 
observations on board, has clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its 
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificates, or that 
the master or crew is not familiar with essential shipboard procedures, a more detailed 
inspection is carried out. Perhaps even more importantly, i f the PSCO has clear grounds 
for believing that the ship might be sub-standard, he will then proceed to a more detailed 
inspection. The more common areas in which serious deficiencies have been found to 
exist are detailed below, photographs showing deficiencies revealed by inspection are 
given in figures 5.1 to 5.20. 
5.1.6.1 Structure 
The PSCO's impression of hull maintenance and the general state on deck, the condition 
o f such items as ladderways, guard-rails, pipe coverings and areas of corrosion or pitting 
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will influence the PSCO's decision as to whether it is necessary to make the fullest 
possible examination of the stmcture with the ship afloat. Significant areas o f damage or 
corrosion, or pitting of plating and associated stiffening in decks and hull affecting 
seaworthiness or strength to take local loads, may justify detention. It may be necessary 
for the underwater portion of the ship to be checked. In reaching a decision, the PSCO has 
regard to the seaworthiness and not the age of the ship, making an allowance for fair wear 
and tear over the minimum acceptable scantlings. Damage not affecting seaworthiness 
does not constitute grounds for judging that a ship should be detained, nor wi l l damage 
that has been temporarily but effectively repaired for a voyage to a port for permanent 
repairs. However, in this assessment of the effect of damage, the PSCO has regard to the 
location of crew accommodation and whether the damage substantially affects its 
habitability. 
Fig. 5.1 Corroded stanchion on deck Fig. 5.2 A deformed longitudinal 
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Fig. 5.3 Cracked stiffener on deck 
5.1.6.2 Machinery spaces 
The PSCO assesses the condition of the machinery and of the electrical installations to 
confirm that they are capable of providing sufficient continuous power for propulsion and 
for auxiliary services. 
During inspection of the machinery spaces, the PSCO forms an impression o f the standard 
of maintenance. Frayed or disconnected quick-closing valve wires, disconnected or 
inoperative extended control rods or machinery trip mechanisms, missing valve hand 
wheels, evidence of chronic steam, water and oil leaks, dirty tank tops and bilges or 
extensive corrosion of machinery foundations are pointers to an unsatisfactory 
organization of the systems' maintenance. A large number of temporary repairs, including 
pipe clips or cement boxes, will indicate reluctance to make permanent repairs. 
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i 
Fig. 5.4 An Oily Water Separator Fig. 5.5 Leaking sight-glass 
i 
Fig. 5.6 Direct overboard bilge connection 
While it is not possible to determine the condition of the machinery without performance 
trials, general deficiencies, such as leaking pump glands, dirty water gauge glasses, 
inoperable pressure gauges, rusted relief valves, inoperative or disconnected safety or 
control devices, evidence of repeated operation of diesel engine scavenge belt or 
crankcase relief valves, malfunctioning or inoperative automatic equipment and alarm 
systems, and leaking boiler casings or uptakes, would warrant inspection o f the engine 
room log book and investigation into the record of machinery failures and accidents and a 
request for running tests of machinery. 
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5.1.6.3 Conditions of Assignment of Load lines 
It may be that the PSCO has concluded that a hull inspection is unnecessary but, i f 
dissatisfied on the basis of observations on deck, with items such as defective hatch 
closing arrangements, corroded air pipes and vent coamings, the PSCO should then 
examine closely the conditions of assignment of load lines, paying particular attention to 
closing appliances, means of freeing water from the deck and arrangements concerned 
with the protection of the crew. 
Fig. 5.7 Damaged weather tight door Fig. 5.8 Broken closing wire for vent flap 
5.1.6.4 Life-saving Appliances 
The effectiveness of life-saving appliances depends heavily on good maintenance by the 
crew and their use in regular drills. The lapse of time since the last survey for a Safety 
Equipment Certificate can be a significant factor in the degree of deterioration of 
equipment i f it has not been subject to regular inspection by the crew. 
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Fig. 5.9 An inverted lifebuoy light Fig. 5.10 Improper securing of a boarding ladder 
Apart from failure to carry equipment required by a convention or obvious defects such as 
holed lifeboats, the PSCO looks for signs of disuse of, or obstructions to, survival craft 
launching equipment which may include paint accumulation, seizing of pivot points, 
absence of greasing, condition o f blocks and falls and improper lashing or stowing of deck 
cargo. 
Fig. 5.11 Life raft without weaklink Fig. 5.12 Broken life boat davit 
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Fig. 5.13 Blocking means of access to liferaft station 
Should such signs be evident, the PSCO would be justified in making a detailed inspection 
of all life-saving appliances. Such an examination might include the lowering of survival 
craft, a check on the servicing of liferafts, the number and condition of lifejackets and 
lifebuoys and ensuring that the pyrotechnics are still within their period of validity. It 
would not normally be as detailed as that for a renewal of the Safety Equipment 
Certificate and would concentrate on essentials for safe abandonment of the ship, but in an 
extreme case could progress to a f i i l l Safety Equipment Certificate inspection. The 
provision and functioning of effective overside lighting, means of alerting the crew and 
passengers and provision of illuminated routes to assembly points and embarkation 
positions should be given importance in the inspection. 
5.1.6.5 Fire Safety 
Ships in general: The poor condition of fire and wash deck lines and hydrants and the 
possible absence of fire hoses and extinguishers in accommodation spaces might be a 
guide to a need for a close inspection of all fire safety equipment. In addition to 
compliance with convention requirements, the PSCO looks for evidence of a higher than 
normal fire risk; this might be brought about by a poor standard of cleanliness in the 
machinery space, which together with significant deficiencies o f fixed or portable 
fire-extinguishing equipment could lead to a judgment of the ship being sub-standard. 
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Passenger ships: The PSCO should initially form an opinion of the need for inspection of 
the fire safety arrangements on the basis of consideration of the ship under the previous 
headings and, in particular, that dealing with fire safety equipment. I f the PSCO considers 
that a more detailed inspection of fire safety arrangements is necessary, the PSCO should 
examine the fire control plan on board in order to obtain a general picture of the fire safety 
measures provided in the ship and consider their compliance with convention 
requirements for the year of build. 
Fig. 5.14 Deficient emergency fire pump Fig.5.15 Damaged portable fire extinguisher 
Fig.5.I6 Damaged fire hydram 
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The spread of fire could be accelerated i f fire doors are not readily operable. The PSCO 
should inspect for the operability and securing arrangements of those doors in the main 
zone bulkheads and stairway enclosures and in boundaries of high fire risk spaces, such as 
main machinery rooms and galleys, giving particular attention to those retained in the 
open position. Attention is also given to main vertical zones which may have been 
compromised through new construction. An additional hazard in the event of fire is the 
spread of smoke through ventilation systems. Spot checks might be made on dampers and 
smoke flaps to ascertain the standard of operability. The PSCO should also ensure that 
ventilation fans can be stopped from the master controls and that means are available for 
closing main inlets and outlets of ventilation systems. 
Attention is given to the effectiveness of escape routes by ensuring that vital doors are not 
maintained locked and that alleyways and stairways are not obstructed. 
5.1.6.6 Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
A vital aspect of ensuring safety of life at sea is full compliance with the collision 
regulations. Based on observations on deck, the PSCO should consider the need for close 
inspection of lanterns and their screening and means of making sound and distress signals. 
Fig. 5.17 "Al l round" stem light 
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5.1.6.7 Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate 
The general condition of the ship may lead the PSCO to consider matters other than those 
concerned with safety equipment and assignment of load lines, but nevertheless 
associated with the safety of the vessel, such as the effectiveness of items associated with 
the Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate, which can include pumping arrangements, 
means for shutting of f air and oil supplies in the event of fire, alami systems and 
emergency power supplies. 
5.1.6.8 Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificates 
The validity of the Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificates and associated Record of 
Equipment (Form R) may be accepted as proof of the provision and effectiveness of its 
associated equipment, but the PSCO should ensure that appropriate certificated personnel 
are carried for its operation and for listening periods. Requirements for maintenance of 
radio equipment are contained in SOLAS regulation IV/15. The radio log or radio records 
should be examined. Where considered necessary, operational checks may be carried out. 
5.1.6.9 Muster List 
The PSCO may determine i f the crew members are aware of their duties indicated in the 
muster list. He may ensure that muster lists are exhibited in conspicuous places 
throughout the ship, including the navigational bridge, the engine room and the crew 
accommodation spaces. When determining i f the muster list is in accordance with the 
regulations, the PSCO may verify whether: 
.1 the muster list shows the duties assigned to the different members of the 
crew; 
.2 the muster list specifies which officers are assigned to ensure that 
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life-saving and fire appliances are maintained in good condition and are 
ready for immediate use; 
.3. the muster list specifies the substitutes for key persons who may become 
disabled, taking into account that different emergencies may call for 
different actions; 
.4 the muster list shows the duties assigned to crew members in relation to 
passengers in case of emergency; 
.5 the format of the muster list used on passenger ships is approved. 
Fig. 5.18 Life boat station 
In order to determine whether the muster list is up to date, the PSCO may require an 
up-to-date crew list, i f available, to verify this. Other possible means, e.g. Safe Manning 
Document could be used. 
The PSCO may determine whether the duties assigned to crew members manning the 
survival crafl (lifeboats or liferafts) are in accordance with the regulations and verify that a 
deck officer or certificated person is placed in charge of each survival crafl to be used. 
However, the Administration (of the Flag State), having due regard to the nature of the 
voyage, the number of persons on board and the characteristics of the ship, may permit 
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persons practised in the handling and operation of liferafts to be placed in charge of 
liferafts in lieu of persons qualified as above. A second-in-command shall also be 
nominated in the case of lifeboats. 
5.1.6.10 Communication 
The PSCO may determine i f the key crew members are able to communicate with each 
other, and with passengers as appropriate, in such a way that the safe operation of the ship 
is not impaired, especially in emergency situations. He may ask the master which 
languages are used as the working languages and ensure that the key crew members are 
able to understand each other during the inspection or drills. The crew members assigned 
to assist passengers should be able to give the necessary information to the passengers in 
case of an emergency. 
5.1.6.11 Fire and Abandon Ship Drills 
The PSCO witnessing a fire and abandon ship drill should ensure that the crew members 
are familiar with their duties and the proper use of the ship's installations and equipment. 
He may witness a fire drill carried out by the crew assigned to these duties on the muster 
list. After consultation with the master of the vessel, one or more specific locations of the 
ship may be selected for a simulated fire. A crew member may be sent to the location(s) 
and activate a fire alarm system or use other means to give alarm. Those crew members 
assigned to other duties related to a fire drill, such as the manning o f the emergency 
generators, the CO2 room, the sprinkler and emergency fire pumps, should also be 
involved in the drill. The PSCO may ask these crew members to explain their duties and i f 
possible to demonstrate their familiarity. 
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Fig. 5.19 Abandon ship dnll Fig. 5.20 Lowering of lifeboat 
5.1.6.12 Damage Control Plan and Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan 
(SOPEP) 
The PSCO could determine i f a damage control plan is provided on a passenger ship and 
whether the crew members are familiar with their duties and the proper use of the ship's 
installations and equipment for damage control purposes. The same applies with regard to 
SOPEP on all ships. He may determine i f the officers of the ship are aware o f the contents 
of the damage control booklet which should be available to them, or of the damage control 
plan. The officers may be asked to explain the action to be taken in various damage 
conditions. They could be expected to have a sound knowledge of the effect of trim and 
stability of their ship in the event of damage to and consequent flooding of a compartment 
and counter-measures to be taken. 
5.1.6.13 Fire Control Plan 
The PSCO may determine i f a fire control plan or booklet is provided and whether the 
crew members are familiar with the information given in the fire control plan or booklet 
and may verify that fire control plans are permanently exhibited for the guidance of the 
ship's officers. Alternatively, booklets containing the information of the fire control plan 
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may be supplied to each officer, and one copy should at all times be available on board in 
an accessible position. Plans and booklets should be kept up to date, any alterations being 
recorded thereon as soon as possible. 
5.1.6.14 Bridge Operation 
The PSCO may determine i f officers in charge of a navigational watch are familiar with 
bridge control and navigational equipment, changing the steering mode from automatic to 
manual and vice versa, and the ship's manoeuvre characteristics. The officer in charge of 
a navigational watch should have knowledge of the location and operation of all safety 
and navigational equipment. Moreover, this officer should be familiar with procedures 
which apply to the navigation of the ship in all circumstances and should be aware of all 
information available. 
He may also verify the familiarity of the officers on all the information available to them 
such as manoeuvre characteristics of the ship, life-saving signals, up-to-date nautical 
publications, checklists concerning bridge procedures, instructions, manuals, etc. and may 
verify the familiarity of the officers with procedures such as periodical tests and checks of 
equipment, preparations for arrival and departure, change over of steering modes, 
signaling, communications, maneuvering, emergencies and log book entries. 
5.1.6.15 Cargo Operation 
The PSCO may determine i f ship's personnel assigned specific duties related to the cargo 
and cargo equipment are familiar with those duties, any dangers posed by the cargo and 
with the measures to be taken in such a context. With respect to the carriage of solid bulk 
cargoes, the PSCO should verify, as appropriate, that cargo loading is performed in 
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accordance with a ship's loading plan and unloading in accordance with a ship's unloading 
plan agreed by the ship and the terminal. 
5.1.6.16 Certification of Seafarer 
The PSCO should verify that all seafarers serving on board, who are required to be 
certificated, hold an appropriate certificate or a valid dispensation, or provide 
documentary proof that an application for an endorsement has been submitted to the 
Administration and to ensure that the numbers and certificates of the seafarers serving on 
board are in conformity with the applicable safe manning requirements of the 
Administration. The PSCO may assess the ability of the seafarers of the ship to maintain 
watchkeeping standards as required by the Convention i f there are clear grounds for 
believing that such standards are not being maintained because any o f the following have 
occurred: 
. I The ship has been involved in a collision, grounding or stranding, or 
.2 There has been a discharge of substances from the ship when underway, at 
anchor or at berth which is illegal under any international convention, or 
.3 The ship has been maneuvered in an erratic or unsafe manner whereby routeing 
measures adopted by the Organization or safe navigation practices and 
procedures have not been followed, or 
.4 The ship is otherwise being operated in such a manner as to pose a danger to 
persons, property or the environment. 
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5.1.6.17 Equipment in Excess of Convention or Flag State Requirements 
Equipment on board which is expected to rely on in situations affecting safety or pollution 
prevention must be in operating condition. I f such equipment is inoperative and is in 
excess of the equipment required by an appropriate convention and/or the Flag State, it 
should be repaired, removed or, i f removal is not practicable, clearly marked as 
inoperative and secured. 
5.1.6.18 Detention of Vessels 
The lack of valid certificates as required by the relevant instruments may warrant the 
detention of ships. However, ships flying the flag of a state not party to a convention or not 
having implemented another relevant instrument, are not entitled to carry the certificates 
provided for by the convention or other relevant instrument. Therefore, absence of the 
required certificates should not by itself constitute a reason to detain these ships; however, 
in applying the "no more favourable treatment" clause, substantial compliance with the 
provisions and criteria specified in this document must be required before the ship sails. 
It should be recognized that all equipment is subject to failure and spares or replacement 
parts may not be readily available. In such cases, undue delay should not be caused if, in 
the opinion of the PSCO, safe alternative arrangements have been made. Where a ship has 
suffered accidental damage and enters port for examination and repairs, the Port State may 
ascertain the remedial action that is being considered. I f it is established that appropriate 
remedial action is being taken to render the vessel safe to proceed to sea, no detention 
order should be issued. 
Since detention of a ship is a serious matter involving many issues, it may be in the best 
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interest of the PSCO to act with other interested parties. For example, the PSCO may 
request the owner's representatives to provide proposals for correcting the situation. The 
PSCO may also consider co-operating with the Flag State Administration's 
representatives or recognized organization responsible for issuing the relevant certificates, 
and consulting them regarding their acceptance of the owner's proposals and their 
possible additional requirements. Without limiting the PSCO s discretion in any way, the 
involvement of other parties could result in a safer ship, avoid subsequent arguments 
relating to the circumstances of the detention, and prove advantageous in the case of 
litigation involving undue delay. 
Where deficiencies cannot be remedied at the port of inspection, the PSCO may allow the 
ship to proceed to another port, subject to any appropriate conditions determined. In such 
circumstances, the PSCO needs to ensure that the competent authority of the next port of 
call and the Flag State are notified. 
When deciding whether the deficiencies found in a ship are sufficiently serious to merit 
detention the PSCO should assess whether: 
. 1 the ship has relevant, valid documentation; 
.2 the ship has the crew required in the minimum Safe Manning Document. 
During inspection the PSCO will further assess whether the ship and/or crew, throughout 
its forthcoming voyage, will be able to: 
.3 navigate safely; 
.4 safely handle, carry and monitor the condition of the cargo; 
.5 operate the engine-room safely; 
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.6 maintain proper propulsion and steering; 
,7 fight fires effectively in any part of the ship i f necessary; 
.8 abandon ship speedily and safely and effect rescue i f necessary; 
.9 prevent pollution of the environment; 
.10 maintain adequate stability; 
. 11 maintain adequate watertight integrity; 
.12 communicate in distress situations i f necessary; and 
. 13 provide safe and healthy conditions on board. 
I f the result of any of these assessments is negative, taking into account all deficiencies 
found, the ship should be strongly considered for detention. A combination o f deficiencies 
of a less serious nature may also warrant the detention of the ship[5-6]. 
Hong Kong, in the opinion of one agent, is the strictest port in the region in regard of its 
rate of vessel detention during Port State Control inspections. One must wonder i f the 
right line was drawn to the various deficiencies identified on board by the PSCO as to the 
justification of such detentions. 
But the practice is to find in favour of the ship whenever possible. In the course of PSC 
inspection, it is the PSCO* s duty to ensure all possible efforts are made to avoid a ship 
being unduly detained or delayed. I f a ship is unduly detained or delayed, it shall be 
entitled to compensation for any loss or damage suffered. It should be borne in mind that 
the main purpose of Port State Control is to prevent a ship proceeding to sea i f it is unsafe 
or presents an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. The PSCO should 
exercise professional judgment to determine whether to detain a ship until the deficiencies 
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are corrected or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies, having regard to the particular 
circumstances of the intended voyage. 
Despite this approach, in 2000, the number of Port State Control inspections (excluding 
any follow up inspection) was 885, while the number of detentions was 85, indicating a 
detention rate of 9.6%. The detention for the year of 1999 was at 13.56%[5-3], Theseare 
high detention rates and are indicative of the extent of sub-standard shipping found to be 
operating in Hong Kong waters. 
5.1.6.19 Reporting of Port State Control Inspection 
The PSCO has to ensure, on the conclusion of an inspection, that the master, or 
representative of the ship (ships' agent) is provided with Form A and Form B giving the 
results of the inspection, details of any action taken by the PSCO, a list o f deficiencies 
identified by the PSCO and corrective action to be taken. In the case of a detention, 
notification shall be made to the Flag Stale Administration. The recognized organizations 
(classification societies) which have issued the relevant certificates on behalf of the Flag 
State should be notified, where appropriate. 
I f the ship has been allowed to sail with known deficiencies, the PSCO, after returning to 
the office will communicate all the facts to the maritime authorities of the next port of call. 
I f a vessel is detained in Hong Kong the Marine Department submits the deficiency 
reports of the detained vessel, in accordance with the control provisions contained in the 
relevant Conventions, to the IMO after the inspection. On the other hand upon receiving a 
report on detention regarding any Hong Kong registered vessels being detained in foreign 
150 
ports, the Marine Department should also inform the IMO as soon as possible of its 
remedial action taken in respect of such detention. 
5.2 Inspection in Year 2000 
Through the year 2000, Hong Kong conducted a total of 885 PSC inspections on foreign 
flagged ships. Against the number of ships visiting the port, 5,627 individual ships, it 
represents a 15.73% inspection rate. 
The following tables show the information for year 2000: 
Table Information 
Per ships' flag 
Per classification society 
Per ship types 
Per deficiency nature 
Table 5.3 - Inspection Data by Flag 
No. of ships 
Flag No. of with No. of No. of Detention 
inspections deficiencies deficiencies detentions percentage 
Antigua and Barbuda 27 23 112 1 3.70% 
Austria 1 1 2 0 0.00% 
Bahamas 25 22 135 1 4.00% 
Belize 25 25 285 8 32.00% 
Myarmiar 3 3 32 0 0.00% 
China 47 36 142 2 4.26% 
Cyprus 35 32 193 0 0.00% 
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Cambodia 10 10 143 9 90.00% 
Denmark (DIS) 3 0 0 0 0.00% 
Denmark 3 0 0 0 0.00% 
France 2 1 3 0 0.00% 
French Antarctic 
Territory 
2 1 4 0 0,00% 
Germany 23 17 41 0 0.00% 
Greece 16 10 47 0 0.00% 
Honduras 2 2 41 2 100.00% 
India 3 3 24 0 0.00% 
Indonesia 7 7 82 2 28.57% 
Iran 3 3 9 0 0.00% 
Israel 1 1 3 0 0.00% 
Italy 3 3 9 0 0.00% 
Japan 8 8 16 0 0.00% 
Korea, Democratic 
People's Republic 
6 6 104 5 83.33% 
Korea, Republic of 31 31 209 4 12.90% 
Kuwait 3 3 23 0 0.00% 
Liberia 60 54 253 0 0.00% 
Malaysia 14 14 105 0 0.00% 
Malta 26 25 186 2 7.69% 
Isle of Man 1 0 0 0 0.00% 
Marshall Islands 12 11 47 0 0.00% 
Mauritius 1 1 4 0 0.00% 
Netherlands 5 2 5 0 0.00% 
Nigeria I 1 23 0 0.00% 
Norway 3 2 7 0 0.00% 
Norway (NIS) 6 5 21 0 0,00% 
Pakistan 3 2 4 0 0.00% 
Panama 284 256 1,962 29 10.21% 
Philippines 9 9 78 1 11.11% 
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Qatar 1 1 2 0 0.00% 
Russia 11 11 48 0 0.00% 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
19 19 186 2 10.53% 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 7 0 0.00% 
Singapore 59 48 285 2 3.39% 
Switzerland 1 1 1 0 0.00% 
Taiwan, China 52 49 322 8 15.38% 
Thailand 7 7 67 2 28.57% 
Turkey 2 2 7 0 0.00% 
United Kingdom 9 6 10 0 0.00% 
USA 1 0 0 0 0.00% 
Viet Nam 8 8 78 5 62.50% 
Total 885 783 5,367 85 9.60% 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Tabic 2000 
Table 5.4 - Inspection Data by Classification Society 
Classification society No. 
Of 
inspec 
tions 
No. of ships 
with 
deficiencies 
No. of 
deficiencies 
No, of 
detentions 
Detention 
percentage 
American Bureau of 
Shipping 
99 73 297 1 1.01% 
China Corporation Register 
of Shipping 
65 62 558 14 21.54% 
Bureau Veritas 32 30 283 4 12.50% 
Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia 3 3 18 0 0.00% 
Det Norske Veritas 50 42 200 1 2.00% 
Germanischer Lloyd 124 105 478 2 1.61% 
Vietnam Register of 9 9 83 6 66.67% 
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Shipping 
Korean Register of 
Shipping 
70 65 421 6 8.57% 
Lloyd's Register of 
Shipping 
72 61 421 2 2.78% 
Panama Bureau of Shipping I 1 6 0 0.00% 
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 212 196 1,440 18 8.49% 
Panama Register Corp 5 5 60 2 40.00% 
Polski Rejestr Statkow 1 1 11 0 0.00% 
Panama Maritime 
Surveyors Bureau Inc 
2 2 20 1 50.00% 
Registro Italian© Navale 9 9 34 0 0.00% 
Russian Maritime Register 
of Shipping 
13 13 60 0 0.00% 
China Classification 
Society 
80 68 459 7 8.75% 
Indian Register of Shipping 1 1 11 0 0.00% 
Croatian Register of 
Shipping 
2 2 13 0 0.00% 
Other 35 35 494 21 60.00% 
Total 885 783 5^67 85 9.60% 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
Table 5.5 - Inspection Data by Ship Types 
Ship type No. of 
inspections 
No. of ships 
with 
deflciencics 
No. of 
deficiencies 
No. of 
detentions 
Detention 
percentage 
Tanker, not otherwise 
specified 
6 6 33 0 0.00% 
Combination carrier 8 7 29 0 0.00% 
Oil tanker 40 34 190 3 7.50% 
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Gas carrier 4 4 27 0 0.00% 
Chemical tanker 10 10 63 1 10.00% 
Bulk carrier 37 37 339 4 10.81% 
Vehicle carrier 5 4 32 0 0.00% 
Container ship 502 413 1,998 15 2.99% 
Ro-ro cargo ship 6 6 62 1 16.67% 
General cargo / 
multi-purpose ship 
242 238 2,406 58 23.97% 
Refrigerated cargo 
carrier 
5 5 55 1 20.00% 
Ro-ro passenger ship 1 1 7 0 0.00% 
Passenger ship 11 11 54 0 0.00% 
Offshore service 
vessel 
1 1 16 1 100.00% 
Special purpose ship 1 0 0 0 0.00% 
Tugboat 1 1 27 1 100.00% 
Other types of ship 5 5 29 0 0.00% 
Total 885 783 5,367 85 9.60% 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
Table 5.6 Inspection Data by Deficiency Nature 
Code Nature of deficiencies 
No. of 
deficiencies percentage 
0100 SHIP'S CERTIFICATES AND DOCUMENTS 199 3.71% 
0200 CERTIFICATION AND WATCHKEEPING FOR 
SEAFARERS 
80 1.49% 
0300 CREW AND ACCOMMODATION (ILO 147) 48 0.89% 
0400 FOOD AND CATERING (ILO 147) 129 2.40% 
0500 WORKING SPACES (ILO 147) 4 0.07% 
0600 LIFESAVING APPLIANCES 1,059 19.73% 
0700 FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES 647 12.06% 
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0800 ACCIDENT PREVENTION (ILO 147) 64 1.19% 
0900 STABILITY, STRUCTURE AND RELATED 
EQUIPMENT 
775 14.44% 
1000 ALARM SIGNALS 2 0.04% 
1100 CARRIAGE OF CARGO AND DANGEROUS 
GOODS 
100 1.86% 
1200 LOAD LINES 426 7.94% 
1300 MOORING ARRANGEMENTS (ILO 147) 32 0.60% 
1400 PROPULSION AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY 63 1.17% 
1500 SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 738 13.75% 
1600 RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS 195 3.63% 
1700 MARPOL - ANNEX I 248 4.62% 
1800 OIL, CHEMICAL TANKERS AND GAS 
CARRIERS 
1 0.02% 
1900 M A R P O L - A N N E X II 1 0.02% 
2000 SOLAS RELATED OPERATIONAL 
DEFICIENCIES 
342 6.37% 
2100 MARPOL RELATED OPERATIONAL 
DEFICIENCIES 
126 2.35% 
2200 M A R P O L - A N N E X I I I 5 0.09% 
2500 ISM RELATED DEFICIENCIES 67 1.25% 
9800 A L L OTHER DEFICIENCIES (CLEARLY 
HAZARDOUS TO SAFETY) 
6 0.11% 
9900 A L L OTHER DEFICIENCIES 10 0.19% 
Total: 5,367 100.00% 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
Detentions 
During 2000, 85 ships from 17 flags were detained. The detention percentage was 9.6%. 
The table below outlines the PSC statistics since 1997. It is noted that the tendency of the 
detention percentage is decreasing. The reasons may be the increase of inspection number 
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and the effectiveness of the PSC regime [5-7]. 
Table 5.7 Inspection and detention figures between year of 1997 and 2000 
No. No. of No. No. No. of Inspection Detention 
Year Of ships with Of of individual rate percentage 
inspections deflciencies deficiencies detentions ships (%) (%) 
1997 501 448 4,701 192 6,097 8.22 38.32 
1998 607 522 3,747 131 5,863 10.35 21.58 
1999 900 745 5,696 122 5,580 16.13 13.56 
2000 885 783 5,367 85 5,627 15.73 9.60 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
It can be seen that the number of detentions reduced significantly from 192 ships in year 
1997 to 85 in year 2000. The author participated in PSC inspection in Hong Kong since 
year 1996 and felt that the number of sub-standard ship arrived to Hong Kong has largely 
reduced. Out of the detainable deficiencies from fire fighting appliances, life saving 
appliances, navigational equipment to load line items there is a great improvement today 
in the standard of operation, maintenance and alertness to safety on board in comparison 
with 5 years ago [5-8]. 
During the year 2000 a total of 368 detainable deficiencies were found on 85 ships. Such 
deficiencies are tabled as follow in terms of nature: 
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Table 5.8 Statistic on detainable deficiencies 
c 
E a> 
Deta inab le de f i c i enc i es 
120 
100 
20 
O** ..^ 
* > > 
N a t u r e of d e t a i n a b l e d e f i c i e n c y 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
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Four types of deficiencies are the major factors for the detainable items, i.e. Fire fighting 
appliances, Life saving appliances. Navigation and Load lines. The further break-down 
for such four types of deficiencies are shown as below: 
Table 5.9 Statistic on fire fighting deficiencies 
c 
Detainable deficienceis - Fire Fighting Appliances 
X / / / 
Fire Fighting Appliances 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
159 
Table 5.10 Statistic on life saving appliances deficiencies 
Detainable deficiencies - Life saving appliances 
Life saving appliances 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
Table 5.11 Statistic on navigational equipment deficiencies 
Detainable deficiencies - Naviga t ion 
/ / 
Navigation 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
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Table 5.12 Statistic on loadline item deficiencies 
Detainable deficiencies - Load lines 
z 2 
Load lines 
Source: Marine Department Statistical Table 2000 
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5.3 Relative Performance of Hong Kong 
Table 5.13 Performance of Tokyo MOU 
Among Tokyo MOU Members |5-4| 
Members 
Tokyo M O L 
Member 
Number of PSCO 
(Dedicated & 
Non-Dedicated) 
Number of Ships 
Inspected 
Ship Inspected Per 
PSCO Per Year 
Australia 52 2,753 53 
Canada 250 360 1.44 
China 203 1,510 7.4 
Fiji 9 100 11.1 
Hong Kong 6 885 148 
Indonesia 21 853 40.6 
Japan 277 3,579 12.9 
Republic of Korea 30 1,846 61.5 
Malaysia 23 338 14.7 
New Zealand 17 743 43.7 
Philippines 96 135 1.4 
Russian Federation 20 428 21.4 
Singapore 6 1,019 169.8 
Thailand 31 83 2.7 
Vanuatu 7 14 2 
Vietnam 26 270 10.4 
Total 1,074 14,916 13.9 
Source: Tokyo MOU annual report 2000 
As can be seen from the above, Hong Kong comes 2"*^  after Singapore in efficiency and 
productivity among Tokyo MOU members. The differences may be accounted for 
because Hong Kong has more detentions and re-inspections than Singapore. The majority 
of Singapore's PSC inspections are carried out on the berths. Some of the resources are 
also deployed to deal with the workload arising from such detentions and re-inspections 
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and the inspection of coastal vessels. 
Unlike other regions in the area, PSCO in Hong Kong are all f i i l l time dedicated officers to 
the PSC section. Under the present establishment there should be six PSCO in the section 
responsible for all PSC inspections and its related activities in Hong Kong. As all PSCOs 
are already qualified Flag State surveyors, enjoining the section each wil l receive only 
two weeks of familiarisation training before conducting the PSC inspection on his own. 
The advantages of being a full time PSCO are full time dedication and more direct 
involvement to the job. This involvement largely affects the experience and skill of PSC 
inspection and their attentiveness which could be different to that of a multi-task surveyor 
responsible for various Flag State annual / renewal shipboard survey inspection and other 
mandatory duties. 
In some states the PSC inspection is just part of the duties of a Marine Officer. They carry 
out the PSC inspection in conjunction with other tasks and the Marine Officer often has to 
wait until a readily available ship arrived at their port for inspection. The priority of PSC 
inspection in these states often comes very low in comparison with the other mandatory 
survey activities. Associating with this passive attitude of PSC inspection would be the 
inadequate standard of inspection and difficulty in meeting the obligation of the 
inspection target under the MOU due to inadequate opportunity to participate in the PSC 
inspection [5-9]. 
One of the reasons for such reluctance of commitment in some states could be the 
non-revenue generated nature of the PSC inspection. In maintaining a section of six 
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PSCOs in Hong Kong Marine Department the cost is very high. As the initial PSC 
inspection incurs no charge to the vessel, revenue can only be generated from follow up 
inspections, i.e. in the case when a ship is detained. The amount of revenue generated 
from PSC section falls far too short to the cost incurred for the maintenance of the section 
itself From an isolated financial point of view running a PSC activity often operate at a 
loss with no revenue generated. 
However i f the safety of shipping is to be considered as a whole, the picture should be 
viewed quite differently. It is therefore, the degree of involvement to the MOU would 
actually depend much on the commitment of individual state as to the goal o f reduction of 
sub-standard shipping in the region. 
5.4 Summary 
As one of the largest ports in the world. Hong Kong is visited by thousands of ships each 
year. In year 2000, 885 ships were inspected, with an inspection rate of 15.73% (A little 
higher than the target rate of 15% set by the Tokyo MOU). This was carried out by 6 
PSCOs, and shows that the PSC section performs with high efficiency and productivity. 
The purpose of Port State Control is to prevent a ship proceeding to sea i f it is unsafe or 
presents an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. Under this principle, 
a PSCO not only looks for deficiencies, but also finds remedial measures. 
Although Hong Kong has a higher detention rate than other Port States in the same region, 
statistic shows that this rate has been dropped largely in recent years, which indicates that 
generally the standards of ships visiting Hong Kong have been heightened. However, 
deficiencies in regard to fire fighting appliances, life saving appliances, navigation, and 
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load line are still major factors among detainable items. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF WORLD-WIDE SHIPPING 
CASUALTIES 
6.1 The Scope of Statistics and Related Elements 
The analysis in this chapter is based on an investigation into all the casualties, that 
occurred world wide in 2000, to sea going trading ships of 100 gross tonnage (GT) and 
above, and on an evaluation of ail reliable international statistics for the period 1995 and 
2000. 
Even in our technologically advanced age, we are still dealing with enormous safety risks 
in all parts of the shipping environment. In spite of efforts to minimize risks, disasters still 
occur. Concerning marine traffic, it seems obvious that the more the substandard shipping 
increases in the shipping industry, the more likely to fail are efforts to improve safety. 
Having in mind some spectacular disasters involving tankers, combined carriers and 
sometimes general cargo ships, the public often gets the impression that in the marine 
field, as far as the commercial sector is concerned, safety is at a lower level than in air or 
rail traffic. 
In this chapter it is in acknowledged that general opinion accords marine casualties to 
human failure, negligence, carelessness and inaccuracy. On the other hand, failures might 
also be caused by malfunctioning of equipment, non-perfect technical systems, or 
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unsolved technical and operational problems. Sometimes a lack of safety might be due to 
poor manning or, i f not necessarily bad then weak management, performing under the 
financial constraints of a policy that cheapest is best. On many occasions the dividing line 
between mechanical failure and human error may not be clear [6-1]. Malfunction of 
equipment is often caused by poor maintenance or its improper use. It can be said human 
failure in some form is the dominant factor in shipping casualties. 
Even i f it is recognized that safety activities in shipping operations should start as early as 
possible, what needs to be addressed has still to be decided. It is evident that the 
prerequisite for real improvement is an analysis in depth to identify critical points. To 
improve safety there are different strategies, in general we differ between two basic 
approaches: firstly, reducing the probability of an accident happening, secondly, limiting 
the consequences should an accident occur. What PSC inspection attempts to accomplish 
is basically the first strategy. However, this chapter wil l not pursue the ambitious goal of 
developing measures to reduce the number of accidents, but to present a broad statistical 
analysis of the world shipping and functional descriptions of the risks concerned, on 
which basis further measures like Port State Control inspections may be taken to improve 
safety. 
Why do shipping accidents occur? Growth in the global economy and in sea trade over 
the past 50 years has seen the total capacity of the world fleet increase both in terms of 
both gross tonnage (GT) and the number of ships. On the other hand technological 
development of ships has progressed in tandem with technological innovation. Moreover, 
the development of various kinds of related equipment to aid the safe navigation of ships 
has led to enhancement in ship safety, and contributed towards reducing the number of 
crew required to man the highly technological ships, while also contributing towards 
reducing the number of shipping casualties. In reality, however, the author considered 
that it is still very difficult to reduce drastically the number of shipping casualties, and the 
consequent loss of human life, through modem technology alone. In a number of 
situations, reduction of manning could cause the ship to be more prone to risk. 
6.2 Environmental Factors and Causes of Shipping Casualties 
When a ship navigates the sea, she carries her cargo and/or passengers and travels along 
the predetermined route. The administrative staff of the shipping company concerned and 
the captain who is responsible for the operation of the ship, as well as other crew member 
of the ship, should give the highest priority to the safety of the ship, its crew and cargo. 
They also determine the operating conditions of the ship, such as maintenance, the well 
being of the cargo, the route and service speed. These considerations take into account the 
safety and economic efficiency of the anticipated voyage. The conditions of the high seas 
are, however, not always as good as originally expected, A worse situation could be 
encountered resulting in unexpected damage to the ship. 
Any delay in promptly and appropriately responding to such a sudden change in 
environmental factors may often lead to a serious marine disaster. Qualified and 
experienced ship's staffs are one of the important factors in enabling the ship to arrive 
safely at her destination. 
Analyzing the nature of such environmental factors, there are four inter-relating 
conditions that could lead to a shipping accident: 
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. 1 The Condition of Nature 
The first environmental factor is the effect of the forces of nature which on the 
sea. The means are available of collecting up to date and reliable weather 
forecasts so that unexpected weather conditions are reduced to minimum. The 
avoidance of this cause of casualty largely depends on the experience and 
competency of the ship* s master and his officers as well as the condition of the 
GMDSS equipment in receiving weather information 
.2 The Conditions of the Route 
The second factor affecting the operation of the ship is the nature of the route 
along which the ship navigates. This factor includes the geographical 
conditions, such as narrow channels, depth of the sea and currents, as well as the 
traffic density of ships in a particular sea lane. 
.3 The Conditions of the Ship 
The conditions of the ship that are essential in order for the ship to secure its safe 
navigation, consist of such factors as the state of the ship hull, normal working 
conditions of engines, navigational instruments and ship communication 
equipment. This refers particulariy to the ageing of the ship which often 
generates the needs for greater attention to maintenance. 
.4 The Competency of the Crew and other Human Factors 
Shipping casualties could occur even when the ship condition is best suited to its 
navigation, e.g. under ideal natural conditions of the sea and route, coupled with 
the most favorable conditions of the ship. The competency problem for some 
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Flag States in having too young officers, who lack adequate sea service, skill 
and knowledge of maritime factors, is considered to contribute in some shipping 
casualties. The majority of shipping casualties are caused by the conditions of 
the operator which are essentially human-related factors, such as competency in 
ship operating skill, knowledge in the stowage of cargo and in dealing with 
various emergencies and problems relating to the working environment 
including ergonomic factors and the induction of fatigue[6-l]. 
6.3 Statistical Data of Merchant Ship Loses in 2000 
The worid fleet of propelled sea-going merchant ships of all types, of not less than 100 
gross tonnage (GT) stood at 85, 494 ships o f 522.2 million GT and an average age of 19 
years. Completion during the year of 1997 amounted to 1,820 ships of 25.2 million gross 
tonnage. Ships out-going from the world fleet as losses or disposals totaled 666 ships of 
8.1 million GT and average age of 26 years [6-2]. 
. 1 Cargo Carrying Ships 
In 1997, the world cargo carrying fleet was 45,830 ships of 757.8 million 
deadweight (Dwt) (496.5 million GT) and average age of 18 years. During the 
year, completion totaled 1,276 ships of 37.0 million Dwt (24.7 million GT). 
Outgoing from the worid cargo carrying fleet as disposals or losses were 494 
ships of 13.2 million Dwt (7.8 million GT) and average age of 26 years. 
During the year of 2000, 167 ships of 0.89 million gross tonnage were reported 
as total losses. The number of total losses of cargo carrying ships was 123 ships 
of 0.87 million GT (1.36 million Dwt). 
(Source: Seatrade Review Feb 2001) 
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.2 A survey of the world merchant ship losses 1995 - 2000 
The following is an overall summary, for all ship-type categories, of reported 
losses (actual total losses (ATL) and constructive total losses (CTL)) for the 
years of 1995 to 2000. 
ATL - Where the subject matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to 
be a thing of the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof 
CTL - Where the subject matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its 
actual loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from 
actual loss without an expenditure, which would exceed its value, when the 
expenditure had been incurred. 
Table 6.1 Losses of Merchant Shipping between 1995 and 2000 
Year 
A T L C T L Total losses 
No. m. G T No. m. G T No. m. G T 
1995 195 0.6 57 0.4 252 1.0 
1996 182 0.5 73 0.6 255 1.2 
1997 146 0.4 64 0.8 210 1.3 
1998 180 0.4 73 0.6 253 1.1 
1999 153 0.5 46 0.6 199 I.I 
2000 151 0.6 16 0.3 167 0.9 
(Source: Seatrade Review Feb 2001) 
The number of persons reported killed or missing (lives lost) as a result o f total losses 
during the year of 2000 was 352. 
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In 2000, losses of merchant ships of over 100 GT reduced from 252, totaling 1.0 million 
GT,in 1995 to 167 ships, totaling 0.9 million GT. During the year of 2000 the world fleet 
of merchant ships grew by 2.8% to 522.2 million GT. Within this total there was 
considerable variety in the rate of growth, reflecting the different economic circumstances 
prevailing in different parts of the shipping business, and in different parts o f the worid. 
Table 6.2 The reported total losses for the year of 2000 
Total losses 
No. G T 
Foundered 81 305,859 
Missing 1 4,010 
Fire/explosion 18 79.962 
Collision 20 75,392 
wrecked/stranded 34 248,472 
Contact 4 16.658 
Other 9 162.783 
Totals 167 893,036 
(Source: Scalradc Review Feb 2001) 
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Table 6.3 Loss rates per 1000 ships for the year of 2000 and the previous 5 years for the 
ship-type categories: 
Total losses 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Oil 1.6 1.6 2.5 1.4 0.9 1.0 
Bulk carrier 1.9 3.2 2.8 5.7 2.9 3.3 
general cargo 5.6 6.1 5.2 6.1 5.5 4.3 
All cargo-carrying 3.5 3.8 3.2 3.7 3.0 2.7 
Fish catchin<^ 3.3 2.5 2.2 2.8 2.0 1.3 
All ship-types 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.9 2.3 1.9 
(Source: Scatradc Review Feb 2001) 
in ft 'H JS W 
0 
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6.4. Analysis of Data 
6.4.1 Ship foundered 
The number of total losses due to ships that foundered has remained the most notorious 
over the years. It is obvious that heavy weather often contributes to this category of loss. 
Other causes, such as the age of ships and poor maintenance, also contribute to the high 
loss rate. In about 20% of the cases heavy weather was the known cause, whereas in about 
one third of the cases cargo shifting led to the accident [6-3]. 
For thousands of years men who went to sea did so in awareness of the dangers. Despite 
the increase in size of ships, constructed of steel instead of wood and fitted with powerftil 
engines, the perils remain. Ships are still subject to extremes of weather with all the 
adverse contingencies that arise. In 2000, 81 ships foundered in heavy weather. The 
problems that ships have to face in adverse weather are mainly connected to the stability 
and the structure of the ship. Very important in this respect is the kind of cargo 
transported and the way it is stowed. Certain kinds of cargoes are significantly more 
dangerous in this context, in particular: 
•'j . I grain and other cargoes in bulk which are likely to be shifted in sea voyage; 
'^ ^v .2 steel cargo with improper lashing often cause cargo shifting and result in severe 
' structural damage; 
.3 wood or timber cargoes stowed on deck, i f in excess volume they often cause 
the ship to become unstable and capsize. 
Though the ship's master is responsible for the stowing of the cargo, it is questionable 
whether this is in accordance with reality. Often, during the stay in port, there is not 
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enough time to check this thoroughly because of the many other duties he has to do. On 
-. 
the other hand more and more cargo is brought to the ships in containers which, under 
normal circumstances, cannot be controlled by ship staff. In the case that a ship has to ride 
through a storm ship safety depends on the knowledge and experience of the ship* s master. 
I f he knows well how his ship behaves the risk of danger will be reduced [6-4]. 
6.4.2 Fire / Explosion 
Fire and explosions on ships have increased considerably. The majority of such incidents 
involving tankers happen in port, and even one half of similar incidents to dry cargo ships 
also happen in port. The problem is that i f the fire spreads from the berth, or occurred 
when the ship was in dry dock under repair, we have to consider some non-marine 
elements when dealing with safety aspects. Up to 2000 the incidence of fire in ports in 
general mainly affected smaller size tankers. For dry cargo ship fires there is no 
concentration in general, and losses show no pattern size ranges. 
6.4.3 Collisions 
1^  It can be seen that the rate of losses for all sizes of dry cargo ships has been remarkably 
constant over the years. The same is true for tankers, although it has to be kept in mind 
that a tanker loss is.not always put in this category as wholly due to the collision because 
such collisions are often followed by fires which cause the ships to be rendered a loss. 
6.4,4 Ships Wrecked 
Losses in tankers wrecked increased as did the tanker fleet itself Compared with wrecked 
dry cargo chips, tanker losses in this category are comparatively low, possibly because of 
the greater ease in re-floating stranded tankers. 
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6.4.5 Losses to vessel - Summary 
In general, it can be said that there is no overall pattern permitting the prediction of the 
number of losses, especially with regard to the financial risk connected with certain ships 
by type, size, flag, trade, etc.. The number of losses in a distinct category changes from 
year to year although we can observe certain trends. Another fact to consider in the 
analysis of total losses which includes small trading vessels and non-trading vessels is that 
for the respective period these ships accounted for more than 60% of the ships lost (100 
GT and above). 
Investigating the major trends in the total loss analysis over the period of the last 30 years, 
we come to the result that there is: 
. 1 an increase of losses in number and tonnage caused by fire; 
.2 an increase of losses in number but not in tonnage due to grounding; 
.3 a constant quota by number and a decrease by tonnage concerning collisions; 
.4 a decrease in number and tonnage concerning stranding. 
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6.5 Age and Flag Distribution of Ship Losses in 2000 
Table 6.4 Age distribution of the world merchant fleet by types of vessel, 
as at 1 January 2000 
Type Total 0-4 5-9 years 10-14 15 years Average 
World total Years years and over age 
All ships 100 19.1 18.7 12.9 49.3 14.3 
Tankers 100 16.6 23.6 12.1 47.6 13.91 
Bulk carriers 100 20.8 17.0 14.6 47.6 13.83 
General cargo 100 10.9 9.9 10.2 69.0 17.32 
Container 100 36.1 24.9 13.3 25.7 9.72 
Al l others 100 18.9 13.4 13.1 54.7 14.92 
(Source: Scatrade Review Feb 2001) 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD MERCHANT FLEET AS OF 1-
JAN-2000 
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WORLD TOP TEN MERCHANT FLEET FLAGS GROSS TONNAGE 
Norway(NIS) 
S i n g a p o r e 
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Gr e e c e 
C h i n a Japan 
L i b e r i a 
Merchant fleets of the world top ten flags ( in decending GT) as of June 30, 2000 
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Table 6.5 Top 10 Registrations on Merchant Shipping and average age 
Registration No. G T Age 
Panama 6,212 111,077,621 17 
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Liberia 1,582 54,415,951 12 
Bahamas 1,295 30,969,685 17 
Malta 1,534 27,734,643 19 
Greece 1,516 25,292,089 25 
Cyprus 1,524 23,421,486 17 
Singapore 1,749 22,107,214 11 
Norway(NIS) 751 18,705,173 16 
China 3302 16,356,361 20 
Japan 8308 16,101,324 12 
(Source: Seatradc Review Feb 2001) 
WORLD'S TOP TEN MERCHANT FLEET FLAGS AS 
OF 30-JUN-2000 
Singapore 
Cyprus 
Malta 
L i b e r i a 
Norway (NIS) 
China 
Panania Japan 
(Source: Seatrade Review Feb 2001) 
The tonnage o f 1970s built ships in service is now 171 mi l l i on GT, compare wi th 166 
mil l ion o f 1980s built vessels and 164 mil l ion GT built in the 1990s. The 28 mi l l ion GT o f 
deliveries scheduled for 1998 exceeded the 27.8 mi l l i on GT o f 1976 built ships still in 
service, formally pushing the 1970s age bulge into second place. 
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I f nothing else, this demonstrates that the world shipbuilding industry now has more than 
enough capacity to replace the remaining 1970s fleet, even i f all o f these vessels were to 
be scrapped promptly, which looks increasingly unlikely (at the end o f 1999, 17,000 ships 
built before 1970 were still in service). 
6.6 Age and Flag Analysis of Ship Losses 
Commonly it is expected that the more modem and sophisticated a ship, the less it w i l l be 
exposed to loss. Looking at the statistics a certain confirmation o f this opinion appears to 
exist. 
Table 6.6 Total losses by ship types 
Total losses 
less than 10 years 10-19 years 20 or more years 
Oil 1 1 7 
bulk dry 1 2 7 
general cargo 5 12 43 
all cargo carrying 8 22 66 
Fish catching 4 7 19 
A l l ship-types 12 29 91 
(Source: Seairade Review Feb 2001) 
Total losses in descending order o f number o f ships by registration, the 5 leading 
merchant fleets are as follows: 
Table 6.7 Total losses by registration 
Registration Total Average 
No, G T Age 
P A N A M A 17 223,631 28 
SAINT V I N C E N T 14 88,252 26 
RUSSIA 11 23,852 26 
CYPRUS 6 87,917 21 
182 
BELIZE 6 9,535 26 
(Source: Seatrade Review Feb 2001) 
TOTAL LOSS OF SHIP OF 5 LEADING 
MERCHANT FLEET REGISTRATION 
I T o t a l No. 
lAverage Age 
PANAMA SAINT RUSSIA CYPRUS B E L I Z E 
VINCENT 
Ships o f 20 years or more account for all total losses over the year o f 2000. However, the 
fact that newer ships show up better than older ships cannot be attributed whol ly to the fact 
that their safety standard is better. 
Analyzing the total losses by ship type over a period o f 5 years [6-5] , we see that general 
cargo ships account for a higher number o f total losses than we should have expected. 
This might be caused by the fact that the bulk o f the old ships are dry bulk carrier. 
Without wishing to discuss thoroughly whether there is a relationship between 
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sub-standard o f ships and the country o f registry we cannot neglect the figures showing us 
year by year that some countries like Saint Vincent, Cyprus and Panama are contributing 
the bulk o f ships lost by number and tonnage in 2000. There seems to be a correlation with 
the age structure o f the respective fleets. 
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6.7 Causes O f Shipping Casualty 
What are the causes o f shipping casualties? How can we prevent them from occurring? 
There are various kinds o f information or report that have been made public f rom time to 
time by ardent analysts and researchers. However it is d i f f i cu l t to find the causes o f the 
losses from the reports. The ultimate event which led to the loss is often not possible to 
identify, or perhaps was a chain o f events, like: collision / fire / foundered etc. Yet we are 
sure that every ship which because o f age, lack o f o f f ic ia l control, or careless management 
not corresponding to the generally required safety standards, does not only run a potential 
risk for the ships staff, but also for other ships, for the environment and the underwriters 
[6-5]. There is also risk to the freedom o f the shipping industry, because under pressure o f 
the public opinion. International Maritime Organization and responsible governments w i l l 
pass more stringent regulations for which all o f us w i l l ultimately have to pay. 
Casualties and losses o f ship are not always due to sub-standard shipping, for example, the 
Ro-Ro ferry "Herald o f Free Enterprise" and the notorious accident o f "Estonia" in 1994, 
they were not regarded as a sub-standard ship but a modem well-equipped passenger ferry, 
yet she capsized due to human error. On many ships it is necessary to improve the 
qualification o f crew and officers. One o f the reasons for failure may be the mixing o f 
nationalities on some ships, when the use o f non-mother tongue languages has created 
difficulties in communication and understanding orders. 
Accidents sometimes are treated as i f they cannot be avoided. So researchers who rely on 
mathematics try to forecast the number o f casualties on the basis o f some factors as type o f 
ship, age, flag and traffic density. This approach, however is neither adequate nor logical 
for a problem which cannot be solved by mathematics, but by technicians and the safety 
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consciousness o f the men engaged in the daily shipping business. For instance, we know 
from the air traffic system that safety ranks first in business policy, being a prerequisite for 
a profitable business, and the basis o f success. To achieve the safety consciousness, the 
fol lowing criteria should be considered i f safety is to become predominant: 
. 1 moral obligation or pressure to give safety highest priority, 
.2U excellent education and practical training programmes, 
.3 installation o f modem, ergonomically designed, and well maintained technical 
equipment, 
.4 good communication and relations between ship crew. 
6.8 Shipping Management Cultures 
There are many differences between shipping and the air industry but the most significant 
is after an accident, when the air industry shows its cause culture whilst shipping has a 
blame culture. Af ter an air accident the causes are identified fo l lowing which remedial 
steps are taken to prevent a recurrence o f another accident f rom that same cause. On the 
other hand, after a shipping accident most investigative activity is aimed at identifying 
who is to blame and, once this person or corporate body has been identified, the matter can 
be quietly put to rest. 
The evasion culture - It can be seen that when the costs o f complying wi th rules and 
regulations become so high, the profit margin o f transport w i l l no doubt be affected. 
Therefore it can be seen that the shipping industry is often trying to get away wi th 
minimum standards or in some cases, evading the rules altogether. 
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The compliance culture - some owners and operators may strive to comply with 
legislation in the cheapest possible way in order to get the certification need to operate 
their businesses. There is a danger when ship owners fail to maintain their ship, they may 
still fail the Port State Control inspection even when all o f the certifications are valid. The 
lack o f monitoring o f standards o f some flag o f convenience authorities, can often cause 
their ships to be subject to detention by Port States[6-6]. However, the growth o f flags o f 
convenience in recent years has indicated a general acceptance o f compliance culture by a 
number o f ship owners and operators in running their business. 
The safety culture - describes an attitude existing in the shipping industry, probably the 
smallest sector but growing with the advent o f tougher Port State Control. 
6.9 Preventive Measure against Shipping Casualty 
No matter how far technological advancements are made in ship automation or electronic 
control, it would be more than di f f icul t to completely eliminate the occurrence o f 
accidents in this or any other type o f transport. Though it is possible wi th the modem 
technology to navigate wi th auto-pilot, radar and ARPA, as well as other collision 
avoidance systems, it is not possible to control the operation o f the other opponent ship. 
Strengthening o f inspection standards for the safety o f the ship (including Port State and 
Flag State inspection) offers some solution. A series o f occurrences o f casualties, 
involving large sized tankers and bulkers in the early 1990s, led to the development o f 
preventive measures against oi l spills, and also strengthened inspection control over 
sub-standard shipping on a global basis. In addition, the shipping industry is now 
proceeding with various measures toward the enhancement o f seamen's ship operating 
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skills and the safe operation o f the ship such as STCW 95 and the I S M code [6-7]. To 
conclude this chapter, the followings are points o f issue which can be regarded as some 
preventive measures against shipping casualties: 
.1 Reduction in sub-standard ship numbers through removal from the registry o f old 
and outdated vessels not complying wi th the classification societies* 
recommendations for structural improvements o f the ship for safety purposes. 
.2 Restrictions placed by major oi l companies on the chartering o f old tankers. 
Restriction on the chartering o f tankers not complying with the standards established 
by major oi l companies for safety requirement. 
.3 Ratings established by insurance companies based on their own inspection standards 
for the safety o f the ship. Classification o f ships by ratings based on the standards 
established by insurance companies for the purpose o f inspection o f ships. 
.4 Strengthening o f Port State Controls in place in most regional area for safety 
purposes in order that a global net coverage to ensure that most o f the trading ships 
are under monitoring wi th respect to their safety standard. 
.5 Familiarization among crew members o f manuals on emergency and competency -
under ISM and STCW 95 the ship managing company is to ensure that their crew on 
board should be provided wi th adequate training and means o f access to the 
information needed to the various safe operations o f their ship. 
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.6 Acceleration o f scrapping o f old ships. Due to corrosion o f steel metal, aged vessels 
tend to be weaken in its structural strength and often require more maintenance. As 
the wor ld tonnage grows and the tonnage become excessive, scrapping o f old ships is 
one o f an alternative to balance the oversupply and in regulating the freight rates. 
Classification societies and I M O may take on board the consideration o f the potential 
dangerous siaiation with some o f the dangerous ship type and aged ships to formulate 
regulations to l imi t the life span o f merchant trading vessels. 
6.10 Summary 
Tragically shipping casualties have always happened in the marine transportation industry. 
In these casualties not only loss o f l ife and property has resulted, but often also great 
damage to the environment. Various actions have been taken by I M O , class, Flag States 
and Port State Control authorities to ensure the safety o f shipping. Their ultimate goals are 
the same - to reduce the number o f shipping casualties and the losses they cause. 
The strategy that PSC inspection attempts to accomplish is to reduce the risk o f accident 
occurring. By analyzing statistics o f worldwide shipping casualties, the main causes could 
be identified. This enables more focused PSC inspections to be carried out. 
Although a number o f casualties take place under extreme weather conditions, the 
condition o f nature may not be regarded as the main factor. B y uti l izing modem 
shipbuilding technologies and introducing various kinds o f equipment to aid the safe 
navigation o f ships, a well maintained and manned vessel should have either conquered or 
avoided the most critical conditions. So, human failure in one form or another is always 
the dominant factor in shipping casualties. A t the same time, ship types and conditions 
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also contribute to the causes o f marine casualty. For a high-risk, sub-standard vessel, even 
a minor failure could result in a fatal accident; while a modernized new building ship w i l l , 
to some extent, be more tolerable. From the statistics, conclusions could be drawn that 
older ships are more likely to become victims o f casualties. 
These high risk ships do not only pose danger for the ships' staff, they also threaten other 
ships and the environment, thus they are targeted by PSC inspections. At the same time, 
PSC w i l l continue strengthening its inspection standards for the safety o f ships, and 
contributing more in reducing the number o f world shipping casualties by discovering and 
rectifying ships* deficiencies before they leave port. 
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C H A P T E R S E V E N 
SURVEY OF R E L A T E D PARTIES 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters 3 and 4 the contextual background to Port State Control was reviewed, whilst 
chapter 5 covered the application o f Port State Control in Hong Kong. Given the number 
o f years experience the author has as a PSCO in Hong Kong, and as a Flag State inspector 
in surveying Hong Kong registered ships in countries abroad, it is inevitable that the detail 
given and conclusions reached in those chapters largely reflects a personal Administration 
view. Indeed, over a twelve month period during 2000 and 2001 more than 100 PSC 
inspections were carried out by the author on a fu l l range o f cargo and passenger vessels 
while engaged with the Marine Department o f Hong Kong as a government surveyor in 
the Port State Control Section. 
Added to this was the background o f shared experience wi th other PSCOs in Hong Kong, 
as well as with those from other states in the Tokyo M O U Region. This experience 
provides a great deal o f insight to form views on the effectiveness o f PSC inspections. 
Those views may not be shared by the wider maritime community, and it is necessary to 
test the * Administration* views against those held by outside expert maritime opinion in 
Hong Kong, such as marine insurers, ship managers, ship owners, charterers and brokers. 
A questionnaire was therefore developed for the purpose o f determining this wider view 
from the industry. The same questionnaire was used to form a broad assessment o f the 
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"Administration" view from which comparison with the wider industry view could be 
made. 
7.2 Questionnaire Framework and Construction 
The new, and original, work detailed here took the form o f interviewing potentially 
interested parties to establish issues o f relevance in the Port State Control activities and to 
develop a questionnaire which would conf i rm or disprove these ideas and determine some 
correlation between respondents* answers. The author ini t ial ly sought consultations wi th 
3 - 4 people in each f ie ld o f shipping agency, ship master and classification society to help 
in the configuration o f the questionnaire. 
The interviews, which were unstructured to avoid bias, had two purposes. The first was 
to incorporate the views o f relevant people in Hong Kong wi th the construction o f the 
questionnaire. The second was to adopt a systematic approach o f ident i fying further 
interviewees and potential respondents to the questionnaire. It was hoped that this would 
lead to obtaining a macroscopic view o f Port State Control and its impact on ship safely. 
7.3 The Interviews 
The interviewees were selected in order to elicit views associated wi th many o f the fields 
in the maritime industry and to ensure a broad spread o f opinions. Some individuals were 
contacts known to the author, others were identified by the interviewees themselves. The 
interviews were unstructured and open-ended, allowing development o f the interviewees* 
own views. This interview method was chosen in order not to constrain the author* s 
investigation through any pre-conceptions acquired while working as government agent. 
The interviews permitted the development o f an informed questionnaire [7-1]. 
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Interviews were recorded by note taking and / or by tape recording wi th subsequent 
transcription. The former suited the author and provided a hard-copy backup. The latter 
permitted a review o f the interview and a check on the limitations and errors in note 
taking. 
The cross-section o f marine related people contacted produced a first informal impression 
o f feelings on the effectiveness on Port State Control Inspections f rom people working in 
the shipping field. The majority o f interviews were held face-to-face, wi th five by 
telephone. The face-to-face interviews took place in the interviewees* offices. This gave 
the author a contextual background against which to understand the views being 
expressed by each interviewee. Telephone contact was necessary when there were time 
constraints on the interviewee. 
After transcribing and precising, the interviews were assessed for common themes by 
condensation and categorization to determine priority issues. This enabled the themes to 
be identified and the questionnaire to be formulated. This fiwiework analysis o f the 
initial interviews identified common and unique topics, such as diff icult ies encountered 
by ship owner, and any perceived underiying problems. 
Prior to commencing the interviews a study o f interview and questionnaire techniques was 
undertaken which permitted the development o f a rigorous approach to the next survey. 
Before any interview took place the aims and objectives o f the research were explained to 
the subjects. They were advised they could break o f f the interview at anytime, and their 
identity would not be disclosed to any other party without their explicit permission in 
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writ ing [7-2]. 
7.4 The Questionnaire 
Opinions on questionnaire design [7-3], the numbers within the trial sample, the number 
o f questionnaires to be sent out, and the likely percentage o f returns varied widely. 
Inherently, the larger the sample, the more likely that the answers w i l l represent general 
opinion. There should be more than 30 returns to jus t i fy conventional statistical 
techniques unless an allowance is made for small groups [7-4]. These figures also apply 
to analyses o f sub-sets o f the returns. A questionnaire could expect a return f rom 10% o f 
the population surveyed. I f the interviews were adequately stratified through the relevant 
population and i f the questionnaire returns were also representative o f the population, then 
a large return would help to minimize missing and /or unreliable data and hence the 
analysis is more likely to be valid. 
A postal questionnaire was chosen due to the geographical spread o f the potential 
respondents [7-5]. The questionnaire also allowed contact wi th many more individuals 
than would otherwise have been possible due to time and location constraints. The 
questionnaire design followed the conventional refinement ft-om the broad idea (i.e. the 
aim o f the thesis and the interview framework analysis) to a set o f sub-topics and thence to 
a specific set o f questions. The questionnaire variously required yes/no answers, a choice 
between two to three options, or a selection ft-om a list. Terminology is a major problem in 
questionnaire design, where brief phrases are often used, and some may be "jargon" terms 
to non-cognate members o f the public. Therefore there may be some uncertainty in the 
responses [7-6]. 
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The questionnaire was trialed to twenty persons (technically a content validity measure) 
and various corrections incorporated. Those involved in the trial included marine 
professionals and non-marine related people. To ensure the language used was correct 
and unambiguous versions o f the questionnaire were produced in Chinese and English. 
The trialists, and those taking part in the wider study, were sent both versions as a measure 
to reduce risk o f misinterpretation, 
A four point questionnaire technique was adopted. This helps to ensure the respondent to 
take a position in responding the questions, rather than making a middle selection without 
much thinking about it. The final copy o f the questionnaire is at Appendix B. Initially 
300 questionnaires were sent with a return o f 35%. 
The questionnaire, as constructed, lends itself more to interpretation than to numerical 
analysis. For this reason a qualitative rather than quantitative approach has been taken in 
assessing the response received. 
7.5 The Administration View Point 
The fo l lowing tables from 7.1.2 to 7.8.2 provide the results o f the Administration survey. 
This was conducted by sending questionnaires through Lotus M a i l , the Department's 
communication link, to 40 surveyor grade officers in the Marine Department o f Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). This number represents over 90% o f all the 
marine surveying professionals within the Administration o f Hong Kong SAR. About 
half o f the surveyors are base grade or front line professionals wi th duties including 
statutory surveys, PSC inspection, examination and I S M audit, while the remainder are 
senior professionals working in a range o f posts across the Department, including the 
196 
policy section. Although the sampling size is only one sixth that of the survey of the wider 
marine community, 19 replies were received, equating to a 47.5% response rate. As 
respondents were given limited time to reply, some surveyors were engaged on duties 
overseas, and others were on leave, this is a very satisfactory return. 
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7.6 Response and Analysis - Purpose and Operation of Port State Control 
7.6.1 PSC in General (Question lA) - View from wider marine community 
Table 7.1.1 Response to question lA asking what are the purposes of Port State 
Control (View from wider marine community) 
No Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 To get rid of sub-standard ships 3 - 3% 50 - 56% 12- 13% 25 - 28% 
2 To persuade Flag States to 
maintain their ships 
38 - 32% 60 - 50% 8 - 4 % 14-12% 
3 To assist in ensuring survival of 
National Flag 
1 9 - 16% 43 - 36% 40 - 33% 18-15% 
4 To make Flag of Convenience 
less attractive to ship owners 
8 - 4 % 38 - 32% 2 0 - 17% 54 - 45% 
5 To discourage charterers from 
employing sub-standard ships 
27 - 23% 2 0 - 1 7 % 51 - 4 3 % 22-18% 
Table 7.1.2 Views from Administration 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 9 - 4 7 % 9 - 4 7 % 1 - 5% 0 
2 3 - 1 6 % 12-63% 2 - 1 0 % 2 - 1 0 % 
3 0 2 - 1 0 % 11 - 58% 6 - 32% 
4 I - 5% 8 - 42% 7 - 37% 3 - 1 6 % 
5 2 - 10% 8 - 4 2 % 6 - 32% 3 - 1 6 % 
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Table 7.1.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Strongly agree / agree Agree 
2 Agree Strongly agree / agree 
3 Neutral / disagree Agree / neutral 
4 Agree / neutral Disagree 
5 Agree / neutral Neutral 
Differences of opinion arises with question No. 1A3. While a number of the wider marine 
community indicated their agreement that assistance in ensuring survival of national flag 
was a purpose of PSC, the Administration view disagreed. The Administration strongly 
supports the view the PSC aims to get rid of sub-standard ships, or at least persuade Flag 
States to maintain their ships. Survival of national flag is not an issue of concern to the 
Administration. Comfort could be drawn from the Administration's rejection of the 
possibility of there being a hidden agenda. 
Question 1A4 also revealed differences. It is possible that the Department sees making 
FOC less attractive as an outcome rather than a purpose. 45% of the wider marine 
community disagree. \f this is so, then clear water exists between the official and industry 
view. 
Similarly the Administration tends to accept the idea that PSC can discourage charterers 
from employing sub-standard ships while 43% of the wider marine community had a 
neutral opinion to the issue. One of the motivations behind PSC inspection was to keep 
the sub-standard ships out of business by publicizing their ships name i f it had been 
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detained. This record can be obtained from government public site and can be accessed 
freely by the charterers. It may not be having the desired effect. 
Chart 7.1 Chart Showing Response to Question l A (View from wider marine 
community) 
60-0 
Neutral 
Strongly Agree 
R ^ ^ l ^ o J o n ^ e R a g 
N a ^ o n ^ F ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ 
According to the section lA of the questionnaire, most of respondents strongly agree or 
agree that the purpose of PSC in general is to persuade Flag States to maintain the standard 
of their ships and to get rid of the sub-standard ships. The responses are ranked as follows 
(strongly agree agree): 
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1. To persuade Flag States to maintain their ships 82% 
2. To get rid of sub-standard ships 59% 
3. To assist in ensuring survival of National flag 52% 
4. To discourage charters form employing substandard ships 40% 
5. To make FOC less attractive to ship owner 36% 
Speaking in general terms, the respondents considered that the main purpose of PSC is to 
persuade Flag States to maintain their ships as 82% agree against only 12% disagreeing 
with the possibility. The finding of the responses matches closely with the Administration 
point of view. The next highest option was to get rid of sub-standard ships. Without 
curing the root problem of getting the attention of the Flag State, for them to rectify the 
sub-standard situation through imposing of pressure to the operator of the ships, the 
problem of substandard ships would continue. 
In a situation when a Hong Kong ship is Port State detained, the Marine Department office 
would ask the operator to provide the PSC report as soon as possible. I f justified to be a 
serious detention, that is a lot of serious deficiencies identified, a surveyor wil l fly from 
Hong Kong Office to the ship for conducting a Flag State Quality Control (FSQC) 
inspection on behalf of the Flag State. After returning to the Hong Kong office, the 
operators and owners would be invited to discuss the findings from the inspection and 
steps agreed for the future improvements to such ship. 
Beside the fact that such ship was in a state of poor maintenance and the deficiency was 
identified "on the spot", the experience revealed that many detentions were incorrectly 
issued. Take for example using incorrect version of SOLAS convention and improper 
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interpretation of convention. A Hong Kong registered ship was detained because there 
was no totally enclosed lifeboat on board. The keel of laid of this ship was however found 
to be in 1982, ships built before July 1986 are not required to have totally enclosed 
lifeboat. 
The point of bringing this example is to highlight the importance of concern from the Flag 
State and the subsequent follow up actions in case of Port State detention. Unfortunately 
not many Flag States are doing this job well. Some Flag States even appear to have 
difficulty in achieving liaison with the owners of ships flying their flag. One of the 
objectives of PSC is to address concern regarding a sub-standard ship to the responsible 
Flag State and ask them to act on the ship themselves. Getting rid of sub-standard ships 
through measures imposed by Port States, no matter how severe those measures are. will 
not tackle the root problem while there are Flag States that respond passively to the PSC 
detention of their ships. 
According to the records of the PSC section in Hong Kong there has been a great 
improvement to certain popular FOC, like Panama and Belize, in the response to their 
ships being detained in Hong Kong. Beyond showing their concern, some even informed 
the Port State of their own penalty measures when their ships were found seriously 
deficient, and had been detained by a Port State. 
52% of the responses agreed that the purpose of PSC is to assist in ensuring survival of 
national flags. Between the years 1998 and 2001 the Hong Kong registry was actively 
promoted. In fact the tonnage of Hong Kong registry rose from 8 million to 11.3 million 
GT. One of the attractions of the Hong Kong registry is a reputation for quality shipping. 
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Hong Kong registered ships have recorded at the low detention rates over the past 3 years 
rolling average ratio in both Paris and Tokyo MOU regions. Most of the respondents 
would have been aware of the registry's promotion, which could have directed them to a 
conclusion that one of the aims of PSC is to assist in ensuring national flag survival. 
On question 1A5, 'a purpose of PSC is to discourage charterers from employing 
sub-standard ships', 43% of the respondents selected the neutral option. Amongst those 
responding to the questionnaire were representatives of'business runners' such as ship 
managers and marine insurance brokers, and * non-business runners' such as class 
surveyors, pilots and port administrators. Further investigation revealed that the 
' non-business runners' tended towards the agree options, while the * runners' gave much 
greater weight to the neutral and disagree options. 
This finding is interesting. Further elaboration has been sought through personal contact 
to respondents from each stream. The ship operators explained that there had been some 
tough times for them, a few years ago. when the PSC activities were carried out intensively 
on ships trading within the MOU regions, in particular Europe, Asia Pacific and United 
States. They found that some pooriy maintained ships they were operating were often 
detained by the Port State. As a consequence the ship operators would face financial loss 
due to delays and added maintenance cost etc. However, the PSC activities have not 
discouraged the charterers from employing sub-standard ships. 
It does not mean to say that PSC activity has slowed down. Most charterers now have a 
strategic ship deployment plan to cope with PSC inspection to their vessels. For areas with 
strict PSC like Australia, United States and Europe, the need to deploy their newer and 
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well maintained vessels are clear. However, on the other hand, for areas where PSC 
activities are still under development the need of maintenance to the ships is not so great, 
sub-standard situations are more likely to occur on board ships operating in these trades. 
In another words PSC activity has not discouraged them from employing sub-standard 
ships, instead it has modified the system of deployment of the fleet. 
While 36% of respondents thought making FOC less attractive to ship owners was a 
purpose of PSC, 45% disagreed. Of the five options offered by question 1 A, this was the 
only one not to draw a cleaHy polarized response. Respondents' opinions can be separated 
into two major areas. Traditionally FOC has been associated with low quality ships that 
are often targeted by PSC. Those respondents who had selected the affirmative answer to 
this question possibly considered that PSC was aimed mainly at FOC ships. Today*s 
shipping circles may not fully agree with this assumption. In fact the standard of 
maintenance of the ships often depends on the management company rather than the Flag 
State. Experience in Hong Kong PSC in the past few years has revealed that many Panama 
and Liberian registered ships were, widely seen as being FOC, are often very well 
maintained. The chance of finding a sub-standard ships under some major FOC often 
varies widely. One just cannot equate the FOC alone as an indicator to sub-standard 
shipping. 
On the other hand a lot of sub-standard shipping has been identified as being ships flying 
flags of developing nations. In recent years the trend of associating sub-standard shipping 
with developing nations has almost overtaken the previously held assumption that FOC 
equates to sub-standard shipping. According to the 2000 PSC inspection record in Hong 
Kong PSC, the detention rate of ships flying the Cambodian flag was 100%, while it was 
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85% for Vietnamese and 90% to North Korean ships [7-7]. Therefore to say that the 
purpose of PSC is to make FOC less attractive to ship owners may not truly reflect the full 
picture of sub-standard shipping. 
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7.6.2 Cost and Effectiveness of PSC (Question IB) 
Table 7.2.1 Response to question IB , relating to statements referring to cost and 
effectiveness of PSC (Views from wider marine community) 
No Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 The cost of PSC should be borne by 
all port users 
29 - 26% 33 - 30% 1 0 - 9 % 38 - 35% 
2 The cost of PSC should be bome 
sub-standard ships 
50 - 42% 42 - 35% 2 0 - 1 7 % 8 - 7% 
3 Government surveyors are more 
severe and impartial than Class 
surveyors 
62 - 52% 38 - 32% 1 3 - 1 1 % 7 - 6% 
4 Classiflcation Societies could be 
delegated to carry out PSC inspection 
on behalf of Port State 
12-10% 26 - 22% 14-12% 68 - 57% 
5 PSC has a positive effect in reducing 
marine accidents and protection of the 
environment 
1 6 - 13% 42 - 35% 47 - 39% 15-13% 
Table 7.2.2 Views from Administration 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 5 - 26% 5 - 2 6 % 6 - 32% 3 - 16% 
2 4 - 2 1 % 8 - 4 2 % 6 - 32% 1 - 5% 
3 6 - 32% 9 - 4 7 % 3 - 1 6 % I - 5% 
4 0 2 - 10% 4 - 2 1 % 13-68% 
5 8-42% 9 - 47% 2 - 1 0 % 0 
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Table 7.2.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Agree / neutral Agree 
2 Agree Strongly agree / agree 
3 Strongly agree / agree Strongly agree / agree 
4 Disagree Disagree 
5 Strongly agree / agree Agree / neutral 
In general the responses between the Administration and the wider marine community 
show broad agreement on the cost and effectiveness of PSC. The Administration, 
however, is very confident that PSC has a positive effect in reducing marine accidents and 
in protection of the environment. The wider marine community is less sure that this is so. 
On balance, government surveyors have a closer contact with accidents and emergencies 
than the wider community who will only be ftiUy aware when one o f their own ships is 
involved. This could account for the difference in weighing 
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Chart 7.2 Chart Showing Response to Question IB 
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Based on section IB of the questionnaire, 56% of the respondents agreed that the cost of 
PSC should be borne by all port users, while 35% of the respondents disagreed with this 
suggestion. I f the cost of PSC is borne by all port users then all the substandard ships are 
automatically included. On the other hand, 77% believed that sub-standard ships should 
bear the cost. The only conclusion the author can draw from this is, a significant number 
of those responding thought while all sub-standard ships should bear the cost of the PSC 
some other ships should not bear the cost. But what are those ships? 
:()s 
Under the existing arrangement in most of the Tokyo MOU member states the initial PSC 
inspection does not incur any charges to the ship. Charge wi l l only be incurred i f a 
re-inspection is required in case of a detention. The present cost for a PSC re-inspection in 
Hong Kong is about 500 steriing pounds for the first hour of re-inspection, another 100 
sterling pounds is added for the work of every additional hour. Although this levy of 
re-inspection has been criticized by some the shipping companies, these charges are 
insufficient to recover the fiill operational costs of PSC inspections. Thus from a financial 
point of view, PSC inspection is at all times running at a loss and the Administration is 
required to subsidize the cost of PSC inspections. 
In Hong Kong a bill relating to the cost of PSC re-inspection has been drafted and is now 
in the pipeline waiting to become law. This bill would increase largely the cost of PSC 
re-inspection with the aim of achieving an overall balance in PSC inspection costs. The 
finding from the questionnaire tends to agree with the Administration's intention to 
increase the re-inspection charges to sub-standard ships. 
Under the Paris MOU ships are now categorized into white, grey and black lists. Ships 
with clean PSC records wil l be classed in the while list and ships with record of serious 
detention will be classed in the black list. The United States Coast Guard has also 
introduced a similar point system for ship targeting. They have also introduced a system 
called Quali Ship 21 for ships with a clean record. I f the analysis of questions I B I and 
1B2 led to a conclusion that some of the ships should not be paying to the cost of PSC, then 
logically it should be those ships in the white list and those classed as Quali Ships. On the 
other hand ships identified to be at the low side of the list, according to the findings of this 
survey, should bear most of the costs of PSC inspection. 
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The responsibility of PSC inspectors is to spot-check the standard of the ship following 
the instructions and the requirements of PSC. While in doing so they may use their own 
discretion in interpreting those requirements, their view remains impartial and should not 
be influenced by commercial considerations. Respondents overwhelmingly (84%) 
recognize the rigour and impartiality of government surveyors, i.e. PSC is working on 
behalf of the Port State authority and should not be subject to commercial pressures. 
Conversely classification societies are commercial orientated companies and although 
their integrity is not questioned, commercial considerations are likely to be an influencing 
factor, in this particular case, on a sensitive and often a conflict of interest issue. It is 
therefore not surprising that a majority of respondents (57%) do not agree that 
classification societies could be delegated to carry out PSC inspection on behalf of the 
Port State. 
It has to be noted however that one third of respondents, constituting a significant minority, 
believe the task of PSC could be delegated to classification societies on behalf of the port 
Administration. However the debate on either Administration or classification society 
surveyor may not be conclusive i f based only on the opinions of respondents from Hong 
ICong. Not all states share Hong Kong's ability to carry out PSC. For this reason some of 
the Port States conduct insufficient inspections to fulf i l l their obligation under the MOU 
quotas. In such cases delegating responsibility for PSC inspections to classification 
societies may be the best option available, however the author considers the argument of 
this issue would be beyond the scope of this study. 
Statement IB5 - PSC has a positive effect in reducing marine accidents and protection of 
the environment - while 48%, less than half the respondents, considered PSC has a 
210 
positive effect on reducing marine accidents and protection of the environment, perhaps it 
is still early days for the industry in Hong Kong to know the effect of PSC. Some comfort 
can be drawn from the fact that only 13% disagreed with this assertion. 
The fact that it is still early days for PSC in Hong Kong also brings into question the depth 
of understanding on the part of the maritime community at large, and perhaps, the amount 
and type of publicity PSC gets in Hong Kong. It is generally felt from the response that 
the impression given to the maritime community, at least in Hong Kong, is that PSC is 
nothing but another measure to penalize sub-standard shipping and the means to drive 
them away from our port, rather than seeing it as part of a continuous movement towards 
reduction of marine accidents and protection of environment. 
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7.6.3 Adverse Opinions on Port State Control (Question I C ) 
Table 7.3.1 Response to question I C relating to adverse opinions on PSC 
(Views from wider marine community) 
No Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 Professional standard of 
PSC inspectors is not 
Competent enough 
9 - 8% 1 0 - 8 % 38 - 32% 63 - 53% 
2 Inconsistent inspection 
standards exist among 
PSC inspectors in different 
countries 
2 0 - 17% 70 - 58% 16- 13% 1 4 - 12% 
3 Too many and too frequent 
inspections especially 
When ships are on 
continental trade 
10 -8% 82 - 68% 1 3 - 1 1 % 15-13% 
4 PSC inspections often 
hamper the smooth 
Running of shipboard 
business 
3 - 3% 2 2 - 18% 30 - 25% 65 - 54% 
5 PSC activities have 
suffocated the already low 
Profit margin shipping 
business in some 
Developing countries 
38 - 32% 44 - 37% 2 0 - 17% 18-15% 
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Table 7.3.2 Views 
from Administration 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
1 0 4 - 2 1 % 5 - 26% 10-53% 
2 7 - 37% 12-63% 0 0 
3 3 - 1 6 % 10-53% 6 - 3 1 % 0 
4 I - 5% 9 - 4 7 % 4 - 2 1 % 5 - 26% 
5 I - 5% 5 - 26% 9 - 4 7 % 4 - 2 1 % 
Table 7.3.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Disagree Disagree 
2 Strongly agree / agree Agree 
3 Agree Agree 
4 Agree / neutral Neutral / disagree 
5 Neutral Agree 
More surveyors than individuals in the wider marine community considered that there 
were inconsistencies in inspection standards among PSC inspectors in different countries. 
This finding is natural as government surveyors tends to be more technically involved in 
PSC than the marine community. They might be able to understand in detail with regard 
to inspection standard of the other countries. 
The responses to question 1C4 are surprising. People in the marine community tend to 
disagree with the view that PSC often hampers the smooth running of the shipboard 
business. Conversely the Administration tends to believe that shipboard business was 
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hampered by PSC inspection. When PSC officers conduct the PSC inspection, they are 
conscious of a standing instruction under the Tokyo MOU guidelines that the ship being 
inspected must not be unduly delayed. The marine community might have considered that 
the PSC inspection has become higher in priority than the ship* s schedule, in fact this is 
not the situation. I f a PSC officer found that a ship would sail within two to three hours 
from the time of boarding, in accordance to the guideline of the MOU, he should not board 
this ship. It is really compliment to PSC officers that the wider marine community 
believes their actions do not hamper ship's business. 
Those involved in ship operations have a closer connection with the realities of shipping 
economics than a government surveyors. This would account for the difference in 
responses to Question 1C5. 
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Chart 7.3 Chart Showing Response to Question IC 
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Referring to question ICl of the questionnaire, only 16% of respondents thought the 
professional standards of PSC inspectors were inadequate, while more than half 
considered the inspectors are professionally competent. But when moving on to questions 
1C2 it is interesting to note that by over six to one respondents agreed inconsistent 
standards exist in different countries. This raises the question whether inconsistency is 
compatible with competence. From these findings it could be assumed that the general 
support shown for inspectors in question I C l applies perhaps to Hong Kong, and does not 
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extend to respondents wider experience of PSC. Without deeper investigation there is no 
way of confirming this assumption, but the survey of opinion was taken mainly from local 
respondents and it is possible to assume that the response to question I C l applies to Hong 
Kong PSC. It is generally known locally that the Marine Department of Hong Kong SAR 
has devoted a lot of resources and commitment to its participation in regional PSC 
activities. Unlike many other countries, particularly in the Asia Pacific region, all PSC 
officers in Hong Kong are dedicated ful l time to the task of PSC. 
The response to question 1C2 is perhaps unsurprising. Many of the respondents were from 
ship management circles where they should have some experiences of PSC inspections on 
their ships. In discussion with respondents from ship management companies the author 
was given examples of unjustified detention. These varied from incorrect application of 
the SOLAS Convention to misinterpretation of the Convention itself A well known 
example was to demand installation o f an hydrostatic release to the forward 6 men life raft 
(there is no such requirement in the SOLAS Convention). A similar misunderstanding 
was an inspector's false belief that there was a requirement for a fire detector in a manned 
machinery space. 
Under the present system, the actions available to the management company of a detained 
vessel are limited, even i f the ship is unreasonably detained. As given in Notice to 
Mariners a Hong Kong ship owner should inform the Flag State at the first instance when 
their ship has been detained, and provide Forms A & B to the Administration giving 
information on the detainable deficiencies that had been identified by the Port State. 
Experience has shown that some PSC detentions could be unreasonable, and i f compliant 
is made in time by the Flag State the detention could be reverted. 
216 
From an Administration viewpoint there are identifiable reasons why inconsistent PSC 
inspection standards may exist in different countries. Not only is each inspector likely to 
have his personal view and judgment, each Port State tends to concentrate on different 
sections of the inspection requirement when establishing instructions for their inspectors. 
In some cases, due to tight working schedules, inspectors can only conduct spot checks on 
some incoming vessels, or even check only vessels in the target list. 
Question IC3 sought to determine whether respondents though there were too many and 
too frequent inspections, with particular reference to the coastal trade. 76% thought there 
were, while only 13% disagreed.. The response echoes a dilemma facing PSCOs. Many 
ships entering port have been inspected by other authorities within the preceding six 
months. The trend is getting worse as the MOU increases its the target inspection rate. It 
has been agreed at a recent MOU Committee meeting that a ship should not be PSC 
inspected again i f it had been inspected by other authority within the same MOU in the 
past 6 months, unless a clear ground is found. On the other hand there would be a target 
inspection rate for the PSCO and their authorities to meet, currently set at 15% of ships 
visiting their port(s) in Asia Pacific Region and 25% in Europe. Taking Hong Kong as an 
example a 15% target would mean 850 initial PSC inspections to be undertaken each year. 
Identified during discussions with the respondents, and reflected in this survey, was that 
ship masters too frequently experience repeated inspections o f their vessel during a six 
month period. Although in theory the master may raise the six months' rule' to the PSCO, 
in the real situation little can be done by the master i f the PSCO insists in carrying out the 
inspection. There have been complaints from the ship masters to the IMO on the issue of 
too frequent PSC inspections that could cause a lot of unnecessary interference to the 
217 
ship's operation. This is particularly true to some new buildings and to container ships 
that are constantly running on tight sailing schedules. 
Question IC4 sought opinion on whether or not PSC inspections often hampered the 
smooth running of shipboard business. Intuitively one would think any additional in port 
activity would adversely impact on shipboard business, yet surprisingly more than half the 
respondents thought PSC did not. Perhaps ' often' was the key word in this question. 
That only one fifth of respondents thought such disruption did occur could indicate that, in 
general, good relationships exist between inspectors and ships' staff. 
In asking whether PSC activities have suffocated the already low profit margin shipping 
business in some developing countries. Question 1C5 was looking at wider implications, 
beyond the impact of the inspection itself 69% thought such suffocation had taken place 
while only 15% disagreed. 
In analyzing these findings it is understood that where ships are targeted they are 
inevitably subjected to what may seem * frequent' inspection. This can lead to complaints 
fi-om the ship's master that PSC inspections hamper the smooth running of shipboard 
business. But all non-Port State vessels are liable to be subject to Port State inspection 
whether targeted or not, while the vessels of the Port State are subject to inspection under 
their own Flag State requirements. The degree to which any inspection hampers the 
smooth running of the vessel is largely dependent on the condition of that vessel. Clearly 
well found and well-maintained vessels will be less hampered than vessels seen to be in 
poor condition. To this extent where ship masters, ship owners and ship managers have 
concerns they also have the solution in their own hands. It can often be seen that the 
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shipping companies in developing countries do have not sufficient capital to maintain 
quality shipping. They employ ships at low cost and run their business in marginal profit. 
In addition, the crew employed on board often possesses low professional standards 
ftjrther aggravating the situation. 
Unconfirmed information from discussion with Tokyo MOU members revealed that a new 
targeting system is in the pipeline and is to be considered in the IMO Flag State 
Implementation (FSI) sub-committee under MSC. The new targeting system will use 
inspection scores to replace the physical number of ships inspected. The targeting 
percentage of each MOU would be based on inspection scores rather than the number of 
individual ships inspected. Scores would be allocated to each ship inspection on a basis of 
past PSC record, age, type and other relevant factors under a unified score allocation 
system. In future i f the PSCO inspects a new built container ship which had no previous 
detention, such inspection may be allocated with a score less than one, say 0.5, whilst 
another PSCO inspecting an aged bulk carrier having a poor detention record may allocate 
the ship a score higher than one. This idea aims to encourage PSC authorities to 
concentrate their effort at the aged and ill maintained ships with a view to minimize any 
unnecessary interference to the new and well-maintained ships. 
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7.6.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of PSC Activities (Question ID) 
Views from wider marine community 
Table 7.4,1 is not reproduced as there were too few responses to this section of the 
questionnaire. 
Fewer than ten responded to this section ID of the questionnaire. While no conclusions 
can be drawn from their comments, it is of interest that the following views were 
expressed: 
The majority of the respondents to this section were from ship management sectors. Their 
responses indicated that the strengths of PSC directly relate to the capability to maintain 
the standard of shipping. They considered that the weaknesses of PSC fall on its 
inspectors, who may have inconsistent inspection standards and exercise individual 
discretion in detaining ships. There were also fears on the possibility of corruption. 
In the area of commercial impact to the shipping of developing countries, although there 
was no direct evidence to prove the allegation, the respondents felt that PSC activities 
could cause suffocation of the already low profit margin shipping business in some 
developing countries. The fijture of PSC depends on relevant parties in regional MOUs 
and a need for a better co-ordination and harmonization (including IMO) were identified 
from this section along with that for a better appeal process. 
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Table 7.4.2 Views from the Administration 
The following strengths and weaknesses were identified from the responses: 
Strengths No. of 
appearance 
To get rid of substandard ships 10 
Reduce marine accidents and to protect environment 2 
Government surveyors are more severe and impartial 2 
Improve the safety standard of ships 
> 
To provide a level playing field for those ports who believe in fair trade 
> 
PSC has a positive effect in reducing marine accident 
> 
Power of PSC to get rid of sub-standard 
Persuade Flag State to maintain ship standard 
Make sure Classification Society carry out their job properly 
To persuade Flag States to maintain standard of their ships 
To penalize the irresponsible shipowner/management 
Weaknesses No. of 
appearance 
Inconsistent inspection standard exist among PSC inspectors in 
different countries 
7 
PSC inspection often hamper the smooth running of shipboard business 6 
Impose costs to port 3 
Suffocated the already low profit margin shipping business in 
developing coumtries 
2 
Professional standard of PSC inspectors is not competent enough 2 
STCW 95 1 
Carriage of dangerous goods 1 
ISM Code I 
Key person may not be on board during inspection 1 
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Inspection not plarmed 1 
To be used by none free trade countries to protect their own shipping 
industry such as local shipping companies and repair yards 
Responsibility of Flag State dropped to Port State 
Too many and too frequent PSC inspection especially when ships are 
engaged in continental trade 
Possible to create corruption in some countries 
Abuses PSC for some under-table reasons 
Although there were fewer than ten responses from the wider marine community, there 
were indications that the strength on PSC was the maintaining of standard of ships. On the 
weakness side, inconsistency in standard of inspection and the possibility of corruption 
were the worries shared by the wider marine community. 
At the Administration sector more than 50% of the respondents gave their opinions in this 
question. On the strength side, getting rid of substandard ships appeared to be a common 
opinion where most of the government surveyors considered. On the contrary 
inconsistency of inspection and the possibility of hampering the shipboard business during 
inspection were being identified as the weaknesses. The findings between the two sectors 
are found to be generally in line with each other. 
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7.6.5 Reasons for a Sub-Standard Ship (Question 1 E) 
The questionnaire sought opinion on the reasons why a ship becomes sub-standard. The 
response is detailed in the tables below. 
Table 7.5.1 Reasons for a Sub-Standard Ship (Question I E ) 
(Views from wider marine community) 
No Reason Agree Disagree 
1 The economic situation of the ship's Flag State 62 - 52% 58 - 48% 
2 Severe competition in sea transport causing low 
freight rates 
90 - 75% 30 - 25% 
3 Poor market situation for sea transport as a whole 8 5 - 7 1 % 35 - 29% 
4 Poor performance of the ship management company 37 - 34% 73 - 66% 
5 Ship type requiring extra attention and maintenance 75 - 63% 4 5 - 3 7 % 
6 The age of the ship causes vessel to become a "rust 
bucket" 
7 3 - 6 1 % 47 - 39% 
7 The classification society used being disreputable 33 - 28% 87 - 72% 
Table 7.5.2 Views from Administration 
Agree Disagree 
1 11 - 58% 8 - 42% 
2 15-79% 4 - 2 1 % 
3 15-79% 4 - 2 1 % 
4 18-95% I - 5% 
5 13-68% 6 - 32% 
6 10-53% 9 - 47% 
7 12-63% 7 - 37% 
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Table 7.5.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Neutral Neutral 
2 Agree Agree 
3 Agree Agree 
4 Agree Disagree 
5 Agree Agree 
6 Neutral Agree 
7 Agree Disagree 
Strong difference in question 1E4 existed on whether the poor performance of the ship 
management company is one of the reasons for a sub-standard ship. Under the ISM 
system the ship management is directly responsible to the maintenance and operation of 
their ships. This is a general understanding among the Administration and naturally there 
is a 95% of respondent in this sector in favour of this view. 
However the ship management staff might view differently. In discussing with some 
respondents in the marine community they opined that even the best support had been 
given to the ships, it might still become sub-standard i f the ships crew did not operate 
correctly. It is not the intent of the author to comment whether such statement is correct or 
not, the survey, however does reflect there are difference o f opinion in the two sectors 
with the performance of ship management companies - one might not seeing the mole in 
one's own eye. 
In question 1E7 on choice of classification society was also an area of large difference of 
opinion identified in the survey. While the marine community does not consider that a 
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disreputable classification society would contribute to the forming of sub-standard ship, 
the Administration however considered it so. As discussed in earlier chapters that the role 
of classification society is important in maintaining the standard of a ship. However due 
to the commercial nature of the classification society it would not be surprise to see that 
the classification society would, in some occasions compromise on the standard with the 
business. In the real world classification societies are competing fiercely for customers. 
Since the Administration is closely in touch with the classification society, the 
respondents may be able to understand more than the wider marine community the in 
depth situation. 
Chart 7.4 Bar Chart Showing Reasons for a Sub-Standard Ship (Views from wider 
marine community) 
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There are many reasons for a sub-standard ship to exist. Section IE tried to 
identify these reasons and divided them into hardware of the ships itself, software 
part on the shore management company and the Flag State and the various 
constraints in the macro economical shipping market. 
There are many reasons for a sub-standard ship to exist. Section IE tried to identify these 
reasons and divided them into * hardware', being the ships themselves, 'software*, in the 
form of shore management and the Flag State, and the various constraints in the macro 
economic shipping market. 
Responding to question IE4 on the poor performance of the ship management company, 
66% disagreed with 34% agreed, and to question IE7 on the disreputable classification 
society being used. 72% disagreed with only 28% agreed that these were factors. It is 
worth mentioning that only one in three thought poor management ashore was a key factor. 
It gives rise to the question whether ships' staff would agree with that assessment, since 
the respondents of the questionnaire had not taken ship staff into account. The author 
opined that those ashore would naturally wish to throw responsibility onto factors like' the 
world situation' such factors are seemingly beyond their control. They would be the last 
to follow the lead of OPEC and keep prices up by reducing supply. Over supply of 
shipping is an element in the existence of sub-standard ships, and who but owners and 
managers is responsible for that? It is of interest, and concern, that more than one in four 
thought disreputable classification societies are a contributing factor. 
It appears that these opinions might not be in line with the general Administration view on 
sub-standard shipping with reference to management companies and classification 
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societies. Apart from traditional IMO Conventions in regulating the standard of shipping, 
the ISM, in force ft-om 1 July 1998, was specifically aimed at the regulation of shore 
management companies. It would not be reasonable, when considering reasons for 
sub-standard shipping, not to include poor ship management staff. But the purpose of this 
study is to assess the effectiveness of PSC, not the root causes of sub-standard shipping, 
and apart from observing on this fact, it is not the subject of this study. 
Questions IE2 and 1E3 addressed as possible reasons for sub-standard shipping severe 
competition in sea transport and poor market situation for sea transport as a whole. An 
average of 3 to 1 agreed that these were factors. It could be argued that one o f the reasons 
for a ship to become sub-standard was the general poor worid economic situation, which 
had resulted severe competition in sea transport with low freight rate. The poor market 
situation in sea transport as a whole also encouraged the shipping companies to hire 
sub-standard ships with lower cost and run their business at low profit margin, which 
directly linked to the cause of a sub-standard shipping. 
Regarding condition and type of vessel as in questions IE5 and 1E6 - ship type requiring 
extra attention and maintenance and the age of the ship are reasons for sub-standard 
shipping, there was a 2 to 1 in agreement with these assumption. It is interest to see that 
there were still 39% of the respondents did not agree with the statements. 
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7.7 Response and Analysis - Port State Control and Its Implications on Safety 
7.7.1 Sub-Standard Ships (Question HA) 
Section IIA of the questionnaire sought to determine respondents* views on the factors 
leading to a ship becoming sub-standard. The results are shown in table 7.9 below. 
Table 7.6.1 Factors in determination of sub-standard shipping (question IIA) 
Factor Very 
Important 
Important Neutral Not 
Important 
1 Condition of ship and equipment 61-51% 42 - 35% 1 0 - 8 % 7 - 6% 
2 Living & sanitation conditions on 
board 
13-12% 2 2 - 1 8 % 30 - 25% 55 - 46% 
3 Demonstration of crew competence 32 - 27% 5 3 - 4 4 % 28 - 23% 7 - 6% 
4 Combination of multi-national 
crew 
15-13% 2 0 - 1 7 % 43 - 36% 42 - 35% 
5 Flag of ship having high detention 
record 
2 0 - 1 7 % 2 2 - 1 8 % 30 - 25% 48 - 40% 
Table 7.6.2 Views from Administration 
Very 
Important 
Important Neutral Not 
Important 
1 15-79% 4 - 2 1 % 0 0 
2 4 - 2 1 % 15-79% 0 0 
3 11 - 58% 7 - 37% 1 - 5% 0 
4 0 5 - 26% 9 - 47% 5 - 26% 
5 4 - 2 1 % 13-68% 2 - 10% 0 
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Table 7.6.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Very important 
important 
Very important / 
important 
2 Very important / 
important 
Neutral/ not important 
3 Very important 
important 
Important 
4 Neutral Neutral 
5 Important Scutral 
The views between the Administration and the wider marine community appeared to have 
diverged in question IIA2 in considering whether hving and sanitation condition onboard 
should be an important factor of a sub-standard ship. A lot more views from the 
Administration opined that the sanitation condition onboard should be an important factor 
whilst 46% of the wider marine community considered it differently. 
It can be understood that living and sanitation condition do not have a direct impact to the 
safety of ship. However the International Labour Organisation Conventions, which ships 
have to comply with, do require the living and sanitation standard of the ship should be 
brought up to an acceptable standard. Moreover the living and sanitation onboard could 
reflect on the comfort and hygiene condition which directly affects the crew's resting 
condition. Fimess and the fatigue issues might then follow. This could be the reason why 
there were a number of opinions from the Administration considered that this should be an 
important factor. 
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Question IIA5 has also indicated some difference of opinions between the two sectors. 
Opinions varied in the wider marine community as to whether the flag of ships with a poor 
record should be considered as an important factor. 35% of respondents confirmed this 
agreement while 40% thought that it should not. In the Administration side, however had 
an overwhelming agreement on the issue» 89% of government surveyors considered the 
flag of ships with poor record is an important factor in determining a sub-standard ships. 
In actual experience, a PSC officer could learn some ideas about the condition of a ship he 
is about to inspect by referring to the flag record which the ship is flying. The chance of 
finding serious deficiencies on ship with poor flag record would be much higher than 
other ships. This on hand experiences of the PSC inspection perhaps, caused the 
overwhelming responses to this question by the respondents in the Administration sector. 
230 
Chart 7.5 Chart Showing Response to Question IIA 
(View from Wider marine community) 
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Overwhelmingly respondents thought that the poor condition of a ship and her equipment 
may indicate a sub-standard vessel. 
A sub-standard ship is usually a ship in sub-standard condition. Accidents could happen 
due to ships* poor condition and equipment failure. However, the relationship between 
conditions of the ship and accidents can be explained in the followings: 
Firstly, under the same unfavourable conditions - such as extreme weather condition, 
human errors during operation, etc. - ships of poor condition are much more likely to run 
into accidents in adverse conditions than those when in favourite conditions. 
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Secondly, when an accident does happen to a ship, an i l l maintained ship could result in 
greater losses of life and property, and cause greater damage to the environment than a 
ship which is in good condition. 
As the purpose of identifying sub-standard shipping is to reduce marine accidents and to 
ensure safety and environmental protection, it would be reasonable to see that condition of 
the ship and her equipment should be considered with highest priority. 
Other than condition of the ship itself, the majority of respondents viewed crew 
competence as an important factor. This conforms to the widely agreed opinion - which 
has been stated in Chapter 3, that most of maritime casualties are caused or aggravated by 
human error. Most human errors resulted from the ship's crew being not competent in 
their onboard duties. In recent years, modem technologies have been widely employed in 
shipbuilding and on board operation. Modem ships with advanced equipment had no 
doubt helped the industry in making ships safer and also brought a reduction in manpower. 
However i f the crews are not properly trained they could make operational mistakes that 
could lead to an accident despite the vessel being in good condition and well equipped. 
The findings of the questionnaire regarding crew competence indicated that a substandard 
crew could lead to the ship becoming sub-standard. 
That the living and sanitation conditions on board depend in part on the culture and life 
style of the ship's crew, could lead to the respondents being less certain that whether this 
should be a factor in determining a sub-standard vessel. Indeed most respondents thought 
this factor unimportant. 
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International regulations regarding living and sanitation conditions are mainly addressed 
in the ILO conventions. Compared with IMO, ILO concerns itself much more with 
factors relating to humanism and crew welfare. Although it is agreed by the industry that 
living conditions onboard do affect crew's standard of living thus could be one of the 
factors that lead to human error, these effects vary greatly from person to person, and have 
no readily identifiable connection with accidents. 
However, nearly one third of the respondents opined that this factor is important in 
determining a sub-standard ship. The reason could be that living and sanitation conditions 
can reflect vessel's overall standard to a certain extent. It would be rare to find a ship 
which is in sub-standard condition maintaining a high standard of living and sanitation 
condition at the same time. 
It is a surprise to see that feelings were fairly evenly divided on whether multi-nationalism 
amongst crew was also considered as a factor. Multi-nationals could also mean 
multi-lingual, and i f this could lead to communication problems, ship and crew safety may 
be at risk in emergency situations. This is a common problem that has been identified 
among ships with multi-national crew. Many senior mariners wil l remember situations 
from their early experiences, when communication between officers and crew of different 
nationalities could only be relayed by petty officers as interpreters. This can explain why 
one third of the respondents regarded multi-nationalism as a factor when determine 
substandard ships. 
In recent years the multi-national crew system has been widely adopted by more and more 
ship owners/operators with high management standards. Shipping companies from some 
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of the traditional marine countries such as Norway and Germany have also started to 
recruit crew members from other countries to work together with native officers. As a 
result, some of these multi-national crewmembers have had the opportimity of being 
trained to high international standards, gaining in the process good experience with 
colleagues from different countries. Nowadays, it would not be difficult to find a high 
standard ship that is manned by multi-national crew. From this point of view, 
multi-national crew does not necessarily mean sub-standard vessel, this suggestion is 
supported by another one third of the respondents. 
7.7.2 Ship Targeting (Question II B) 
To improve the effectiveness of Port State Control, targeting and points systems are often 
used by Port States when selecting ships for inspection. Section IIB of the questionnaire 
asked respondents to assess the importance of some of the attributes used in the targeting 
process. The responses are given in tables below. 
Table 7.7.1 Attributes Used in PSC Targeting (Question IIB) 
(Views from wider marine community) 
No Attribute Very 
Important 
Important Neutral Not 
Important 
1 Age of ship 42 - 35% 38 - 32% 27 - 23% 1 3 - 1 1 % 
2 Flag of ship 27 - 23% 29 - 24% 44 - 37% 20 -17% 
3 Ship type (container, 
tanker, passenger etc) 
28 - 23% 28 - 23% 46 - 38% 2 0 - 16% 
4 Ship size 26 -23% 30 - 27% 48 - 43% 8 - 7% 
5 Nationality of crew 2 0 - 17% 5 0 - 4 2 % 30 - 25% 2 0 - 17% 
6 Classification society used 20 - 17% 28 - 23% 30 - 25% 42 - 35% 
Table 7.7.2 Views from Administration 
Very 
Important 
Important Neutral Not 
Important 
1 9 - 4 7 % 9 - 4 7 % 1 - 5% 0 
2 3 - 1 6 % 15-79% I - 5% 0 
3 2 - 1 0 % 10-53% 6 - 32% 1 - 5% 
4 0 3 - 1 6 % 9 - 4 7 % 7 - 37% 
5 0 10-53% 7 - 37% 2 - 10% 
6 0 13-68% 6 - 32% 0 
Table 7,7.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
1 Very important / Very important / 
important important 
2 Important Important / neutral 
3 Important / neutral Important / neutral 
4 Neutral / not important Important / neutral 
5 Important / neutral Important / neutral 
6 Important / neutral Neutral 
Responding to question IIB4 more people in the wider marine community considered the 
size of ship should be an attribute used in PSC targeting than respondents in the 
Administration sector, 47% of whom thought that the idea should be neutral. With 
automation and advances in marine technology, operating a large modem ship today does 
not always prove more difficult than operating a ship of conventional size. On the 
contrary PSC detention records reveal a large portion of ships being detained were of 
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conventional sizes. 
In question IIB6, more views in the Administration sector considered that the 
classification society used should be a factor used in ship targeting. This agrees with the 
earlier discussion on question IE7, where a general difference of opinion on the level of 
significance of classification societies existed between the two sectors. 
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Chart 7.6 Chart Showing Response to Question IIB 
(View from Wider marine community) 
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Respondents accepted the need for measures to target vessels for PSC inspection by a ratio 
of 3 to 1. The various targeting attributes suggested in the questionnaire were thought to 
be important. 
The respondents considered the ship's age to be the most important indicator. Two third of 
the respondents shared this viewpoint. 
These co-insides with the result of casualty analysis in Chapter 6, which showed that ships 
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20 years old or more accounted for 69% of all total losses over the year of 2000 (Chapter 
6.6). Furthermore, various international regulations regarding safety and environmental 
protection have been implemented, all containing clauses of either exemption or longer 
transitional periods for older ships. As a result, while facing higher risk of causing 
accidents, older ships have been regulated under safety standard which are usually lower 
than those of newer ships. 
The respondents seem well aware of this, and believed that aged ships should be targeted 
for PSC inspections with highest priority in order to ensure safety. 
The second import attribute identified by the respondents turned out to be the nationality 
of crew. There were 59% of the respondents opined that it to be important when setting 
targets. 
Crews carry out the daily operation and maintenance work onboard ships. Their abilities 
and attitudes are critical factors in ships' safety. It may be correct, in this case, to judge 
with prejudice whether crews of certain nationalities are better or worse than others, but 
different nationalities may mean different background and culture. For example: crews 
from traditional maritime nations may have more historic attachment about navigational 
safety & maritime culture, whilst crews from most of non-English speaking countries are 
of^en found to have reservation with external communication in languages. 
As for ship owners/operators, crew from different nationalities would also mean different 
manning costs and expenses. In an industry where cutting cost is inevitable, the 
management of some sub-standard enterprises tends to choose crews in accordance to the 
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salary level as first priority instead of their competency. To a certain extent, the 
nationality of ship's crew may reflect on how much the owner/operator intends to invest in 
the standard of ship's safety. 
It was felt that the respondents realized that ship's crews of developing nations might not 
have proper training, their knowledge and experience might not be adequate in ship board 
operation or to maintain the vessel in good condition, yet they are employed in manning 
an appreciable amount of shipping tonnage. 
Ship size, ship's flag, and ship type, as targeting attributes, were all scored in similar 
fashion, they are being considered as important by about half the respondents. 
Why is ship size important? Firstly, bigger ships are more difficult to manoeuvre and need 
more resources for maintenance. Secondly, in the event of marine casualty, bigger ships 
could bring more damage to property and the environment. It follows that most 
international maritime regulations in marine safety and environment protection have set 
different criteria for ships of different sizes. This common understanding may explain 
why the ship size was rated a slightly more important factor than flag or type. 
The same applies to ship type. Ships of different kinds may pose different risks, and some 
ships are always considered to be more dangerous than the others. For example: oil 
carriers and chemical tankers may cause more pollution and severe consequence in case of 
an accident. Stricter regulations have been set up for these ship types. 
As for the flag of ship, it would be the Flag States that carry out ship registrations. Under 
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the United Nation Law of the Sea they should be responsible for maintaining their ships to 
a proper standard. The performance of the Flag State has a direct affect on the standard of 
their ships. The respondents considered that the flag of a ship might reflect the standard of 
the ship, and should be regarded as an important factor for targeting. 
There are many FOC ships in the merchant fleet today and the relationship between FOC 
Flag States and their vessels can be sometimes quite vague. However for toda/s FOC 
shipping it can be seen that the condition of the FOC ship of\en not depends on the flag 
Administration but depend on their operator. It is also noted that the condition of ships 
flying the same flag may vary to a large extent, their differences are dependent on their 
operators. 
With regard to classification society only 40% of the respondents agreed that this should 
be an important factor for targeting, while 35% disagreed - the highest disagreement 
rating among the 6 attributes. As discussed in paragraph 6.5.4, classification society 
figured last in this order of precedence accords with the majority view, that the 
classification society being used was disreputable was not deemed to be a reason for a ship 
becoming sub-standard. 
On the question of targeting, however, respondents were still marginally in favor of the 
classification society being used being a factor in targeting. It can be seen that most of the 
responses opined that all classification societies are almost equally qualified. I f the 
elements on classification societies are to be targeted for PSC inspection, under such 
assumption it would be difficult to select one. 
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However, in the real world there might be some classification societies which lowered 
their standard in ship survey in order to compete for customers. Those respondents who 
agreed to target classification societies might believe that by such targeting it could 
motivate classification societies to maintain their standards. 
7.7.3 Punitive Measures (Question IIC) 
Section IIC of the questionnaire sought to determine, from a list provided, what measures 
should be taken against a vessel found by PSC inspection to have serious deficiencies. 
The results are given in Table 7.13 below. 
Table 7.8.1 Punitive measures against ships having serious defects (Question IIC) 
(Views from wider marine community) 
No Measure Agree Disagree 
1 The Flag State of the ship should bear the entire cost of 
inspection 
88- 73% 32 - 27% 
2 Ships under the same management company should be 
banned from the port 
42- 35% 78 - 65% 
3 Allocate and publish demerits to classification society 
and Flag State 
40- 33% 80 - 67% 
4 Inform immediately ship owner's underwriters and 
P&I Club 
83- 69% 3 7 - 3 1 % 
5 Ship owner should bear entire cost of inspection 90- 82% 2 0 - 18% 
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Table 7.8.2 Views from Administration 
Agree Disagree 
1 6 - 3 2 % 13-68% 
2 4 - 2 1 % 15-79% 
3 18-95% 1 - 5% 
4 14-74% 5 - 26% 
5 14-74% 5 - 26% 
Table 7.8.3 Comparison of views 
No Administration Wider marine community 
I Disagree Agree 
2 Disagree Disagree 
3 Agree Disagree 
4 Agree Agree 
5 Agree Agree 
Difference of views existed in question IICl between the two sectors as to whether the 
Flag State of the ship should bear the entire cost of the inspection. 73% of the wider 
marine community considered that the Flag State should bear the cost. In earlier 
discussion it has been highlighted that the Flag State of the ship should have the prime 
responsibility in the maintenance of standard to ships flying their flag. The wider marine 
community opined that i f the ships flying a flag were found to be a problem in other port, 
naturally the Flag State should retain the most of the responsibility, including the cost 
incurred. In fact there are technical difficulties for this direct responsible concept because 
there are ship operators who should be more responsible to the maintenance o f standard to 
their ships. However the author opined that the principle of charging the Flag State could 
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still be feasible subject to acceptance of agreement by the Flag States concerned, again 
this would be a difficult process to implement. 
Difference of opinion once again arose in the area of classification society at question 
IIC3, where the Administration sector overwhelmingly supported the publishing of 
demerits to classification society and Flag State. On the contrary 67% of respondent from 
the wider marine community did not agree with this suggestion. It is understood from the 
administrative point of view such punitive measure would take a direct threat to the 
business reputation of the classification society and Flag State (particularly with FOC) 
concemed. In fact the punitive measure has been in force for over three years since it was 
introduced in the MOU regions. The author discussed with respondents in the marine 
community their reasons for not supporting this measure and replies varied. In general 
people in the marine community considered that it might not be a good practice to nail 
down a particular partner from a sense of business in the long run. 
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Chart 7.7 Bar Chart Showing Response to Question IIC 
(View from wider marine community) 
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These measures were identified as a result of the earlier unstructured interviews (para 7.2). 
It is worth noting that the measures *The Flag State should bear the entire cost of 
inspection" and "Ship owner should bear the cost of entire inspection" were 
overwhelmingly endorsed by the respondents. 
Most respondents considered that the Flag State should be responsible for the condition of 
ships flying its flag at all times. It is noted that 73% of respondents agreed with the first 
suggestion. How, i f at all, this could be made to work in practice is beyond the scope of 
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this study, but the responses are indicative of the feehngs of the Hong Kong maritime 
community towards the sub-standard shipping. 
The objective of PSC is to improve vessel standards and thus enhance safety and 
environment protection. It is of the utmost importance that remedial measures should be 
taken once a ship is found to be sub-standard during PSC inspections. This should apply 
not only the to ship found question, but also to other ships possibly carrying similar 
defects. From the response of the questionnaire we can safely arrive at a consensus view 
that the best way to accomplish this goal is through actions taken by the Flag States. To 
ensure the Flag State takes serious actions, the respondents opined that to let them bear the 
cost of entire inspection of their ships in question would be much more effective then just 
informing them ship's name or by other existing means. Of course this cost would relate 
back to the shipowners or operator through a mechanism set up by the Flag State. 
Similar responsibilities also lie on ship owners. Actually, they play the key role in 
maintaining ships in proper standard. It is also noted that 82% of respondents thought the 
ship owner should bear the ftjil cost of inspection. 
In Hong Kong, ship owners are required to pay the cost of re-inspection for a ship with 
serious deficiencies. From the general view obtained from interviews with the 
respondents, it appears this practice is widely accepted by the respondents. This 
assumption is further supported with a response of 82% in agreement that the ship owner 
should even bear the entire cost of inspection. Poor condition of ships is usually caused by 
ship owners not providing adequate resources and support for their ships. As a punitive 
measure, most respondents considered that they should also pay the full cost of PSC 
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inspections. 
The respondents were 2 to I in favor of the ship's underwriters and P&I club being 
informed when serious deficiencies are found. The role played by underwriters and P&l 
club in relation to sub-standard ships is both proactive and passive. By setting stricter 
insurance clauses, they may put pressure onto ship owners to improve the ship's standard. 
On the other hand, underwriters and P&I clubs already carry some burden from 
sub-standard shipping by facing higher risks of accidents. The respondents definitely 
think that getting them involved in PSC inspections by providing negative information on 
ships they insure would be helpful in maintaining ship*s standards and an incentive for 
them to increase the insurance premium. 
Each of the above 3 measures is supported by more than two thirds of the respondents. It 
is obvious that if Flag States pay inspection costs for their ships, the costs could be 
transferred to ship owners in one way or another by the authorities. As for underwriters 
and P&I clubs, termination of contract or increasing of the premium would possibly be 
considered when negative PSC reports regarding their insured ships is received. As a 
result, Flag States, underwriters and P&I club would put pressure onto ship owners 
thereby increasing their running costs. This will in turn, drive the ship owners to improve 
their safety standard onboard. 
With only I in 3 of the respondents favouring banning ships under the same management 
company from the port, the fxill implications of such action are not supported by most of 
the respondent. Banning ships would lead to certain consequent actions such as ' what 
would be the appeal process?' 'Would this proliferate the formation of single ship 
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management companies?' These questions can be dragged on and on but again they are 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Similarly, respondents were 2 to 1 against published demerits being attached to the 
classification society and Flag State. This may show a bias away from publicity towards a 
closed system. To most of the respondents, the responsibility of Flag State and 
classification society warranted indirect rather than overt action. 
The questionnaire invited respondents to suggest any other measures they thought 
appropriate. No specific suggestions were received, which could indicate that the 
respondents considered the measures listed in the questionnaire were adequate. 
7.7.4 Flags of Convenience (Question II D&C) 
The questionnaire asked whether targeting should be confined to ships flying flags of 
convenience. Despite the obvious difficulties in reaching some common agreement on 
which flags would qualify as being of * convenience*, 57% of those respondents thought 
targeting should be so confined. The questionnaire then sought to determine reasons why 
the 57% equate flags of convenience to sub-standard shipping. The responses are 
recorded in Table 7.15 below. 
With benefit of hindsight it is regretted that the 43% who were against such limited 
targeting were not asked why they rejected the suggestion. The need to do this was 
overlooked in the construction of the questionnaire, and not identified during the trialing, 
which was mainly aimed at avoiding ambiguity. Had the question been asked the 
arguments for and against, this issue would have been better understood. As stated in 
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previous chapters, ships from some of the developing nations flying their national flag 
also have a high detention rate. On the other hand, as increasing number of the ship 
operators have chosen to register their ships with FOC, today it would not be difficult to 
find high standard ships flying FOC flag. These findings could be the reasons suggesting 
not to limit ship targeting to FOC ships. 
Table 7.9.1 Flag of Convenience = Sub-Standard Shipping 
(View from Wider marine community) 
No Reason Agree Disagree 
I Ships flying FoC are more prone to marine 
accident 
51 -75% 12-25% 
2 Administrations of FoC countries less capable 
o f policing* their ships 
33-49% 35-51% 
3 FoC ships denote shipping of a lower quality 56 - 82% 12-18% 
4 Crews of FoC ships are inadequately trained 62-91% 6 - 9% 
5 Serious marine accidents usually involve FoC 
ships 
45 - 66% 23 - 34% 
Views from Administration 
The questionnaire asked whether targeting should be confined to ships flying flags of 
convenience. 95%, representing 18 respondents opined that that flag targeting should not 
be confined to flag of convenience, only 1 respondent held different view. Due to the few 
minority, the view of this 5% has not been brought up. 
There is an overwhelming disagreement in the Administration sector in confining PSC 
target to FOC ships. In fact the statistic in chapter 6 indicated that the trend of substandard 
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shipping has changed from the notorious FOC flag ships to the ships of developing 
maritime nation. The performance of FOC flag ships could be seen in earlier discussion 
that it had been improved in the recent years, instead the quality of some FOC flag ships 
now vary upon on the record of the operators. This could be the reason of not suggesting 
target the FOC ship. 
Slightly more than half of the wider marine community or 57% of its respondents 
considered the opposite. The reason could be because the traditional notorious nature of 
FOC ships still dominated most of the view of the marine community in relating 
sub-standard shipping to that of the FOC. 
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Chart 7.8 Bar Chart - Reasons Why FoC Equates to Sub-Standard Shipping 
(View from Wider marine community) (Note: Respondents'* below means 
Respondents who think targeting should be confined to ships flying flag of 
convenience".) 
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An overwhelming number of respondents (91%), considered inadequate training of crews 
as a reason to support FOC targeting. Their concern is quite understandable. Training and 
certification are roles mainly undertaken by the respective national authorities of the crew. 
Since crews commonly come from nations other than the FOC state it is virtually 
impossible for FOC nations to arrange effectively the necessary training, and control the 
crews working onboard their ships. Although most FOC certificates are issued in 
accordance with the crew's national license, the processing procedures available to the 
FOC state to ensure the crew's competence are far from perfect. In this respect, most of 
the respondents accept that FOC ships should be targeted by PSC due to the possibility 
that there is a sub-standard crew onboard. 
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82% of the respondents thought FOC denoted shipping of a lower quality. Due to their 
relaxed registration requirements, FOC stales have always been attractive * homes' for 
ships in relatively sub-standard condition. Poor condition of ships, together with 
incompetent crews, is thought to equate to low quality shipping. 
Around two thirds of the respondents agreed that ship's flying FOC are more prone to 
marine accident, and are usually involved in serious marine accidents. This is fully 
supported by the analysis in Chapter 6.6. The analysis shows that in the year 2000, 
Panama, Saint Vincent, and Cyprus were rated the first three of ships lost by tonnage. 
Nearly half of the respondents agree to target FOC ships because FOC maritime 
authorities often lack the capability of policing their ships properly. When neither the ship 
owner/operator nor the ship's crew is from the FOC state, it is nearly impossible for the 
FOC authorities to take any administrative action towards the ships under their 
registration. However, in recent years, improvement in FOC State control has been 
observed. Some have increased their direct involvement with ships under their flag, by 
appointing representatives, and authorizing classification societies to act on their behalf, 
in countries across the world. Some now have proactive attitudes towards reports 
received from PSC. While these developments have more or less elevated the status of 
FOC as a whole, they have yet to fully meet the requirements and expectations of the 
industry. 
251 
7.8 Background information of respondents (wider marine community) 
The analysis for the above questionnaires is based on the result o f 120 respondents who 
have completed the questions. Their numbers and nature of business are listed in Chart 
7.9. 
Chart 7.9 Bar Chart - Numbers of Respondents and Their Nature of Business 
Flag State Management 
Tokyo MOU Secretariat 
Ship management 
Ship owner 
Hartx)ur pilot 
Government Surveyor 
College lecturer 
Ship agency 
Ship's crew 
Ship's master 
Charterer 
Marine Insurance 
Classification societies 
Marine lawyers 
0 
Potential respondents across the maritime field were targeted, in order to obtain a wide 
range of views and opinion, representative, as far as possible, of the many local maritime 
interests. While it was impossible to effect any form of control on who would and who 
would not respond, in the event a reasonably fair representation was achieved. 
Respondents from ship management, ship owners, ship charterers and shipping agencies 
comprised 50% of the sample. These respondents are directly involved in the operation of 
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shipping, rather than ancillary services, and would have encountered the most direct 
impact from PSC activities. 29% of the respondents were from the shipping services 
sector, including pilots, marine insurers, marine lawyers and classification societies. The 
remaining 21% were representative of Administrations, in the form of Port or Flag States, 
or the Tokyo MOU Secretariat. 
It is with regret that the sample includes no representatives from ship masters and crews. 
While on many occasions the author has boarded ships as a PSC inspector, the relationship 
between inspector and ship's crew is essentially fonnal. The possibility of response being 
biased by the outcome of the inspection was recognized, and after discussion with peers in 
the industry it was decided to omit the shipboard sector from the questionnaire element of 
the study. 
7.9 Background Information of Respondents (Administration) 
All surveyors in the Marine Department of Hong Kong SAR were potential repondents 
irrespective of whether they were working as Port State Control inspectors or not. The 
reason was because periodical transferal policy injthe Department had caused surveyors to 
work across different areas, changing every 2 to 3 years. A number of surveyors in the 
Department have dealt with PSC maners to some extents over the past ten years. However 
in an the actual situation there are 7 surveyors now working in the Port State Control 
section including the head of section and they have most front line experience including 
the opportunity to participate in various activities held within the Tokyo MOU. Under 
normal circumstances one could expect some differences of opinion relating to the Port 
State Control inspection policy in the Department or within the Tokyo MOU. It has been 
noted that all 7 PSC surveyors responded to the questionnaire for this survey. 
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Like other marine surveying professionals, surveyors in Marine Department are a mix of 
three maritime professions. They arc naval architects, marine engineers and master 
mariners. Out of the 19 returned questionnaires there were 5 master mariners, II 
engineers and 3 naval architects, among the respondents there were 4 principle surveyors 
6 senior surveyors and 9 base grade surveyors. This represented a full coverage of various 
marine professionals within the Administration and this coverage is considered to have 
fulfilled the objective of this survey. 
7.10 Summary 
In order to elicit the overall views and opinions regarding various aspects of PSC activities, 
the author carried out a survey among marine industry experts. The survey was carried 
out by the respondents by completing a questionnaire designed by the author. The 
questionnaire covered a wide range of PSC activities, and generated different opinions 
from which the respondents could compare and choose. Respondents were targeted to 
represent non-biased opinion across as many fields of the industry as possible. 
Questionnaires were returned from 120 respondents. A detailed analysis providing the 
wider views of the industry has been carried out. The analysis shows that the majority of 
respondents supported the goal of PSC in eliminating sub-standard ships, and agreed with 
most of the PSC activities presently being carried out. These views are highlighted as 
follows: 
.1 PSC has played an active thus important role in improving ships conditions and 
reducing marine casualties; 
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.2 PSC should put more pressure to Flag States to ensure that they take effective 
actions to control their ships; 
.3 Notwithstanding the harsh market situations, ship owners/operators should take 
frill responsible to improve the condition and maintain the standards of their ships; 
.4 To enhance the effectiveness of the port safety, PSC should set up a target and 
point system to select the ship* s for inspection, concentrating on the age of the ship 
and the nationality of ship's crews; 
.5 Crew* s competency has drawn greater attentions than expected, while prejudice 
against FOC has given way to more reasonable judgment. 
Respondents from the Administration sector show a proactive attitude towards 
implementing PSC activities, while those from shipping business runners seem to have 
more concerns, especially in the aspects relating to their running costs. Classification 
societies and marine underwriters, who need both commercial support from business 
runners and proper standards to survive the competitions, also welcome most PSjC 
activities. 
A final conclusion drawn from the analysis is that the concept of PSC has been widely 
accepted by the industry, and expectations are there that PSC will assist in achieving the 
goal of "Safer Ship, Cleaner Sea". 
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C H A P T E R E I G H T 
COST AND E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F PORT S T A T E 
CONTROL 
8.1 Views Of The Industry 
Views of the Industry were obtained through personal contact during normal office duty. 
Meetings with classification societies and shipping companies are routinely conducted 
after PSC inspections on board their ships. The author took such opportunity to exchange 
views with them, and took notes in formulating the content of this chapter. Articles from 
the maritime press in relation to the subjects were also extracted, other sources were made 
through attending conferences, both locally and overseas with other Administrations and 
people from overseas maritime industry. It is important to make clear that these are view 
of the industry and not of the author. 
8.1.1 Classification Societies 
As with Flag States, the classification societies also set safety standards. Classification 
societies create rules on how to build and outfit vessels, and oversee to ensure that such 
rules are complied with. Increasingly classification societies have also taken over control 
fiinctions on behalf of some Flag States. They are then authorized to inspect and certify 
the vessels for compliance with international regulations, such as SOLAS, Load Line and 
the ISM Code. 
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Classification societies were established in order to safeguard life, property and the 
environment, with emphasis on operations representing a high potential risk to human life, 
property or the environment. New terms such as "Total Safety Class" have been 
introduced, which focus on the interdependence between the ship itself, management of 
operations, personnel and their education, and skills and attributes regarding safety. This 
is a great leap forward in overall safety at sea, providing assurance that all critical aspects 
of safety are taken care of 
However the control performed by some classification societies, on behalf of some Flag 
States, is considered inadequate and these situations are often identified during Port State 
Control inspection. The classification societies, general speaking, are commercial 
organizations which compete for tonnage and hence their revenue. There is a danger that 
such a competitive environment can lead to certain classification societies lowering their 
standards in order to attract tonnage. Today the International Association of 
Classification Societies (lACS) is to some extent regulating this, but there will always be 
an element of profit involved. 
Classification societies are in a unique position to influence the safety of ships with their 
well-established sets of rules, networks of surveyors, and offices world-wide. But in 
many respects the classification societies only have as much power as the industry gives 
them. Surveyors are expected to keep their eyes open when attending a vessel and any 
obvious problems, even when outside the scope of the survey, should be acted upon - even 
to the extent of withdrawing the relevant certificates until necessary action has been taken 
to put things right. Though surveyors are not expected to be policemen, increasing 
responsibility is being put on them in order to see that every effort is made to ensure that a 
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vessel is always safe to go to sea under normal conditions that can be expected. Their 
work is in a way regulated by the shipping industry through the members of the Boards of 
Directors or Executive Committees whom are mainly selected from the industry itself, i.e. 
the ship owners and insurers. However, there is a strong element of commercialism 
involved that is not necessarily compatible with the ideal way of regulating the industry. 
Traditionally, in the eariy days, classification societies gave vessels a class or a rating 
meant to reflect the level of confidence the underwriters could place in the unit. This 
enabled the underwriters to adjust the premium depending on the condition of the ship. 
For many years now this practice has been abandoned by the classification societies. All 
vessels are built to the highest class, and maintain that class until the vessel is scrapped. 
For all practical purposes for the underwriters today it is a question of having class or not, 
and being classed in lACS or not. In other words, it sets a minimum standard requirement. 
For many years Flag States have recognised the qualities of the major classification 
societies and many states have also appointed the classification societies to carry out 
regulatory approvals and surveys on their behalf The classification societies* world-wide 
coverage in offices, and their experienced surveyors, has reduced the burden on the Flag 
States. 
Some Flag States that traditionally have not authorised classification societies to carry out 
surveys on their behalf are now beginning to do so. and to shift the focus on the number of 
vessels boarded at an ever increasing number of ports throughout the worid. 
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8.1.2 Port State Detention 
A Port State detention is reported to the respective classification society. The boarding 
officer* s findings are analysed, together with the attending surveyor's report, in order to 
try and determine what went wrong. Sometimes it is necessary to go back to the survey 
office that issued the certificates concerned, in order to gain ftirther insights into the 
problems. The results of the analysis will then dictate the immediate actions, including 
re-training of surveyors or re-writing of procedures, if it is felt that the surveys have been 
at fault. 
Of course, when the statistics of boardings and detentions are put together, class is 
inevitably looked at, along with other factors and, depending on the circumstances, the 
society may be targeted by the Port State for more intensive auditing and additional 
boardings. 
One must not lose sight of the fact though that, ultimately, the owner is responsible for the 
safe operation and maintenance of his vessel. The classification society will only certify 
that the vessel meets the necessary requirements once per year. A lot can happen, and 
does, in twelve months. However, in most cases of a Port State detention, class is notified 
and a list of deficiencies will be given to the relevant classification society. The Port State 
will only allow the vessel to leave after they are satisfied by the classification society that 
an all-clear rectifying report had been issued. 
Depending on the conditions found and the rating of the classification society involved, 
the boarding officer may return to the vessel for further inspection prior to allowing the 
vessel to sail. It is true that in some areas, the Port State authorities only notify the 
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classification society after the vessel's deficiencies have been dealt with, re-inspected by 
those authorities and issued clearances. Unfortunately, as the classification society is not 
called in, this could lead to suspension or, possibly, cancellation of class of the vessel for 
not reporting to class as per the classification society rule requirements. 
8.1.3 Charterers Views on Port State Control 
A charterer* s perception of Port State Control was revealed at the Port State Control 
Managing Safety & Quality in Shipping Conference in December 1998. 
Most charterers have in place a pre-charter ship vetting system. However the degree of 
severity of the system often requires an actual vessel inspection. One of the easiest checks 
a charterer can make on a prospective vessel is to check the individual ships Port State 
Control detention history, together with the Port State Control detention history for all 
vessels under the same management and/or ownership. Such data can provide valuable 
information on maintenance standards and work practices o f a vessel and her owner. It is 
important that such data is reviewed by an experienced technical person so that a good 
ship and owner are not unreasonably penalised for minor defects to a vessel. 
Where a vessel and other vessels in a fleet are fi-equently seen to be seriously failing Port 
State Control inspections, they will find it harder to operate with charterers. In this respect 
charterers can support the work of Port State Control authorities and assist in forcing the 
rogue vessels / operators out of business. 
At present when a charterer checks a prospective charter vessel's Port State Control 
detention record, they can do so by: 
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.1 asking the owner; 
.2 accessing various MOU websites; 
.3 checking Port State Control data published in the shipping press; 
.4 other published data by MOUs 
The shipowners will advise the charterer when the last Port State Control Inspection was 
carried out and they will often provide a copy of the report and other evidence to show that 
the marked deficiencies had been corrected. However this may not be always the case in 
reality. Some rogue shipowners will only advise part of the favourable information that 
the vessel had passed the Port State Control Inspection, or had not been inspected at all i f 
the result was not too favourable. In this situation, further checking of record is often 
required. 
To check the various MOU's databases could be time consuming. Unfortunately different 
MOUs have different criteria for publishing detention information. Some show all data on 
ships inspected, but others only provide detention data on vessels detained more than 
twice in the last two years. The best scenario for charterers would be an approach similar 
to that adopted by the USCG where data on all Port State Control inspections is shown. A 
vessel detained once with several serious defects could cause just as much reason for 
reporting as a vessel detained twice with minor defects. To this end i f there is one web site 
which gives a ship's f i i l l Port State Control history would seem to be the answer. Such a 
site should show records of all inspections, including those passed clear of defects. 
8.2 Consistency in Port State Control 
The following was reported by an anonymous ship operator regarding an actual PSC 
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inspector on a ship under his management - PSC inspector boards a ship and identifies 
some * sub-standard* item. And just coincidentally, the repairman is available 
immediately with the right parts. The PSC inspector and the repairman greet each other as 
old friends, which is not surprising, because they probably are. In some cases, some PSC 
inspectors even make outright demands for money, cigarettes or spirits in return for not 
giving a detention for an item that, with reasonable survey, would easily pass the test. 
Incidents of extortion apart, there appear to be serious drawback in the way PSC 
inspections are carried out. Some of these were highlighted by the Asian Shipowners 
Forum (ASF), Safe Navigation and Environment Committee (SNEC) at its meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur. "PSCs are deviating from their original objective" the SNEC noted, while 
at the same time emphasising that it is supportive of the PSC objective of eliminating 
sub-standard shipping [8-1]. 
This so-called "deviation" appears to be a fall-out of the Tokyo MOU PSC Committee 
decision to raise the rate of ship inspection from 50 per cent to 75 per cent effective from I 
November 2000. SNEC fears that quality ships could end up as targets because 
inspections will be easier and faster. In other words, they ensure a smooth and swift 
voyage towards the * quota' for inspectors only too keen to get the numbers on the board. 
At the same time, sub-standard ships - by their very nature more time-consuming and 
troublesome - could well go scot-free. The point has also been made that some PSC 
organisations, because of their small size, might not have the manpower resources to 
perform their tasks. This also leads to the question of competency - "PSC inspectors of 
some countries are quite incompetent as they have shown inconsistency in their 
inspections" [8-2]. 
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Incompetence can be easily traced to lack of proper training. "Some PSC inspectors 
appear to be not even aware of how or what to inspect," alleged by Mr. Arthur Bowring, 
Director of Hong Kong Ship Owners' Association. While owners do not want to pick up 
the financial burden of training inspectors, they are not averse to chipping in by arranging 
for lectures and practical demonstrations, identifying sub-standard ships would be less 
difficult i f parameters for targeting such vessels were spelt out clearly - as the US Coast 
Guard has done - and there is free exchange of information on ship data between PSC 
States, Meanwhile, corruption, like weeds, flourishes where it is allowed to grow. 
8-3 Cost of Port State Control 
Port State Control is a cost that must be borne solely by the practising authority. Within 
the Regional States of Tokyo MOU member states contribute to the overall funding of the 
Secretariat, and pay a fee, computed on a "time used" basis for the usage of the 
information bank in Canada. 
In Europe the Paris MOU in its 1992 annual Report, estimated that its first ten years of 
operation had cost its members almost 20 million ECU (US$25 million). During the same 
period some 125,000 inspections were conducted, each with an estimated duration of 
approximately 2-3 hours. Based on a computed cost of about 60 ECU (US$75) per 
man/hour, the average cost of a Port State Inspection works out at US$ 150-225. Even i f it 
is assumed that owners were required to pay for re-inspections conducted on the 4,000 
vessels detained during this period, the reduction in total cost incurred by the Paris MOU 
is very small [8-3]. 
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Generally, the states that are practising Port State Control are maritime nations with large 
fleets of their own, thus the cost of Port State Control joins an already long list of costs 
against which Flag State Control must compete for usually limited available national 
resources. However, this could become a great burden for some of the developing states 
within any regional MOU to bear. This raises some speculation as to whether Port State 
Control in some states, is being done at the expense of Flag State Control, thereby adding 
the inadequacy of the already low marginal resource. However the importance that has 
been attached to Port State Control by society in most of the traditional maritime states, 
belittles whatever costs are involved. According to an official of the Norwegian Maritime 
Directorate, cost is never an issue where Port State Control in Norway is concerned [8-4]. 
Yet, it would be unreasonable to assume that states would be prepared to continue 
committing ftinds towards Port State Control, i f they are not convinced that its 
effectiveness, to date, in the battle against falling standards of safety in shipping is able to 
justify its continued practice. 
8.4 Standard and Cost Impact on Developing States 
A number of developing states have complained that the standards of safety of shipping 
which were set out by the International Maritime Organization are too excessive and often 
unnecessary. They accuse that Port State Control has been used by the most developed 
states as a weapon to suffocate the shipping industries in developing states. Quoting a 
government official from a developing state in the MOU conference: 
"High safety standards would mean high operation costs, excessive training 
and requirements made to the ship's crew are just wastage of resources, these 
all turn out to be a bar going against the shipowners who are working at very 
low profit margin ". 
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Is the standard of safety under SOLAS and other IMG Instruments a minimum safety 
standard? Whether this argument stands might be subject to long and tedious discussion, 
however statistics have shown that over 70% of the ships being detained during Port State 
Control inspection belong to states which were classified as developing nations. In 
September 1999 the Consulate of Panama officially addressed its concern to the IMO 
regarding vessels flying its flag being targeted by the Japanese Maritime Authorities for 
frequent inspection and detention [8-5]. 
The Port State Control record is often credited with a positive influence on maritime 
safety, although one would sometimes wish to see more facts to justify such praise. The 
high detention rate would draw attention immediately to the question of fairness and 
standard of the Port State Control inspection. It may not be fair to say that all Port State 
Control officers would be biased before boarding by the reputation and records of a 
particular Flag State, however most Port State Control officers, after boarding a targeted 
flagged vessel, would spend greater effort looking for deficiencies than when on other 
flags. 
It may be yet too early to ascertain the full impact of Port State Control, on influencing 
standards of safety in shipping world-wide, since it has only recently become a popular 
phenomenon in some regional areas. However, both the Paris and Tokyo MOU have been 
practising Port State Control for more or less 10 years now and one is likely to assume that 
its effectiveness, which is evidenced by their achievements to date, would have some 
bearing on the new regional Port State Control initiatives elsewhere. 
The following is a sample of few responses to discussions with some Tokyo MOU 
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signatory States during the 8'^  Seminar for Port State Control Officers in the Asia Pacific 
Region which was held between 20-22 June 2001 in Pusan Korea: 
A reduction in the number of sub-standard ships visiting our ports. Port State 
Control is generally promoting a higher standard of ship in our waters. 
A large number of vessels have been forced to carry out their business in a more 
serious they face the possibility of detention. Shipowners refrain from sending 
their sub-standard ships to our part of the world. 
Hopefully a reduction in the number of ships not complying with international 
rules. 
Some moderate improvements in standards. 
Co-ordination between countries, increased readiness to use sanctions. Effects on 
classification societies. 
Owners are aware that sub-standard ships are not acceptable in many parts of the 
world and crew safety is very important. 
Taking into accounts the key motives behind Port State Control that were discussed in an 
eariier chapter, these achievements should be reflected in the following areas which may 
provide some measures as to the effectiveness of such control: 
. 1 A reduction in the number of sub-standard ships trading, which is evidenced by 
fewer casualties and reduced coastal pollution; and 
.2 A noticeable improvement in Flag State Control. 
However, it can be appreciated that for Port State Control to make any significant impact 
in these areas, a major portion of the world merchant fleet in the course of its trading must 
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be affected by the exercise of such control. 
8.4.1 Removal of Sub-Standard Ships - Casualty Reduction 
The author considers that despite all efforts and determination in the past years on the part 
of the Paris Memorandum partners, sub-standard ships still exist today. This observation 
does not imply that the operation of the Paris MOU is ineffective [8-6]. 
Losses of merchant ships of over 100 GT reduced from 199, totaling 1.1 million GT, in 
1999 to 167 ships, totaling 0.9 million GT in 2000. During the year of 2000 the world 
fleet of merchant ships grew by 2.8% to 522.2 million GT. Within this total there was 
considerable variety in the rate of growth, reflecting the different economic circumstances 
prevailing in different parts of the shipping business, and in different parts of the world. 
Together with the PSC activities in different regions which cover approximately 32 
percent of the ship trading areas, evidence of some degree of effectiveness of Port State 
Control in minimizing losses through the elimination o f sub-standard ships. Furthermore, 
by forcing shipowners to rectify deficiencies that are brought to light by Port State 
inspections, Port State Control may be in some way responsible for the reduction in total 
ship losses from 255 ships in 1996 to 167 ships in 2000. 
8.5 Improvement of Flag State Control 
The highlighting of the growing problem of falling standards of safety in shipping, was 
partly due to statistics on ship deficiencies and detentions, uncovered by Port State 
inspections, which are usually published on the internet by MOU member States such as 
Hong Kong and Australia as well as in its MOU annual report. This sparked an all out 
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attack on classification societies world-wide, which have been forced to take steps to put 
their standards in order. Lloyd's Register, in its attempt to ensure standards of safety on 
board by punitively de-classing ships that are found to be sub-standard, has disclosed that 
the flags most affected are in general those that also produce the worst Port State Control 
figures. This new development, in a way, could serve as an enhancement to the quality of 
Flag State control, particularly with regards to the open registers, which usually delegate 
most of their survey and certification responsibilities to classification societies. 
A further achievement in this area that can be credited to the activities of Port State 
Control, was the establishing, in December 1992, of a new sub-committee on Flag State 
Implementation in the IMO. According to the IMO News, the main task of this 
sub-committee is to identify the measures necessary to ensure effective and consistent 
global implementation of IMO measures, paying particular attention to the needs of 
developing countries [8-7]. One of the sub-committee's planned areas of work was the 
development of guide-lines for delegating authority to bodies acting on behalf of Flag 
States; guide-lines for Flag States monitoring bodies acting on their behalf; and minimum 
standards for classification societies and other bodies acting on behalf of Flag States. Al l 
these measures raise some hope for improved Flag State Control, especially by the 
registers mentioned in Chapter 3. 
Published on the Internet and annual reports of the MOUs on ship deficiencies and 
detentions, which identify delinquent Flag State, coupled with proposed flag targeting, 
have seen a few Flag States, particularly the major open registers, making some effort to 
establish better control in the area of maintaining operational standards of safety on board 
the ships flying their flags. Attempts by Liberia and Panama in an effort to counteract 
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international criticism concerning the quality standards of ships on its register, have 
embarked on upgrading their Departments of Merchant Shipping, along with amended 
ship registration conditions and the development of training programmes in order to 
reduce human error on board [8-8]. However, it will be interesting to see how these 
registers tackle the "genuine link" issue (establish a direct link, usually by setting up an 
office locally between ship owner and the flag Administration), which is so vital to any 
attempt at effective control and enforcement of international standards of safety on board. 
Thus, Port State Control has so far achieved some success in the area of influencing 
improved Flag State control, and it is only after the sub-committee on Flag State 
Implementation begins its work and classification societies regain their lost ground, that 
the magnitude of this success wil l be known. 
8.6 Port State Control - Exaggeration of Balance 
The follows were extracted from discussion with Tokyo MOU members in the PSCC 
10th committee meeting in Tokyo expressing concern over the tough inspection and 
harassment with the PSC inspections: 
Port State Control is just another area where the illusion of uniformity of 
standards tends to be perpetuated. In fact well meaning people suggest that if 
we have uniform rules for shipping, and if they are all inspected to the same sort 
of standards through-out the world, sub-standard ships will go away. 
But this apple pie notion of the worldfails to recognize that there are vast areas 
and numerous nations where the option of high quality shipping remains light 
years away for their inhabitants. In a country where there is real, grinding 
poverty, the only shipping they can afford is seventh hand; vessels on their last 
legs that richer nations would have scrapped long ago. 
One might kindly point out that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
offers technical assistance programmes and the World Bank finances 
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infrastructure projects, but in reality there is little comfort for the poor in such 
promises. IMO can help establish a competent Administration, but the means 
whereby local ship operators can obtain even slightly more modern tonnage 
just does not exist. We have to think about the shipowners in the third world 
countries who have to struggle for survive themselves. 
While their poorly maintained old ships creep around their coastlines, and 
trade to equally poor neighbours, there is probably no problem that concerns 
the rich nations. But when they go into areas where Port State Control nets 
extend, they are detained with numerous deficiencies, for the Port State Control 
inspectors are concerned with the facts and not the cause of the problem. 
Therefore their jlags would be deplored by sober men in suits who consider 
detention statistics and make solemn pronouncements about ships and Jlags of 
shame. But the ships do not get any better because in these countries. There is 
no money to modernize their Jleets, no more than there is money to modernize 
the roads, or the railway and the buses that are death traps. 
The author considers that there is a need to confront the issue of poverty alongside that of 
marine safety. It is not something for the shipping industry, or even maritime 
Administrations, because neither holds the key. It ought to just sometimes make Port 
State Control inspectors think a little about the reasons for these substandard ships, which 
may seem unfair to judge the view from the point of developed industrialized nations, but 
to their operators are about as good as they can get. 
It might also persuade the regulators that i f they are to prevent ships they term 
sub-standard from operating, they have to persuade governments to address the problems 
of poverty and the growing differences between rich and poor in our living planet. 
It is always easier to act freely when there are no restraining influences. The toughest Port 
State Control in the world is arguably in Australia, which has little or no shipping left of its 
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own. In that rich country 2,500 people each year are killed on the roads, and 18,000 more 
are seriously injured, mostly by trucks. Surprise to know, almost no lives are lost as a 
result of accidents involving merchant ships. 
In the author's point of view it is all a matter of priority, really, but should not Port State 
Controllers re-structure their value on the merit and objective of the activity. 
8.7 Other Positive Effects on the Shipping Industry 
The Paris MOU, in its 1997 Annual Report, estimated that Port State detention within the 
MOU region, over the ten year period 1987 to 1997, had deprived shipowners of revenue 
amounting to some US$180 million. As to whether the benefits derived from foregoing 
maintenance and repairs necessary to ensure compliance with safety regulations under the 
various conventions, outweigh the lost revenue resulting from detention. However, with 
industry moving towards the "just in time" concept, primarily to cut back on warehousing 
costs, it is almost inevitable that ships which run the risk of being delayed, following Port 
State Inspections, would find it more and more difficult to gain employment. Difficulties 
of employment for ships of doubtful standards, as jetty owners bid to preserve their 
fortunes, which are affected by ships being delayed or detained at river berths that usually 
have no "lay-by berths or anchorages" [8-9]. 
The spread of effectively executed Port State Control, therefore can further exacerbate 
employment problems for sub-standard operators and sub-standard ships. Shipowners 
will have to either comply with the internationally agreed standards of safety on board, or 
face an inevitable extinction, as trading regions for sub-standard operators disappear. 
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The author opined that shipwners do not view IMO regulatory equipment as an additional 
cost in the price of new buildings. However, the fact that these costs are recognised by the 
owner when calculating running costs, indicates that they wil l influence the level of 
negotiated freight rates. In US, the coastguard has predicted a 17 cents rise per barrel to 
the transport cost of imported oil , as a result of phasing in double hulls [8-10]. Therefore, 
as one manager pointed out, charterers will have to be prepared to pay more, for quality 
tonnage. Moreover, since the burden of price increases seems to always rest with the end 
user, the general public must also be prepared to pay more for commodities whose prices 
include a sea transport cost element: the price for safer ships and cleaner sea. 
A further positive development that could result from forced compliance with 
intemational standards of safety, due to effective Port State Control, is the phasing out of 
very old tonnage which finds it extremely difficult and costly to observe these standards. 
Hence the possibility of improved freight rates due to a reduction in tonnage over-supply. 
This has always proven to be enough incentive to stimulate the placing of new order by 
shipowners. Since the age of the ship has been shown to be an extremely important 
criterion when ships are being selected for Port State Control inspections, it follows that, a 
younger world fleet could see a reduction in the number of Port State Control inspections 
and hence the resources allocated for these inspections. 
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8.8 Summary 
Port State Control is an expensive event. The cost of PSC can be divided into two parts. 
One part is borne solely by the practising authorities, which is the operational cost for 
carrying out Port States Control activities. It comprises costs for Administration, 
information processing, training of PSCOs and so on. This could require the PSC 
authority to spend for example, up to several millions of US dollars each year. On the 
other hand, ship owners and operators have to spend a lot of expenditure to rectify the 
deficiencies found on their ships during PSC inspections, not to mention the demurrage 
and other profit losses caused by detentions. These costs, often higher than the operation 
cost mentioned earlier, are regarded by some of the ship owners and operators as an 
unnecessary extra, and for the sole purpose of satisfying PSC inspections. In fact, they are 
paying the maintenance costs in upgrading the ships' safety standards of their ships and 
avoidance of future accidents. 
In comparison with its costs, the effects of Port State Control are far reaching. Monitored 
by PSC inspections, the classification societies wil l need to address the balance between 
competing for tonnage and maintaining proper safety standards. This effect also extends 
to Flag States. As a result, both classification and Flag State control have been improved 
by the influences of Port State Control. 
To prevent their ships from being delayed or detained, ship owners and operators have to 
put more resources in maintaining their ships' standards. Deficiencies that once have been 
existing and taken for granted are now rectified. Port State Control has, to a certain extent, 
reduced the quantity of sub-standard shipping. 
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Though many positive effects on the shipping industry have been achieved, there will 
always be some shortcomings. By example consistency and fairness in Port State Control 
inspection were issues that were constantly questioned by the ship operators. It appears 
that there is a long way to go towards a harmonized global ship inspection system. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Findings of the Study 
The research reveals the different regional MOU agreements and their practices in 
different areas. The effectiveness of Port State Control was assessed through an 
evaluation of technical aspects of the inspection. Port State Control in general, is 
achieving its purpose in eliminating substandard ships from the regions. The sUidy also 
recognizes that Port State Control should only be a "second line of defence" in combating 
sub-standard shipping and the first line remains Flag State enforcement of standards. 
An analysis into the world's marine casualty statistics has identified that there has been a 
positive result in the reduction of marine accidents since the implementation of Port State 
Control, which might be direct or indirectly, the result of such campaign. The causes of 
accident were analyzed and identified that these causes were addressed by the Port State 
Control objectives during its implementation. The opinion survey from both the official 
and wider marine communities in Hong Kong reveals that there is a general agreement on 
the aims and objectives of Port State Control and the wider marine communities was 
generally in support of the maintenance of standard through the Port State Control regime. 
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9.2 The Way Forward - Effective Port State Control and Development of Safety 
Culture Towards Total Quality Shipping 
Those who are responsible for ensuring that the ships' compliance with the international 
standards shall include, in the order of importance: the ships crew, ship management 
company, classification society, Flag State and Port State. It is often suggested that 
economy is the main reason for any deterioration in the standard of ships. Sub-standard 
ships cannot be eliminated unless sub-standard operators are eliminated. It was hoped that 
the implemented of the ISM Code would result in significant improvements of the 
situation. In the real world, despite the continuing effort made by the Port State 
authorities, many sub-standard ships are still in operation. Nevertheless Port State 
Control should only be referred to as the "second line of defence" and the first line of 
defence being the Flag State enforcement. This does not, however, mean that Port State 
Control is not very effective in the elimination of sub-standard ships. On the contrary. 
Port State Control could be a most usefxil tool in stopping the operation of sub-standard 
ships. Effective Port State Control prevents ships from proceeding to the sea with a risk of 
danger to human life and to the marine environment, but this can only be achieved through 
Port State inspections by well qualified and trained Port State Control officers. 
It is clear that the apparently simple option of IMO regulation, as implemented by 
governments may not be the whole story. How these regulations are implemented 
depends on a number of factors other than mere administrative measures imposed 
externally or from within. As in many things in life, it would need an appropriate balance 
between market forces and administrative measures; between external and self-regulation. 
It follows that self-enforcement of standards, or the development of a safety culture as it is 
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more commonly known, should be at the heart of any success in producing high quality 
operators and seafarers. Such safety culture can be developed in a number of ways 
including the training of seafarers and a commitment from shore-based management. 
Focussing increased effort towards instilling a safety culture in the world's seafarers 
might be the route towards the achievement of the best possible results. It is worth 
mentioning here that the establishment of a safety culture and environmental conscience 
in all maritime activities is one of the objectives the IMO Assembly has adopted for the 
current decade. 
The recent IMO developments of the ISM Code and the thorough revision of the STCW 
Convention have provided an "outcome based" regulatory framework for safety 
management and seafarer training. The ISM Code is necessarily broadly based but 
provides the framework for a measure of company self-regulation. The revised STCW 
Convention describes the competence required of seafarers to perform their tasks safely 
and efficiently. These IMO regulations are therefore already promoting a measure of 
self-regulation. 
Shifting emphasis onto people is another of the objectives o f the IMO in the 2000s, and 
the reason is clear: the safety of life, property and the environment depends on the 
standards of competence and professionalism of seafarers [9-1 ] . So, while any other form 
of self regulation introduced by the industry partners is welcome, it is, the author believes, 
to self regulation by seafarers that we should look to continue the trend of safety 
improvements for both industry leaders and followers alike. 
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PUBLISHED PAPER 1 
Port State Control and Its Implication 
on ship Safety 
Stephen Y. K. L i 
(Marine Department, Hong Kong SAR) 
and Dr. A. Redfem 
(Institute of Marine Studies, University of Plymouth) 
ABSTRACT 
The development of Port State Control (PSC) in Europe under the Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding 1982 has extended to the Asia Pacific Regions, Caribbean and South 
America. The aim of participating States to achieve an inspection rate of 25 per cent of 
non Flag State shipping calling in their ports, results in a significantly higher rate of ships 
trading being inspected between ports of participating States. 
Whilst the prime responsibility rests with the flag States, the weaknesses or difficulties in 
maintaining standard of ship by flag State necessitate inspections by port States. Many 
flag States are unable to maintain a proper control on the standard of their ships on their 
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respective registers. This situation amplifies the role of the port State control in ensuring 
that ships continue to comply with acceptable standards of maritime safety, pollution 
prevention and on-board living and working conditions. . 
Recognising that single port State could not eliminate the operation of substandard ships 
singled handed, the lesson of 15 years of port State control in Europe demonstrates also 
that no one region can effectively eliminate the operation of sub-standard ships. However, 
substandard shipping persists as and where substandard owners take refuge for continued 
operations in exotic registers and areas of lower standards. Thus the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) is being reinforced in the wake of spectacular disasters. More 
casualties and more incidents have supported the view that more attention must be paid to 
shipping management. 
INTRODUCTION 
The demand for ships is derived from the need to move large quantities of goods from one 
part of the world to another, in the cheapest and most reliable way possible. It is estimated 
that 85% to 95% of all intemational transport takes places by sea. It follows, therefore, 
that the demand for sea transport would be affected by the level of world economic 
activity and this in turn, would be expected to have a significant impact on the supply of 
ships and hence, the size of the world merchant fleet. 
The effects of these developments on the worid merchant fleet were two-fold. The first 
was a rapid increase in the supply of ships to meet the additional demand for the sea 
transport. The second was a marked change in the size distribution of ships within the 
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fleet, as economies of scale were being explored to the fullest, especially by Japanese, 
Greek and Norwegian shipowners who sought a competitive edge in the market. 
THE OPEN REGISTRY 
One of the principal means by which owners may seek to cut costs is to register their 
vessels under the flag of an open register or flag of convenience country. 
Much is made of the fact that in excess of 50% of the world* s tonnage is registered under 
flag of convenience. It is also a fact that vessels registered under certain of such flags 
appear in the casualties statistics and in the defect reports of port states on a much more 
regular basis than whose registered under the flags of the traditional maritime states. That 
is not to say however, that all ships registered under flags of convenience are substandard 
nor that all vessels registered under traditional maritime flags are beyond reproach. Some 
flags of convenience operate with accident rates which are less than those achieved by 
certain of the established "national" flags. 
An Open Register may be national or intemational. However, particular attention will be 
paid to the Intemational Open Ship Registers (or Flag of Convenience) which have been 
set up for he purpose of eaming revenue by offering shipowners internationally, attractive 
legal and commercial terms for the operation of their ships. 
The economic benefits to a shipowner that may be had from using an Open Register seem 
to vary from one to another as followings : 
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Non taxable operating profits or no fiscal control; 
Flexibility to negotiate wages with crews of virtually and nationality; 
Limited financial liability to single ship company; 
Freedom of trade without political restrictions; 
Simple and accredited mortgage formalities; and 
Safety regulations imposed by Flag State are limited to the minimum internationally 
agreed standards. 
In articles of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, whilst giving every state the right to set 
its own conditions for ship registration, further requires that there must exist a "genuine 
link" between the registered state and the ship. However, in the absence of a definition for 
what constituted a "genuine link" under the Convention, helped to preserve the ease with 
which a shipowner could gain access to an Open Register and transfer from it at his option, 
without restriction. Moreover, it became almost impossible for any concerted 
international action, questioning the legitimacy of Open Registers, to succeed. 
The Competence Of Open Registry Administration 
The enforcement of IMO and ILO Conventions requires that Flag States adopt or 
incorporate the rules embodied in these conventions, into their national legislative system. 
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This depends solely upon the desire and degree of commitment by Flag States to ensure 
and maintain internationally acceptable standards of quality within the maritime industry. 
The IMO and ILO generally have no powers in this area and hence, this has been regarded 
as the basic defect of these conventions. 
With respect to Open Registries, UNCTAD [1981] has identified the following basic 
reasons why non-observance of standard is likely to be greater under these registries; 
Real owners are not readily identifiable and are therefore in a position to take more 
risks by comparison with owners in normal. 
Real owners can change their identities by manipulating brass-plate companies and 
consequently avoid being identified as repeated substandard operators or risk taker. 
Since the master and key shipboard personnel are not national of the Flag State, 
they have no need or incentive to visit the Flag State and can avoid legal action; 
Owners who reside outside the jurisdiction of the Flag State can defy the fiag State 
by refusing to testify at an inquiry by the flag State and avoid prosecution. 
The open registry seems to be all tied to very easy ship registration laws and manning 
requirements that have been identified as basic features of Open Registries. Furthermore, 
the very little import/export requirements of these registers results in most of the ships 
using Open Registers never having to call at the ports of their Flag States, thus adding 
problem of enforcement. Thus the whole question of there being a' genuine link" between 
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the ship and the Flag State looms once more, and seems to be the root cause of some 
enforcement problems being faced by Open Registers. 
Sub-standard ships 
The following distinct characteristics of a typical sub-standard vessel are : 
It is frequently near the end of its operation life; 
It is inadequately manned in terms of both numbers and qualifications; 
It is poorly maintained; 
It is badly navigated, and/or 
suffers from equipment failure. 
A sub-standard ship may have one or more of the above deficiencies. It is noteworthy that 
these characteristics amply emphasise both the technical and human aspects that are 
essential to the maintenance of standards of board the ship. 
Standards are being introduced at a time when concern about shipping standards is 
growing. After a decade in which the number of serious casualties at sea steadily declined, 
the trend has recently begun to move in the opposite direction. The world fleet is getting 
older because owners are no longer renewing their ships as frequently as they used to. The 
fleets of the traditional maritime nations - which generally have good safety records -
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have shrunk while the fleets of other countries, many with little or no shipping experience, 
have grown. The crews on ships have tended to become smaller over the years, while the 
technology of shipping has become more complex. Crews today are more international 
than they were, raising doubts about the ability of crew members to communicate with 
each other as well as with other people. 
Therefore, despite favourable ratification of the relevant intemational conventions on 
safety, by Flag Stages, their implementation and enforcement have failed to live up with 
the expectations of the IMO. ILO and other Administrations within the maritime industry. 
These inadequacies, coupled with the IMO's lack of power in this area, have resulted in a 
deterioration of standards of safety in shipping, which poses a serious potential pollution 
threat to the marine environment and coastlines, as a result of ship casualties. 
ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS 
Following the 1978 disaster of the Amoco Cadiz in the English Channel, international 
agreement of the maritime authorities of 15 European States was made in Paris in 1982 as 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) known as the Paris Memorandum, whereby 
inspection of ships would be undertaken by maritime authorities of the port States - or 
port State control. The Canadian Coast Guard became a ' co-operating authority' as did 
the US Coast Guard, and the maritime authorities of Croatia, Japan and Russia, with the 
IMO and ILO as observers. The Paris Memorandum was further acceded to by Poland in 
January 1992) and Canada (as frill member) (May 1993). 
Provisions for Port State Control and the standards and regulations are under intemational 
instmments developed through Intemational Maritime Organisation (IMO) : 
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1954 International Convention on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil; 
1966 International Convention on Load Lines; 
1969 International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships; 
1972 International Convention for Safe Containers; 
1973 International Convention for Prevention o f Pollution from Ships, and the 
1978 Protocol 
1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and the 1978 
Protocol; 
1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers; 
1994 SOLAS Conference amendments to SOLAS Regulation I/I9 
1994 United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. 
Certain IMO Conventions (e.g., SOLAS) require that the inspections and surveys be 
carried out by officers of the flag Stage or officers nominated by them for the purpose, or 
organizations recognized by them, such as classification societies. A Port State may, at 
the request of the flag State, cause a ship to be surveyed and certificates issued or renewed 
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i f the ship passes inspection, but in such cases they would not take action against a failing 
ship - they would just refuse or renew a certificate. However, under the MOU; the port 
State has the authority to take enforcement action, as it does under MARPOL. In 
exercising their rights and performing their duties. States shall not discriminate in form or 
in fact against vessels of another State. 
The aim of participating States to achieve an inspection rate of 25 per cent of shipping 
calling in their ports, results in a significantly higher rate of ships trading between port of 
participating States. Whilst the prime responsibility rests with the flag Stales, the 
weaknesses or difficulties in flag State control necessitate inspections by port States, 
whose inspectors have a difficult job by the fact that the ship has to come into port, and by 
the volume of ships. 
Latin American Agreement (Acuerdo de Vina del IMar) 
During a regional meeting which took place in Chile in early November 1992 an 
agreement for co-operation on port State control was signed by the maritime authorities of 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. This agreement follows very closely the Paris Memorandum although it was 
adapted to the special characteristics and circumstances of the Latin American region. 
Asia-Pacific Agreement ( Tokyo MOU ) 
The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region was 
signed by the maritime authorities of Australia, Canada, China, Fi j i , Indonesia, Japan, 
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Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vanuatu, Vietnam and Hong Kong. A 
Committee, to meet once a year, composed of a representative of each maritime 
Administration and observers from IMO, ILO and other organizations which the 
Committee may deem appropriate. 
Caribbean Agreement 
Maritime Authorities of twenty Caribbean States and Territories have agreed on a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control. The Memorandum was signed on 
9 February 1996 at a final meeting held in Barbados, bringing to a conclusion a two-year 
period during which an ambitious set of measures to improve the maritime administrative 
infrastructure of region States and territories were prepared. 
The Caribbean MOU is a practically identical to other MOUs on port State control which 
are in operation in other areas of the worid, including the Paris MOU in Europe, the Tokyo 
MOU in the Asia Pacific region and the Vina del Mar Agreement in Latin America. 
Port State Control in Practice 
When directed to inspect a vessel in a specific area of the harbour the PSC officer selects 
the most neglected looking vessel. After some experience he wil l learn to recognize the 
flags and classification societies which are deserving of his attention. I f a ship flies the 
flag of a state which is not party to one or more or the relevant conventions, "no 
favourable treatment" will be given to such a vessel. 
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In conducting PSC inspections, the PSC officer wii! first check all the relevant certificates 
and documents. I f these are all in order then he must have "clear grounds" for believing 
that the condition of a ship or its equipment, or its crew does not substantially meet the 
requirements of one of the conventions betv^een demanding to carry out a more detailed 
inspection. 
By "clear grounds'* is meant one of the followings : 
1. a report or notification by another authority; 
2. a report or compliant by the master, a crew, or any person or organization 
with a legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship, shipboard living 
and working conditions or the prevention of pollution, unless the authority 
concerned deems the report or compliant to be manifestly unfound. 
3. ther indications of serious deficiencies having regard to the various IMO 
resolutions and other relevant official guidelines. 
I f the ship is badly maintained, the PSC officer wil l normally carry out a more detailed 
inspection during the first visit. After noting a few deficiencies which renders the ship 
unsafe to sail, he will complete PSC Inspection Form A and Form B containing details 
about the vessels and identified deficiencies and provide copies of these forms to the 
master or other senior officer in charge of the vessel. The master, owner or the agent will 
be advised that the vessel will not be permitted to sail fi-om the port until the deficiencies 
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are rectified and the ship is rendered safe. 
When the deficiencies have been made good, the master or the agent will be required to 
arrange a re-inspection by the PSC officer. During the re-inspection, should additional 
deficiencies be detected by the officer, he will list out these additional and any outstanding 
deficiencies on PSC Inspection Form B-1. Depending upon the seriousness of these 
outstanding deficiencies, the officer may allow the vessel to sail but a period wi l l be set for 
the vessel to rectify the deficiencies. In such a case, the officer may advise the vessel's 
next port of call to confirm rectification of those deficiencies, or he may place the vessel 
on the watch list for a further follow up inspection on its next return to this port. In some 
cases he may allow the vessel to proceed to a repair port subject to certain conditions. 
I f no deficiencies are found during the initial inspection, a' NTU Form B will be issued. In 
case of minor deficiencies, the Officer may allow up to 14 days for the owner to rectify the 
deficiencies without the need of detaining the vessel. 
Difficulties With Port State Control Inspection 
As matters presently stand the system of Port State Control remains the most effective 
weapon against substandard shipping. However it is not without its difficulties : 
1. vessels exercising right of innocent passage through coastal waters but not 
calling in port are not subject to inspection; 
2. theoretically, pursuant to SOLAS and various other conventions, an 
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inspector must accept a ship's certificates at face value. A more detailed 
inspection cannot be undertaken unless there are "clear ground" to suspect 
that the ship does not correspond with the certificates; 
3. ort States lack the general right to turn away substandard ships prior to those 
vessels entering their ports; 
4. Port State inspectors are generally in a position to make limited inspections 
only. Vessels remain in port for relatively short periods of time and fiill 
access to construction details and plans is often not available. It is also 
probable that access to parts of the whip wil l be obstructed by cargo or 
ballast or otherwise not open to ease of inspection; 
5. assessment of a crew's competence and the operational efficiency of the 
vessel is difficult in the short time which is general available; 
6. Flag States may attempt to defeat the effectiveness of Port State control by 
issuing exemptions when defects or absence of equipment in the vessel are 
discovered; 
7. vessels have the right to claim compensation i f they are found to have been 
unduly detained; 
8. limitations as to resources and differing standards of competence and 
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experience amongst Port State inspectors; 
9. follow up action may be difficult where a vessel is permitted to sail to 
another port for repair, for example, this may be permitted i f the repair 
facilities at the port of inspection are not adequate or when the cost of repair 
is comparatively cheaper in the other port. 
10. Owners of good quality ships may be subjected to repeated and 
inconvenient inspections when their ships are calling ports of different 
MOU regions. 
CONCLUSION 
The spread of Port State control has shown the international recognition o f the problem 
and the resolve to take direct action against it. The Paris Memorandum in Europe has 
show that it is effective. The new memoranda and agreements in major world areas gives 
recognition of PSC and the consensus of agreement to extend it to as wide an area of the 
world as possible. It is based on intemational standards, operates by commitments of 
national maritime authorities, but requires national and regional co-operation and 
information exchange with unifonnity of standards and interpretation to be effective. 
In commitment, it requires individual states to provide the resources for inspection, 
control and information sharing. It would be unfair imposition of fxirther charges to 
require a contribution ft-om all shipowners and operators. 
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The consensus clearly shows that, while Port State control is not, and must not become, a 
substitute for Flag State control, it is an effective means of directly getting at substandard 
shipping. Reactions to the problem lead Port States to shoulder the additional cost, and to 
share the cost and efforts of regional co-operation. By regional and inter-regional 
co-operation significant steps have been taken to combat substandard shipping and 
enhance safety at sea. By eventual removal of substandard operations, it wil l put good 
shipowners and operators on an even field in respect to operational economics. 
Meanwhile the effect of the system can be maximized by targeting; sharing and 
circulation of information; more publication of results of inspections and records; 
emphasis on crew qualifications an standards as well as standards of condition of the ship 
and her equipment; and examination of ship management as well as ship operations. 
The success of the Paris Memorandum has shown the greater regional success than the 
individual efforts of member states alone. Inter-regional Port State control develops the 
principle to potential worid wide success given the consistency of efforts and co-operation 
in the areas of the new Memoranda of Understanding, but the teeth must bite into the 
economics of the substandard operators. Port State Control is the best way to enforce 
standards with quick results, subject to regional co-operation to close all areas to 
substandard ships. 
300 
REFERENCES 
Archer, J.R.G. 1993. Port State Control 
Captain M. Pickthome, ExC, M N I , Seaways February 1994, Port State Control in the 
Asian-Pacific Region. 
Carlsson, L. Concordia Maritime AB. The Shipping Industry - An Owner's View. 
Dorey, J. Intemational Shipowner and Shipmanager, Marine Management Services, loM. 
Is Port State Control a Fair and Honest Policing System from a Shipmanager*s Point of 
View? 
Horrocks, C. Secretary General, Intemational Chamber of Shipping. Port State Control: 
Does it Stand up to Inspection? 
IMO News No. 2 1996. More Regional PSC agreements are being prepared. 
IMO News No. I , 1994, PSC Standard. 
L i , S.T.H. 1996. Port State Control in Hong Kong 
London Intemational Conference. Port State Control - Views and Developments. 
McPartland, J.M. 1995. How Hong ICong conducts inspections. 
301 
Schiferii, R.W.J. Deputy. Head of the Secretariat of MOU on PSC. Port State Control at 
Work . . A Global Future, 
Smith, J.M.S. General Secretary, Liberian Shipowners* Council. Port State Control, 
Commentary. 
The Chartered Institute of Transport, 1996. Substandard Ships and Crews. 
302 
PUBLISHED PAPER 2 
"Responsibility assessment on 
Recognized Organization" 
Represented The Government of Hong Kong S A R for paper presentation 
on the 8th Seminar for Port State Control Officers in the Asia Pacific 
Region in Pusan, Republic of Korea 6.20 - 22.6.2001. 
303 
G U I D E L I N E S F O R T H E RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENT O F 
T H E R E C O G N I Z E D ORGANIZATION (RO') 
1. Only those deficiencies which, alone or in combination, warrant detention will be 
evaluated to determine RO responsibility. 
2. Equipment deficiencies wil l only be associated with a RO where equipment is 
covered by a RO survey or where RO has issued certification. 
3. Accidental damage suffered on a ship's voyage to a port wi l l not be RO-related^. 
4. Serious wastage or other structural deficiencies not caused by voyage damage will be 
listed as a RO responsibility. 
5. Outdated equipment will not be associated with the RO unless outdated at the time of 
the last survey conducted by RO. 
6. Absence of highly pilferable equipment will generally not be listed as a RO 
responsibility unless a large quantity is missing, and inspection is taking place within 
90 days of the last survey conducted by RO. 
7. Expired statutory certificates will not be associated with the RO unless the certificates 
were not endorsed or were improperiy issued by the RO following a survey conducted 
on behalf of the flag State. 
8. Manning issues, other than those referred to in point 10, whether conducted in 
accordance with SOLAS or STCW, wil l not be listed as RO responsibility. 
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9. Equipment deficiencies will be RO-related, i f that equipment is covered by a survey 
conducted by that RO within the previous 90 days (unless the deficiency was 
apparently long standing). 
10. Failure of human factor issues related to operational drills and tests and other 
marming issues where required and undertaken will be associated with RO 
responsibility only when the RO issued the relevant certificate. 
11. Deficiencies in the ISM Safety Management System wil l be generally RO-related 
only when the RO has issued the DOC and/or SMC. whichever is relevant, and i f 
there is clear evidence that the lack of effective and systematic implementation of a 
requirement of the ISM Code existed at the last audit conducted by the RO. 
1. RO means recognized organizations which include classification society or other 
private body carrying out safety assessment work on ships. 
2. A RO-related deficiency means that the ship's RO that carried out the relevant survey 
or that issued certification had a responsibility in relation with the deficiencies that 
alone or in combination led to detention. 
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APPENDIX B 
Questionnaire on Port State Control 
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To: 
V. K. LI 
Eiaintner of Ma t i c r s and M a t c i 
Scaf-jrcr Cenlficucion Section 
Marine Deparimeni 
Roum 305. Marbour Uui l i lm'^ 
Central 
l long kon ; ; 
University' of Hlynioutli 
Insti lutu of Marine Studies 
Phunc: Z^i2 -136: 
F.'caSi- JO!J utonsi this iV/i*-
Please to}{i alon^ this line 
Sur\'ev on Port State Control and It's Implication on Ship Safety 
Vour kind assisronce is sought on this survey for the purpose of daia collcciiun 
on the research of the capiioncd subject. After completing this questionnaire 
please fold along the dotted lioes. sealed with adhesive tape and return the 
questionnaire to the above address. 
T h a n k vou vvr\' much! 
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ConfldenilnilTv o r i h e Survrv Data 
Pleait b« aisuretl thai all ibc d a u obtained in this survey Mi l l be k«pi in Ibe ciriciest conndcoce. Under no 
circunutancc w i l l your responses be releaied lo ouiaidc p a n l e i . Ind iv idua l data collected w i l l be coded and 
reported only in a(mre«flie fo rm. The whole questionnaires be properly disposed of a f te r serving the 
purpose. 
/ . Survey on the Port State Comroi (PSCj Acihiiles 
Please assess the fol lowing siatemenu in reladon to \ o u r own evaluation of the PSC ociivlties. Please indicate 
the appropr ia te b o i on a scale of I to 4 the e i i c n i to which you agree wi th each of the fo l lowing i i a i emenu bv 
placing a '* '^" lo the relevant bo \ u i ln f i the fol lowioe scale: 
Kcv o f the scale: 
i 1 2 i 3 1 4 1 
j S t roncly u^'ree 1 Afiree [ Neutra l 1 Disagree 
I A. PSC in general 
Thtf following staienients refer lo ihc purposes o f PSC in licncral. plcisc tick on a scale I to -J the extent to which you 
agree wuh each o f Ihc following statements: 
Cetteral Staiemeim I 7 J 4 
\ To get rid o f the sub>SLandarc ships: • • • • 
2. To persuade Dag States to maintain standard ol lhcir ships: • • 
J . To assist in cnsimng the survival o f K'aiionat F*.ag: • • • • 
J To niake Flag of Convenience less amociivc io ship U M n e n : • • • • 
1 o discouratfc chariererv from employing sub-S'jndard sn:ps. • • 3 • 
I 0 Cost and cffcetivenesi o f PSC 
The fol lowing statements refe/ to the cos: and efTeciivencji u f PSC. picasc tick on a scale 1 to i the extent lo wnich you 
acrec wiih tach o f the followins statements: 
I . Tlic cost 01*PSC should be borne b> ull port users: 
r. Tlic cost o fPSC should be borne by sub-standard ships: 
Govemmcni surveyors are more severe and impanial. 
CUisification Societies cnuld be delegated to can> 
out PSC inspection or. behalf o f the Pon S u u : 
5. PSC I m a positive crTcct in rcducin;; marine accidents 
and protecitan o f env:ronmenl. 
a 
• 
• 
• 
Q 
• 
• 
G 
a 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Q 
• 
• 
I C Adverse opinions on PSC 
The toltowina sxatcmcnis refer to same adverse opinions on PSC. piease tick on a scale I to J the extent to which you 
agree with each of the following statements: 
Professional standard of PSC inspectors is not compeiem 
enough; 
Inconsistent inspection scandaid exists among PSC 
tnspenor^ in different countries. 
Too many and too frequent PSC inspections especially 
when ships are engaged in eonttncniAl nadcL 
PSC inspections orten hamper the s.-nooih nmnuic ol 
ihipboard business; 
PSC aciiviiics have suffocated the already low pTofi; 
margin shipping business in some developing countriei 
Q a • • 
• • • • 
• • Q 
• Q • 
• Q • • 
I D Strencths and weaknesses of the PSC acthli lcs 
Pleai< identify the sncngihs and vteakncsscs of the PSC activities, you may cpi the suicmcnis f rom lA to IC. 
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Strengths Weakoesies 
1 
I K Reason(t) for a sub-i iandard ih ip 
Do >ou aiircs :kat ihe following jiaiements aie re:L&<in(s) for n ship to become sub-standard f Plcajc lick )? 
Nu 
1 . The ecoiinmtc siiuauon ol ihc ship's fla^ Si^ie: • Severe compeiiiion in sea transpon which causes iow freight raie; a • 
} . Poor markel situation in sea transpon as a whole: • • a. Poor pcriormancc of ihc ship management company: • a 5 The t>-pe o f a ship which may require extra aiicmion and nuimenancc: • • 
6 . The aije of a ship causes th« ship lo become rusi bucket. • 7 The clastificaiion societ>* used ocmg disrepute. • • 
/ / . Survey on Uie imptlcanou of ihip 
IMraM.* assess Ihc relative imporiai icc of the rolloHing gencnti u i i r l b u i r s in rclut iun lo your own cvaluaiion to ihc 
I'SC ac i iv idc i on ibc impJicoiioii of i t t ip sflfeiy by plucin£ a in ihe relevant h o i l u i n g ibe fo l lowing jcalc: 
K r v f i f Ihr scale: 
I I 
Vcr\ ' Important | Imponaoi 1 Neutra l Not Iraporti t t i t 
I I A Sub-standard Ships 
Tne tollowm^ atmbutes refer to the determinaiior. i f a ship is considered sub-standard, 
importajicc of ihc following anribuics: 
Please assess ihc relative 
Cenerat Aitributcn / 3 4 
1 The condition o f chc ship^ and her equipment. • • a • 
2 The livins and saniiaiion condition on board. • a a • 
r- The dcmonstraiion o f competence of ship's crew. G • • • •i. The combination o f mutli-naiionalitv- of ship's crew • • • 5 rlai* o f a ship which nas a mt*h dtter.itoi: lecord. Q 
n U ShipTurse i log 
To cnluncc the clTcciivcness of PSC. largetine and ;TOint system arc often used by Pon States in i e i ec i in j ships fc r 
inspection. Please assess the relative imponancc o f the followmg airribuics in the ship selection proccss-
l . The age of the ship: • Q • 
2. 'Hiz flag of the ship: • 3 • • 
i. The type ui J i ip (container, oi l tanker e i : . ) : • • Q • 
Tlie size of the ship: • • a Q 
5. The nniionality o f ship's crc\*- a • a • 
d. The classificauon sociei>' used. • • • Q 
II C Punitive Measure 
In your opmion what would be an effective approach to enhance Lie objective o f PSC when a ship is found with scnous 
derlcicncies other wan detention o f the vessel < Please t:ck )? 
Yes No 
Tlie Flag Slate o f the ship should bear the cost o f entire inspcciion. 
Ships under ihc ^ame management company be banned ftom cnicriiig the pon; 
Q 
Q 
a 
• 
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3. Demerits be allocaied i o : n : classiftcaiion socieiv and Flag and results published: 
4. The ship owner 5 underwriters and P & l Club b= immediately info.-mcdL 
5. Ship ou-ner should bear the cosi of entire inspection • 
• 
a 
a 
Oihei measures (Please sratci 
I I 0 Flafi of convenience (FOC) 
Oo you think ihai f l a j larcciir.i: should be conrmcd to ihips flying Oav of conver.iencei Pleiic lick 
• (please io :o ME) ipicasc go 10 I I I ) 
I) E. Plug of convenience * Sub-sundard shipping ' 
II your answer tii question I I D is yes. is « because; 
Ves Nn 
1. Ship s llymir YOC are inoic prone to marine acciucn:; • • 
; Maritime auihoriTy-of FOC arc less capabic o f policing thci: ships propcrU- • a •>. FOC iJiips denote shippinc o f J lower quali:>-. • A. Crew o f FOC ship aic tnadcquziely trained. • 5. Scnous marine accidents tisually invuJvr ship 's flying FOC. • • Other rca5onis>(plca&e s^iiel: 
III. bitck^ruuiiU lit/urmaiwn 
Hea\c provide ihc JoUuwinf; Itt/ormation. 
I . Narr.c of Company. 
.lob tille o f the respondent 
5 . Nature of business of company iplcaac :ick a box i . 
L J !bhipm3nau<r 
• Ship owners 
Q Sh:p agencies 
• Clas>-.ri:aiior. Societies 
Q Hon aax.mistraior 
• Ship brokers 
Z l Man :me law fimis 
3 Ship chanercrs 
3 Marine msurnncc firms 
Your commenis and expcrien::s on PSC inspection o f ships are cordiaII> invi:cd: 
Name o f Respondent (opiionalV 
CAr.taci Tel. No. (oplional): 
Dale: 
e-mail aduressiopiionari 
Think you \er.- .T.uch: 
3 1 0 
